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Abstract
ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) is
an intergovernmental organization for regional cooperation
and integration. Created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, it is currently regarded
as the most successfully operating regional group outside the
industiral world. Like many other regional organizations in
the developing world, ASEAN faces the external and internal
political insecurity, the external economic dependence, the
internal economic vulnerability, divergent nationalisms, etc.
Why has ASEAN exceptionally succeeded?
Contrary to the conventional view of ASEAN, it was
created for mutual security, rather than functional socio-
economic cooperation; it has been active since its creation,
rather than since the 1975 communist victory in Indochina
shocked the region; and it has been governed by the internal
necessity, rather than by the external pressure.
ASEAN's unusual success resulted most fundamentally from
its participants' comprehensive orientation toward not only
economy but also security and community. Starting from their
general but vague commitment, the ASEAN governments gradually
increased their mutual responsiveness to their own need for
cooperation through a flexible use of their informal regional
organization. ASEAN became a vehicle for its participants'
mutual security-seeking combined with their collective
adaptation to a fluid international political and economic
invironment.
The experience of ASEAN illustrates that the study of
regional integration in the developing world needs an
alternative perspective to existing theories.. The domain of
regional integration should include not only the community-
economy linkage but also the economy-security linkage as well
as the community-security linkage. The theory of regional
organizations should be applicable not only to functional
organizations with specific goals but also to loosely-
structured informal and flexible ones. The collective
adaptation of a group of developing countries may be carried
out through the epigenesis of its organization.
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Chapter 1. ASEAN and Regional Integration in the
Developing World
1.1 Problems of Regional Integration in the Developing World
Regional Integration in the North-South Perspective
The North-South problem is doubtlessly one of the most
salient issues in the latter half of this century. Develop-
ment of the South, the most fundamental aspect of the problem,
is not merely domestic concern by each developing country, but
a question of both global and regional politics and economy.
In order to enhance individual economic development and to
pursue collective self-reliance, economic cooperation and
integration at the regional level has been regarded as not only
desirable, but practical.
By the early 1960's, regional organizations for economic
cooperation and integration had already emerged in Asia and
Africa as well as Latin America.1 In 1970, there were a dozen
of such regional organizations in the developing world. The
number of organizations continued to increase throughout the
1970's. Although some turned out dissoved or stagnated, there
are at least thirteen regional organizations operating in the
developing world. 2
The Success of Earlier Theory in Predicting the Failure of
Integrative Practice in the Developing World
Those organizations were created in the hope of over-
coming difficulties which had left developing countries under-
developed. Despite a great hope, those which accomplished
respective goals are-so far very few. A latest comparative
study of regional economic integration programs in the develop-
ing world was based on the recognition that "most of the inte-
gration arrangements in the so-called third world are in a
state of crisis, or indeed in disarray."3 If considered
desirable, such a'regional self-reliance scheme turned out
empirically unsuccessful in many occasions.
However, repeated failures of regional economic integra-
tion were not unanticipated. Already in the mid 1960's, many
unfavorable conditions for regional integration in the develop-
ing world were identified. Even the much criticized original
version of neo-functional theory regarded the success of
regional economic integration among developing countries
as highly unlikely.
Subsequently, based on his investigation of East Africa
and Central America, Nye called attention to the difficulty of
reconciling the politics of developing countries with the
practice of functional integration. 5 According to original
or revised neo-functional theory of regional integration,
economic integration would fail in the developing world. In
this sense, the neo-functional theory was not falsified by most
subsequent experiences. It has been quite successful in
explaining and predicting the failure of regional integration
in the developing world.
1.2 ASEAN: a Case of Unusual Success
As a regional organization of developing countries, the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in
the year when it was pointed out that "many of the general
characteristics of politics in less developed countries are
difficult to reconcile with quiet functionalism." 7 In the
early 1970's that organization was assessed to be at the low-
est level of integration among those in the developing world.8
However, that organization is now, in many eyes, "currently
perhaps the most successfully operating regional group out-
side the industrial world."
ASEAN was established in August 1967 by five countries
in Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand., However, there was no formal treaty
or charter to specify the goal, the program or the membership
of the organization.1 0 The establishment of ASEAN was pro-
claimed by the declaration of the foreign ministers of the
above five countries. Thus, ASEAN's legal foundation was
surprisingly informal in comparison with similar organizations
in Latin American and in Africa.
Even in the founding declaration, neither specific goals,
concrete projects, nor the time table of achievement were
specified. Such vagueness of the organizational objective
made ASEAN appear a more dubious integrative effort. What
was worse, ASEAN neither set up nor announced any plan for the
specific machinery of regional integration.11 The intent to
establish functional committees in the future was declared, but
no concrete specification was given. Thus, with respect to
such vital aspects as its stated objectives and its organiza-
tional basis, ASEAN was obviously inferior to other similar
regional organizations in the developing world, not to mention
EEC.
Moreover, the politico-security factor prevented ASEAN
from looking genuine. For all the five countries of ASEAN
were anti-communist, pro-Western, and deeply concerned with
common external threats.1 2 External threats could make the
ASEAN countries cohesive temporarily, but internal integrative
forces were regarded to be nh:gligible if not absent.
Since its creation, the association has experienced
considerable changes in its activites as well as in its
organizational structure. Such changes will be thoroughly
delineated later in this work, but a short concise summary will
be helpful at this point. The following quotation typically
represents the capsule assessment of ASEAN.
ASEAN's progress toward closer economic cooper-
ation during the organization's first eight years
(1967-75) was disappointing. ASEAN activities dur-
ing this period emphasized the numerous differences
between the five members, and most analyses of
ASEAN's integration efforts pointed to the count-
less obstacles likely to stymie any attempt to
achieve the integration goal. Prompted by the
communist takeovers in Indochina plus the 1974-75
world economic recession, however, the pace of ASEAN
integration accelerated encouragingly during the
last three years. These external economic and
political threats do not guarantee a sustained drive
to integration. Should ASEAN's relations with its
communist neighbors improve, dissipating the five
members' fears of communist aggression, and should
the world economy steadily recover, ASEAN may lose
the motivation to maintain its current drive.
Even if the motivation can be sustained, the prob-
lems that have plagued practically every other
regional integration movement - economic .
20
nationalism, divergent interests, and conflicting
goals - threaten to reduce ASEAN integration
efforts to little more than rhetoric and a plethora
of committees, experts groups, subcommittees, and
working groups. 1 3
In the above quoted paragraph, all the salient factors that
explain the nature of ASEAN are mentioned. In short, the
salient factors widely regarded to have influenced ASEAN and
its members are as follows:
1. The external political threat,
2. the external economic threat, and
3. the internal divergence of interests.
A.s long as.the first and second factors are strong enough
to cancel out the last factor, the above quotation suggests,
ASEAN may continue to pursue integration programs.
Those factors are, in a sense, descriptions of the
situation which the ASEAN countries are still faced with, and
in which ASEAN in now operating. Namely, the ASEAN countries
are anti-communist, and hence they feel threatened by the
neighbor region of Indochina. ASEAN economies are highly
dependent on world market conditions because of their export
concentration on one of a few primary goods. Finally, partly
due to the problems of statecraft associated with their some-
what artificial colonial boundaries, and partly due to more
common problems of nation-building, differences of interests
among the member countries were difficult to harmonize.
21
1.3. ASEAN's Widespread Image and Need for its Reexamination
A Convergent View of ASEAN from Divergent Viewpoints
As may have been realized, the above three categories
of formative influences are partly a relection of the division
of labor, so to speak, in the study of -international relations.
The first category - external political threats - has been
studied mainly by those political scientists who have the
traditional view of the political realm, or the classical
theory concerning the national interest, military strategy and
security. Soon after the creation of ASEAN, the common anti-
communist stance of the member governments was pointed out as
14
a source of their cohesion. The ASEAN region's peculiar
position in the global strategic traingle of the United States,
the Soviet Union and Chine was extensivley discussed in rela-
tion to the ASEAN countries' attempt to adapt changing inter-
national environment.15 As for the achievement of ASEAN, many
believed that politico-security cooperation among the ASEAN
countries was by far the most significant.16
The second category of problems ASEAN has been faced with
- external economic threats - suggests the field of international
political economy. The economic dependence of developing coun-
tries upon developed ones is an oft-told story. As for the
ASEAN countries' economies, "one could gain cosiderable insight
into the external operations of these economies by simply view-
ing them without the 'dependency framework'"17 Although
dominant partners have changed since the 1950's, the ASEAN
countries have invariably depended on Western industrial
22
countries. 18 The activities of ASEAN to cope with economic
dependence began to draw scholarly attention recently.19
Finally, the third category - internal divergence of
interests - has been studied by students of regional inte-
gration and interdependence. As a regional economic organi-
zation, ASEAN was treated very lighly in a comparative pers-
pective.20 As a region, the ASEAN countries had not revealed
evidence of increasing interdependence until the beginning
1970's. While "policy externalization" was pointed out2 2
many expressed pessimism about the possibility of regional
community-building. 2 3
Thus, the regional problems of the ASEAN countries have
been studied from different perspectives. Nevertheless, those
preceding studies have produced convergent almost identical
assessments of the organization. Namely, ASEAN was created
as an organization for primarily functional cooperation.
Interestingly, those who argue for the importance of ASEAN's
politico-security aspects share such a viewpoint.24 Another
prevailing view of ASEAN is that the organization had been
inactive since its creation, and that communist victory in
Indochina in 1975 had so strong an impact on it as to activate
it. 2 5 Another popular view of the nature of ASEAN is that the
organization's first summit meeting in 1976, which was in re-
sponse to the emergence of communist Indochina, redefined
ASEAN as a political as well as socio-economically functional
organization.26 Although there were some dissenting views,
the abovementioned assessment of ASEAN during its first decade
has become substantially a consensus among students of South-
23
east Asian affairs. Consequently, such experts' views have
been widely accepted by non-specialists. 2 7
Cooperation among the ASEAN countries in the last few
years has been obviously much more wide-ranging that the
sporadic cooperation of ten years before. ASEAN's conspicuous
activities have begun to call attention to its regional inte-
gration possibilities.28 Once the majority opinion, a pessi-
mistic view ruling out such possibilities has lost its
persuasiveness. 29 Under such circumstances, it is little
wonder that scholarly interests in ASEAN have grown rapidly.
Need for the Reexamination of ASEAN
In August 1982, ASEAN will be fifteen years old. It
was quite recently, at most six years ago, that ASEAN began to
evoke scholarly interests outside the domain of a few South-
east Asian regional specialists. However, since then, the
attention to ASEAN has been increasing rapidly. It is largely
focused on current affairs, such as the treatment of boat
people from Vietnam, the insecurities caused by the Cambodian
civil war, on-going trade liberalization, Japanese sponsored
industrial projects, etc.30
The increasing interests in ASEAN's current activities,
both political and economic, are by and large based on the
background knowledge of ASEAN provided by the abovementioned
widespread image of the first decade of the organization.
However, that image suffers from severe shortcomings. Speci-
fically, it cannot explain the dynamic process of ASEAN's
development satisfactorily. For instance, why could ASEAN
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have been able to survive if it was inactive? Why could an
inactive ASEAN have been so dramatically activated as to start
immediately a number of substantial cooperation efforts? If
the widely accepted image of ASEAN's experience in the first
decade, then the understanding of its current performance based
on that image may also turn out to be incorrect. It is
definitely necessary to reexamine ASEAN's history with care.
ASEAN was full of political and economic conditions
unfavorable for regional integration. Nonetheless, its start-
ed integrating, and is so far remarkably successful. It is
of course too hasty to conclude at this point that the success
of ASEAN means the failure of the neo-functional theory. It
can be said, however, that ASEAN needs to be
for better understanding and reconsideration of regional
integration theory as well as ASEAN in itself.
1.4 The Theoretical and Comparative Significance of the
Experience of ASEAN
That ASEAN's image was distorted is not unrelated to the
epistemological shortcoming of the study of regional organiza-
tions and regional integration. The experience of ASEAN strongly
suggests that the three major problems pointed out in Section
1.2 are interrelated with one another. Nevertheless, an
epistemological division of labor has caused many scholars and
commentators to make analytically divided assessments of ASEAN.
The employment of one of the three theoretical frameworks dis-
cussed in the last section is insufficient to understand ASEAN
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in its entirety. In order to understand ASEAN holistically,
one needs intimate interfaces among those three distincitve
frameworks of analysis.
In short, the comprehensive study of ASEAN require a
new comprehensive perspective of regional integration that
contains those three existing analystical frameworks as its
parts. Such an alternative perspective will shed light on
the reality of ASEAN holistically.31
The problems with which the ASEAN countries are faced,
namely (1) regional security from external threat, (2) eco=
nomic development vis-a-vis external dependence, and (3)
community building despite internal conflict, are not the
idiosyncrecies for the ASEAN region, but more or less shared
by other developing regions. The strategies which the ASEAN
countries are taking, namely (1) mutual collaboration in
security issues, (2) collective bargaining action against
the developed world, and (3) regiona economic integration, are
not ASEAN's peculiarity either. Those rationales are in fact
adopted, or are regarded to be desirable by most of the develop-
ing countries. But why do they work so well in the case of
ASEAN, and not in others?
It is doubtlessly true that one can learn much from
experiences of failure. One can draw many lessons by examining
cases that result in failure. Unfortunately, it seems also true
that lessons from failure tend to be negative hueristics rather
than positive ones. The examination of rarer successful cases
such as ASEAN to date should be at least as important as, and
probably more important for other developing regions
than, the examination of failed cases. The study of ASEAN
should delineate the conditions and processes that would lead
integration efforts to successful consequences
As elaborated in Chapter 2, an alternative perspective
of regional integration proposed in this study has two aspects.
One is the conprehensive domain of regional integration on
which a group of countries defines goals, and create and oper-
ate its regional organization., The other aspect is the
characteristics of the organization that directly carries out
integration programs. This perspective is constructed gener-
ally enough to be applicable not only to ASEAN but to other
regional organizations for regional cooperation and inte-
grati on.
From the alternative perspective, ASEAN will be analyzed
in Chapter 3 through 6 with respect to ASEAN's formation
process, its organizational transformations, its changing
performance, and its limits and contributions to regional inte-
gration. While rectifying the conventional view of ASEAN, this
study reveals the comprehensive Or;entation toward regional
integration shared by the ASEAN countries and the multi-faceted
development of the organization.
Finally, in Chapter 7, the study of ASEAN is generalized,
and the perspective applied in this work is assessed in compar-
ison with other integrative attempts as well as existing theories
of regional integration. Thus:, this work is aimed at recon-
structing regional integration theory so as to be better
applicable to the developing world on the one hand, and at
studying ASEAN's exemplary case retrospectivley on the other.
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Notes for Chapter 1
1. In Asia, there was the Association of Southeast Asia---
ASA---(established in 1961); in Africa, the Equatorial
Customs Union---UDE---(1959), the Council of Entente---
CE---(1959), and the Customs Union of West African
States---UDEAO---(1959); in Latin America!,, the Latin
American Free Trade Association---LAFTA---(1961), and
the Central American Common Market---CACM---(1961).
2. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the Asain Clearance Union (ACU); in Africa,
CE, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC)
succeeding UDE, the West African E onomic Community
(CEAO) successing UDEAO, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Maghreb Permanent Consul-
tative Committee (CPCM), and the Economic Community of
the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL); in Latin American,
the Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI)
succedding LAFTA, CACM, and the Andean Common Market
(ANCOM); in the Caribbean and the Pacific, the C4ribbean
Community/Common Market (CARICOM) and the South Pacific
Forum (SPF). Dissoved or defunct organizations include
the East African Community (EAC), the Regional Cooperation
for Development (RCD) and the Arab Common Market (ACM).
3. (Pa4aherrera 1978: 73.)
4. (Haas and Schmitter 1964)
5. (Nye 1966; 1967; 1971)
6. (Haas 1971)
7. (Nye 1967)
8. (Sidjanski 1974)
9. (Editorial Note, Journal of Common Market Studies 1979: 2)
10. The aforementioned Pa'aherrera (1978) did not include
ASEAN in his comparative study for the reason that it
was not based on the teaty for economic integration.
11. According to the neofunctional thecry of regional inte-
gration, an important condition for the success in
integration is the strong authority legally granted to
its central institutions (Haas 1958; 1968).
12. Early defense burdens and security concerns often result
in the failure of integration efforts (Deutsch et al.
1957).
13. (Business International 1979:1)
14. (Pollard 1970)
15. (Leifer 1972; 1973; van der Kroef 1974; Chawla et al
1974; Forgensen-Dahl 1976; Wanandi 1977;
Mansbach 1978; Osborn 1978; etc.)
16. (Shee 1977; Wanandi 1977; Mansback 1978; Fifield 1979; etc.)
17. (Wong 1979: 14)
18. (Yamakage 1977a)
19. (Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; Arndt and Gardaut 1979)
20. (Sidjanski 1974)
21. (Yamakage 1977b; Hill 1978.) Attempting to extract common
componenets of interdependence among East Asian, South-
east Asian, and Oceanic countries, (Kegly and Howell
1975) is not quite relevant to the discussion on the
interdependence of the ASEAN region.
22. (Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; Arndt and Garnaut 1979)
23. (Enloe 1977; Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; etc.)
24. (Leifer 1972; Shee 1977; Fifield 1979; etc.)
25. (Jorgensen-Dahl 1976; Shee 1977; Fifibld 1979; etc.)
26. (Shee 1977; Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; Fifield 1979; etc.)
27. Noteworthy exceptions include(Solidum 1974) which empha-
sized the possibility of community formation) (Gordon 1966;
1969) which spelled out internal forces for integration,
and(lau 1976) which ruled out the anti-communist stance
as the source of regional cohesion.
28. Among recent works, (Michael Haas 1979) is most directly
related to this trend.
29. (Leifer 1978; Boyd 1980: 220-223)
30. See each issue of Asia-Pacific Community, the journal that
deals most with ASEAN. There are several articles on
ASEAN in each issue. Also, the Social Science Citation
Index provides information on what are discussed in the
scholarly world.
31. Recently, the study of regional integration regained some
scholarly interests such as (Duffyand Feld 1980) and
Puchala 1981). This work is another attempt to reconstruct
regional integration theory in the course of the study of
ASEAN.
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Chapter 2. A New Perspective on Regional Integration
2.1 Beyond Existing Theories of Regional Integration
Regional economic cooperation and integration among
devloping countries most of which were not successful, have
been studied maily from the perspective of neo-functional
integration theory.1 Such integration schemes as CACM, LAFTA,
ANCOM, CARIFTA-CARICOM in the Western Hemisphere, and as
CEAO, UDE-UDEAC, EACSO-EAC, ACM, RCD in Asia and Africa were
examined in the form of both case study and comparative
study.2
As a result of criticism from outside as well as inside
that paradigm, neo-functional theory has experienced consider-
able modifications. Efforts to revise the theory in order to
better fit the developing world eventually led to the inclu-
sion of many political and economic factors found to impair
quasi-automatic integration processes. They also took
seriously the literature on the political economy of dependence
and the need to de-link regional development from dependence.4
The linkage between inward-looking regional economic
integration and outward-looking dependence rectification was
an important theoretical step. Attnetion to factors imped-
ing, rather than promoting integration, viz., a number of
political, economic and social problems which most of deve-
loping countries are suffering from, was important too. In
this sense, the theory of integration became more realistic.
However, there is still a missing link between the
theory and regional security. ASEAN's success story cannot
be told without serious attention to regional security matters.
Immediatley, those who are familiar with the scholarly contro-
versy between integration theorists and so-called political
realists may quite appropriately ask whether the reconcilia-
tion of regional integration and collective security seeking
is possible at all. 5 If possible, which is the case to be
argued in this work, regional integration theory may need
again *to be reconstructed.
Originally, neofunctional theory paid much attention to
the central authorities of intergovernmental or supranationality
nor technocratic incrementalism were found to guarantee inte-
grative spill-overs. The revision of theory was directed
toward the focus on the political process of inter-participant
bargaining.
Another departure,in this work, from existing theories
concerns the role of international organizations. Regional
integration efforts which I am concerned with are not a mere
process of (dis-) integration, but the directional collective
behavior. They are being carried out by some form of inter-
national organization. It shold be taken seriously again.
In the case of ASEAN, there has been no substantial central
bureaucracy, not to mention supranational authorities. More-
over, the organization seems the arena of the Lindberg type
of collective decision-making process.9 In the needed per-
spective of regional integration, the organizational view-
point and the intergovernmental policies viewpoint should
be combined together, rather than contrasted.
Figure 2.1 shematically summarizes the change of
The Original Version of Neofunctional Theory (the late 1950's - the mid 1960's)
"semi-automatic spill-over of integration incremented by supranational authorities"i ie
internality irreversibility
***criticism and self-criticism***
externality rev
dependence upon
external economic
conditions
IV
ersibility political
integration vis-a-vis
external environment
(externalization)
int ergovernmnental
inter-participant political bargaining
which does not guarantee integration
process
The Revised Versions of Neofunctional Theory (the late 1960's - the late 1970's)
"internally and externally dependent (dis-)integration process of inter-participant politics"
The Deutschean Social
Communication Theory ***criticism and sunthesis in this work***
security communication responsive/adaptive efforts and
orientation
I
organization as a
vehicle of integration
An Alternative Perspective on Regional Integration (proposed in this work)
"integration efforts responsive/adaptive to extra- and intra-regional economic, security
and community issues carried out by the organization governed by participants' mutual
communications"
Figure 2.1. The Pedigree of Regional Integration Theory
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major theses from earlier neofunctional theory to the
perspective to be developed in this chapter.
2.2 The Complex of Community, Economy and Security: the
Domain of Regional Integration
Three Basic Orientations
Regional integration can be described as process or
condition or both.10 And one can ask on the phenomenon, how
high (or low), and how fast (or slow). However, it does not
necessarily take place as functional economic integration in
the beginning, and as political unification ultimately.
Therefore, most fundamentally and most importantly, one has
to ask whither.
Integration attempts or efforts imply the consciousness
of direction. If failed, such a behavior pursues a certain
goal defined in advance. Therefore, the intended direction
of regional integration depends upon the goal setting. The
orientation of integration is thus contingent. With parti-
cular respect to the integration attempts in the developing
world, three basic orientations should be concerned. They
are community, economy and security. 1 1
First of all, the community is, in a purely abstract
sense, the group of people(s) who understand each other
through communication among themselves.12 People(s) who
belong to, or who think they do, a certain community share
common identities as a core of the sense of belonging. The
community is not only based on such a symbolic bond among
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people(s). It is also characterized by a certain way of life.
The orientation toward the creation of a community means,
deliberatley or not, the creation and renewal of common
identities and a certain way of life to be shared by the
people(s) in question.
Such a group of people(s) typically interact among them-
selves for the betterment of their living conditions. They
produce and consume goods and service; they exploit and spend
resources. They also transact with people(s) outside the
grdpp for the same purpose. In general, those activities
constitute an economy. When an economy is based on a common
foundation of transactions, it can be distinguished from other
groups otside of it by a certain boundary. As a unit, a regional
economy is sometimes called a common market. The orientation
toward the creation, renewal and expansion of a regional
economy involves, therefore, the common foundation of trans-
actions, e.g. trade liberalization within the group, common
tariff against people(s) outside, common currency, etc. This
orientation can be directed by some form of synoptic ration-
ality, or by decentralized cost-benefit calculation of alter-
natives.
Both community and economy need to be defended from
fundamental disturbances of any kind. In other words, they
need security: the sense of safety and the promise of well-being
when security is pursued collectively among the group of
people(s) in question, the typical procedure involves
defense against people(s) outside the group. It is directed
toward a common enemy, whether actual or potential. Such
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external defense, presumably linked with military arrange-
ment, is not the only form of the orientation toward security.
Security can be enhanced mutually be the avoidance of heavily
coercive means of conflict resolution within the group. It
may be also enhanced by the invulnerability of the group
against economic disruptions. In other words, threats to
security may exist internally as well as externally, and
economically as well as politically. This point is especially
important to the analysis of the developing world. For
security problems in developing countries often involve inter-
nal threats to political legitimacy, insurgency, economic
underdevelopment, and other internally-rooted factors. Think-
ing of security as identical with external defense is at most
a useful fiction for the developed world.
The group of people(s) can pursue one of three goals
without being based on or pursuing the other two. In prac-
tice, however, some combination of the three basic orienta-
tions is often set up as the goal of regional integration.
Communal identities can be built up around economic bases or
military safeguards. The former can in turn help constitute
the latter.
As the three primary colors can generate the infinite
variety of colors, the three basic integrative orientations can
generate the innumerable types of. integration programs.
Analytically, a certain integration program can be located
somewhere on the spectrum whose extreme ends correspond to a
particular combination of three basic orientations. The
spectrum may be community----economy, economy- security,
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or security- community. 1 3 Although a general theoretical
spectrum is not identical with a specific literature of
integration studiesor a specific group of developing countries,
it may be related to the existing literature of international
relations studies. Certainly, it is helpful to connect the
theoretical spectrum with both exemplary programs and the
literature.
The Combined Orientations (1): Community---Economy
Regional integration attempts are particularly con-
spicuous along with the spectrum of community-- economy.
In fact, most, if not all, of the literature that refers to
regional integration fall onto some points on this spectrum.
Regional community-building is materialized by the
changing pattern of socio-economic and political transaction
and communication among people(s) in question. It is the
central conern of the social communication/control approach
pioneered by Deutsch (1953: 1954) with his associates (1957).
This cybernetic theory of integration primarily deals with
the emergence and maintenance of security-community of people(s).
Because few regional integration schemes pursue political
unification, or the amalgamation of states, in the contemp-
orary world, the notion of the pluralistic security-commun-
ity is more widely applicable than the amalgamated counter-
part.14 A pluralistic security-community is subtler to create
and easy to maintain, whose conditions depend largely on inter-
governmental relations. High volume transactions are not
necessary conditions for its creation.16
The creation of regional economy, the other end of the
spectrum, involves the abolition of barriers of economic trans-
actions across national borders. Economic integration means
the involvement of people(s) in the common foundation of
transactions. 17 Governmental measures to promote integration
allow each countries' market economy to perform more freely
and actively within the region. The theory of economic inte-
gration concerns, therefore, the maximization of economic
gains, the highest of which is often development for develop-
18ing countries, at the regional level. Governments in the
region are expected to reduce intra-regional discrimination,
and to regulate respective economies individually and regional
economy collectively for better performance. In order to en-
hance economic integration, governments and people(s) have
only to agree to follow economic rationality. Theoretically,
the existence of community in advance is not the necessary
condition for the creation of economy.19
However, inpractice, the creation of a cohesive
community and that of a common economy are often pursued to-
gether. As the phrase, socio-economic integration, suggests,
community formation and economic integration are closely
correlated. At least for developed capitalist countries, the
bridge between economic integration and community building
is sometimes constructed. It is thoroughly delineated by the
neofunctional thoery of regional integration.20 The theory's
kernal, the concept of spill-over, can be interpreted as a
semi-automatic mechanism for shift from the orientation
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toward economy to that toward community.
The mechanism did not work for developing countries.21
It was also challenged even in Western European experience.22
In the course of midification, the theory began to emphasize
positive and negative contributions of external factors as
well as intenal political obstacles.2 3 The original emphasis
on inward-looking integration changed to more outward-looking
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externalization. Originally aimed to explain the political
community building with economic bases, the neofunctional
theory was revised continuously until it came to negate the
original premise.
The Combined Orientations (2): Economy----Security
The continuum between economy and security may seem
irrelevant in the study of regional integration, but it
corresponds to a number of practices as will be delineated
below. 2 5
First of all, it should be recalled that the objective
of economic integration among developing countries typically
is not trade expansion per se, but the development of indivi-
dual economy. The creation of regional economy is not the
government's response to private sector's demands to larger
economy, but their initiative's for economic development,
including industrialization. Economic integration in the
developing world is connected primarily with economic develop-
ment problems.26
In the above context, economic integration is closely
related to the secure expectation of future well-being of
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people(s), i.e., security vis-a-vis the prospect of continued
or future economic disaster or maginalization. Here we find
quite different connotations than those of the previous
discussion of the spectrum of community---- economy. Economic
integration and development is a security concern for most of
developing countries.
The need for development is synonymous with the over-
coming of underdevelopment. Because underdevelopment is
regarded as the result of the past colonial rule that imposed
monoculture economy, and of the current dependence upon and
vulnerability vis-a-vis economic performance in the developed
world, economic development cannot be separate from the
world economy.27  In fact, as opposed to individual plannings
for economic development, regional strategy is often adopted.
Such concepts as collective economic security and collective
self reliance are the thematic mixture of the orientation
toward economy and that toward security.28  Regional inte-
gration aiming to reduce dependence and vulnerablility has
practical meanings for developing countries. In this regard,
it is worth noting that neofunctional theory transformed it-
self into a theory deeply concerning collective action and
self-reliance. 2 9
Approaching further to the extreme of security or
external defense, one must realize that the issue of anti-
imperialism is coming up. Threats to the economic security f
for the group of people(s) particularly in the developing world
is called variously such as imperialism, economic imperialism,
neo-colonialism, etc. The essence of threats is the domination
by the developed world, not only by those governments but also
by those capitals. 30 Towards the extreme of security, the
vocabulary and rhetoric becomes all-the-more political so as
to refer to independence, sovereignty, puppet government,
revolution, and so on.
Above discussions on the spectrum of economy--secur-
ity has been devoted to the developing world and its relations
with the developed world. However moderate in the expression,
the analogous discussion can be applied to the developed
world. Here the issue is the recently politicized problem of
interdependence. Its significance is perceived as undesirable
sensitivity and vulnerability of the group of people(s) vis-
a-vis the outside environment.31 Coordination among developed
countries as illustrated by regularized summit meetings is
another manifest testimony of international relations concerned
with the spectrum of economy----security.
The Combined Orientations (3): Security----Community
The central theme along with the spectrum of security
----- community is conflict control, or more precisely, the
attempts to control conflict, externally as well as internally.
The long established practice of such an attempt is military
alliance formation among states. In the traditional balance
of power system, it was believed to be the most important
scheme to prevent attack and to take advantage of power and
security enhancement possibilities. Because foreign threats
arecontingent in nature, the effect of alliance is necessarily
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contingent too. In the context of regional integration, the
foreign threat and the alliance against it have temporary
impact at best, and sometimes work disintegratively.32
Integrative orientation toward security necessitates
more permanent forms of collaboration for security-seeking.
The collective defense arrangement that emerged after World
War II suffice that condition. Like alliance, collective
defense arrangement is directed against the threat from
outside the region, whether actual or potential, whether
present or future. But it involves regular collaboration
among the participant governments and military forces.33
Another form of collective defense is the anti-guerilla
joint operation arrangement. It may be irregular, but is
certainly important for the government of developing coun-
tries. In this case, the external threat exists within the
region. When governments in the region are faced with anti-
governmental forces, they may mutually collaborate to cope
with such disturbances. The neutralization at the regional
level may be included in the category of orientation toward
security. Although it is in non-military terms, it may be
assured by major powers' commitment to non-intervention and
the prevention of attack by other states.
Closer to the community end of the spectrum is collec-
tive security arrangement. It seeks broader security than that
against external threats which is sought by collective
defense arrangement. It prepares against both external and
internal threats. As expected in the United Nations Charter,
conflict control through collective security arrangements
includes the possibility of sanctions directed to any member
country.4
Although the collective security arrangement in the
sense of the United Nations Charter is primarily based on the
military principle to sanction "aggressor" members, orientation
toward regional integration may be also directed to the pacific
settlement of conflict before it escalates to military
hostilities. The pacific settlement of internal conflicts and
the military defense against external threats are certainly
compatible. In fact, there are some instances in the develop-
ing world.3 5
Compared with collective defense, the pacific settle-
ment of internal conflicts is inward-looking and mutually
attentive.It requires the higher degree of mutual understanding.
Now the starting point: orientation toward community. Conflict
management without resort of large scale violence such as war
is the core concept of security-community. 6 The sense of
mutual security is the expectation of peaceful conflict reso-
lution within the group of people(s). The expectation should
be based on past experience and present likeliness. In order
to create and maintain an internally secure community, the
institutionalization of "peaceful change" is necessary.
The Domain of Regional Integration: an Overview
Three basic orientations and their combined orienta-
tions constitute the domain of regional integration. The
practice, goal and possibility of regional integration can be
identified on the domain. With respect to the entity in which
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integration is conceived, pursued or attained, the domain
may be divided into three sub-domains: within a participant
country, within a group of countries/people(s), and outside
the group. With this geographical distiction, the entire do-
main of regional integration is charted in Figure 2.2. The
three basic orientations extend, in the Figure, to three
different directions. Various combined orientations are
located in between. The closer to either axis of the basic
orientations is a certain combined orientation, the more
conspicuously does it include the component of the closer
basic orientation. The location of concrete integrative
programs is approximate, This schematization recapitulates
many of the themes, i.e., interests, concerns, goals, prac-
tices, or possibilities, that are the focus of our concern
with regional integration.
2.3 The Organization: a Vehicle of Regional Organization
Integrative processes may take place without formal
organization. However, much of the contemporary practice of
regional integration we have been observing since World War
II has been facilitated by inter- or supra-national organiza-
tion. Based on fundamental agreements among the participants,
the organization plays an important role as a vehicle for
regional integration. In analyzing the regional integration
attempts, no matter if successful or failed, its organization-
al framework cannot be ignored. 37
On the other hand, political processes taking place among
the countries participating in the organization can neither be
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ignored. 3 8 In fact, except for the supranational body with a
strong central authority and capability, the collectivity
of the participant countries can control their organization.
The needed perspective on regional integration is to treat
the organization in the framework of the inter-participant
relationship. In this sense, the central question is who
steers it in what way, for what?
The Power Structure
Who steers the organization? On the international
scene, it hardly happens that either the central machinery or
the few privileged participants control the rest.39 Usually,
the participant countries want to, and in most cases do, con-
trol their organization. They are also reluctant to be con-
trolled. It is particularly so for new developing countries
which are very sensitive to sovereignty. And we are going to
study an organization consisting of new states.
In analyzing an organization's power structure, the
notion of the collective decision-making system is helpful.
Although different in context, the Lasswell-Lindberg postulate
of decision states (Lindber 1971) provides a classificatory
criterion of international organizations. Problem recognition
is the prerequisite of decision. Both the problem recognition
and decision stages are, in turn, prerequesites of application.
Thus, these three distinctive stages of a decision-making
process take the shape of an hierarchical order.
The lowest of hierarchy is the non-existence of organi-
zation. Under this circumstance, countries communicate and
interact with one another at their own discretion. Such.a
situation can be called "unstructured diplomacy."
An organization being assumed to exist, the lowest level
of its activities is merely information transmission. The
participant countries may mutually consult so as to define and
expand the collective problem-recognition. They may exchange
their views on and may discuss on intra- and/or extra- regional
issues. However, in this type of organization, they will not
make any decisions collectively.
The organization with decision-making function is the
second level. Based on the collective problem recognition,
the participant countries commit themselves to making collec-
tive decisions in the framework of their organization. Deci-
sions may be expressed in various forms such as treaty,
agreement, resolution, declaration, etc. This type of organ-
ization can thus produce decision, but cannot materialize
them. The participant countries are still in charge of
implementation.
Once the participants agree to collectively implement
their decisions, it becomes a unit of action. Within the
regional scene, the organization performs some tasks indepen-
dently of its participants. Externally, it provides its members
with a unit for collective actions vis-a-vis third parties.
Even at this level, the participants are still in control of
organizational performance. In this sense, the organization.
is the agent rather than the actor.
Up to the above third level, the organization is fully
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controlled by its participants. If it is facilitated with
some form of central machinery, this is not provided with
any autonomous power to contro it. As ASEAN has illustrated,
integration efforts can be taken, and concrete measure can be
carried out at this level or even below,
In neofunctional theory, both earlier and later, the
lack of central authority was one of the important obstacles
to regional integration. Inter-participant political processes
were later emphasized to explain the failure of integration.
It is important to recall that such processes taking place
in the framework of organization can successfully carry out
integrative efforts without substantial central authority.
If our purpose is only the analysis of ASEAN, then the
above classification is sufficient. However, many intergovern-
mental organizations have their central machinery. Supra-
national organizations have it by definition. Because such
types of organizations are engaged in regional integration
efforts, it must be useful to expand further the classificatory
hierarchical order of international organization.
From the viewpoint of the power relationship between
the organization and its participants, the supranational
organization can be typologized in terms of the internaliza-
tion of power. Although it can take place before the organiza-
tion becomes, able to perform its actions, such cases are
40indeed rare. Therefore, it can be said that the organization
acquires the capability of controlling performance by and large
after the capability of its performance. In other words, the
types of supranational organization come above the hierarchical
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order of the aforementioned three types of intergovernmental
organization.
It is also important to distinguish two types of power:
power to control itself, and power to control its participants.
Because the latter necessitates the former, they take the
shape of an hierarchical order, too.
Thus., the fourth level of organization carries out its
tasks assigned by its participants, but it has the power of
controlling itself. In may not be independent of its parti-
cipants, but it is autonomous at this level. It can act in
international scene not as the collectivity of its participants,
but as a genuine actor distinguishable from them. As the
organization begins to internalize power, its participants
begin to lose their collective power to control it.
At the fifth .level, the organization can control not
only itself but also its participants. Its performance has
an element of sanction and enforcement vis-a-vis them. In other
words, they start losing their power of self-control, i.e.,
their own individual autonomy. Now, the supranationality
of organization is conspicuous.
Finally, the participants abandon their status as the
sovereign state. Their organization represents them in the
international arena. As individuals and corporations can,
the participants can act internationally. But they are com-
pared to the local government while their organization is
to the sovereign state. According to the Deutschean terminology,
the amalgamation took place although the process was not the
direct merger of sovereign states, but the transfer of power
A Hierarchical Typology of International Organizations
Participant' s
Point of View
New identity with
the collectivity
Gaining new collectivity
at the expense of
independence
Losing control of
organization
Organization's
Point of View
Externally recognized
self-governing entity
Capable of sanctioning
and controlling parti
participants
Acquisition of
self-control
The Level of
Organization
The internalization of power begins to
Collective action on
common problems
Collective decision-
making on the common
problem
take place in the organization above this level
Capable of unified action
on the agreed problem
Decision-making as the
Saggregate of partici-
pants' standpoints
Mutual consultation
the common problem
Discretion based on
sovereignty
on Information transmission
between participants
Non-existence
Forum
Emptiness
0 0 0
Nomenclature of
Organization
Sovereignty
Federation
Autonomy
(Self-government)
Agency
Council
Table 2.1
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from the participant governments to their supranational
organization.
The six forms of international organization briefly
spelled out above can be hierarchically summarized as shown in
Table 2.1. In analyzing ASEAN, we will be concerned with the
lower three levels.
Operational Code
In what way is the organization steered? In particular,
what is the mode of collective decision-making? What is the
conflict resolution procedure that is normatively accepted and
actually applied? This was treated in the literature of neo-
functional theory, from the pioneer Haas (1964) to the revision-
ist Lindberg (1971), as one of the indicators of integration
level. Among the alternative modes of the interplay between
the participants, at some times including the central machinery,
according to the theory, there is a mode suitable to integra-
tion process.41 Their thesis implies that for a successful
integration the integrative mode of decision-making should be
adopted. But the adoption of it neither guarantee the success
nor is desirable in all the cases.
The imposition of collective decision-making is, even
the stage of common problem-recognition, the burden for the
participants. Their individual commitment to integrative
efforts means commitment to bear the burden. Needless to say,
the weight of the burden depends on the mode of collective
decision-making. The simplest mode of it, i.e., diplomatic
negotiation, must be least burdensome. The independent state
is assumed to bear this burden.
With special reference to the developing world, our
major theoretical concern is to find a way, if any, that makes
possible to carry out integrative efforts successfully within
the limit of the tolerable burden for each participant country.
In other words, how can the interplay of the participants
that may not be highly integrated produce the decisions that
will lead them to further integraion in other respects?
Empirically, the case of ASEAN is quite appropriate to
analyse because its inregrative success resulted from exclu-
sively inter-governmental bargaining mode of collective deci-
sion-making.
Why,as in ASEAN, was the least promising mode of collec-
tive decision-making able to promote integraion in the region?
What was wrong in the theoretical argument of neofunctional
theory?4 2 In some cases, ordinary diplomatic negotiation
governed by a rule of consensus may be the only alternative
acceptable to all, How can it realize regional integration?
The more integrative the mode becomes, the heavier the
burden on the participant. Therefore, in general, the parti-
cipant government hesitates to commit itself to more integra-
tive modes of collective decision-making.4 3 Nevertheless,
its burden may be bearable if it brings in comparable or
exceeding rewards, in other respects. When they create a
supranational organization, its participant governments indi-
vidually accept the burden which it will impose on them, i.e.,
the consent to obey its sanctions.
However, new states in the developing world are parti-
cularly sensitive to retain independence and sovereignty, and
consequently they are reluctant to bear the burden of collec-
tive decision-making. Hoping to obtain rewards from regional
integration, developing countries ambitously attempted to
stand its burden. Many integrative schemes failed because each
one contained at least one participant that could not afford
to bear the burden, and the others were not prepared to share
it.
Contrary to the neo-functionalist argument, compromise
on the basis of the greatest common divisor can work well to
enhance integration.4 5 This is more or less the egalitarian
mode of consensus-building. In another respect, it is the unit
veto system of collective decision-making. For if one parti-
cipant strongly objects to a certain point, it will never be
adopted. Based on this rule, the participants finally compro-
mise with one another with a minimal commitment to joint opera-
tions on each point in question.
Admittedly, this mode of collective decision-making has
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shortcomings vis-a-vis smooth and efficient integration.
Nonetheless, it contains elements favorable to regional inte-
gration. And they are particularly important to the inte-
grative efforts taken by developing countries.
First of all, countries do not have to fear the infringe-
ment of their respective sovereignty by other participants of
by the organization. It is relatively easy for them to par-
ticipate in it. The practical right of veto diminishes, if
not completely wipes out, the fear of being dominated by other
participants. Hence, the strong objection to integrative
efforts is unlikely to rise. In the initial years, the pace
of integration must be very slow due to the lack of strong
commitment to it. At the same time, however, tension and dis-
integration are unlikely to overwhelm inter-participant
relations. The more or less voluntary commitment to integrative
efforts, which is protected by the right of veto, will have
the learning effect of making the participants feel more at
ease in collective decision-making, with more trust of their
respective partners, and more benefits from cooperation.
Goal Definition and Redefinition
The last question: for what is the organization steered?
"International organizations. . have formal objectives: these
are invariably spelled out in some detail in the opening
paragraphs of their constitutions, charters or consituent
treaties. Usually these objectives violate the postulate of
flexibility--or vagueness---because national states do not
readily participate in agencies whose goals are not clearly
defined."4 7  This view of organizational goals is exactly what
I will reject in this work. In corollary, I will also reject
the explanatory significance of the concept of redefining for-
mal goals, i.e., spill-over and its auxiliary concepts of
politicization and externalization.
The reason is two-fold. Empirically, the sketch of the
organizational characteristics of ASEAN in the introductory
chapter is clear enough to point out that it does not fit the
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the view quoted above. Theoretically, the rejection is also
suggested by our discussion in the preceding few pages. Heavily
dependent upon the inter-participant political process to
characterize its goals, programs, and structure, such organ-
izations can be called "organizations lacking clear goals."48
The following propositions delineate how goals are
defined or redefined in our perspective of organization.
First, the goal may not be clearly specified. Because the goal
is to be set as a result of inter-participant relations, which
does not assure to assign any specific goals to the organiza-
tion. The creation, existence and survival of the organi-
zation as such may be more important to the participants than
goal attainment.
Secondly, if the goal is specified, the program t'o imple-
ment in pursuit of the goal may not be clearly specified for
reasons similar to those mentioned above. Setting up the goal
in principle is one matter; listing concrete programs in prac-
tice is another.
Thirdly, the goal and the program, or their non-exis-
tence are subject to change over time. The environment changes
in itself; the existence and/or performance of an organization
may change it; changes in the environment may cause changes in
the interests and goals of participants.
Fourthly, the goal and program, if specified, may be
implemented not by the formal structure but by less visible
iTformal structures. More interestingly, some programs may be
implemented by structures, whether formal or informal, which
are desinged to or used to implement other programs.4 9 When
a new goal or a new program is added, and the new structure
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is yet to be set up for that particular purpose, such a
phenomenon may occur. In any case, a priori assumptions on
structure-function conjunction whould be avoided.
Fifthly, in a changeable nature of organization , the
creation of organization is of vital importance to initialize
not only the major characteristics of organization such as
goal and structure, but also behavioral codes and relational
rules of participants. Namely, during the formation process
where prospective participants, not all of which may partici-
pate though, are interacting with one another, precedents are
being gradually established so that they may be referred to
after the organization is founded. If there is discrepancy
between the ostensible goal and the real goal, the formation
process must be most informative to investigate what the organ-
ization is really expected to do by its participants.
The Epigenesis of Organization
The formation and operation of an organizations.can be
thus understood as the interrelationship between the organi-
zation-and its participants on the one hand, and between its
participants themselves on the other. The organization is not
necessarily created as a complete whole, an entity which is
already constructed with certain spedific goals, functions
and structures. Instead, it may be created as a potential
whole, an entity which entails the possibility of future
development in terms of goal, function and/or structure. In
other words, the organization may be analyzed not only from
the performist viewpoint, but from the epigenetic viewpoint. 50
As argued earlier, international organizations, especially
those which are created by governments in the developing world,
may be functionally and/or structurally unspedific, and may
change, whether develop or involute, their own functional
and/or structural characteristics. Such organizations are
presumably better understood from the epigenetic view point.
The formation of an organization with relatively unspecific
characteristics, and its development'i'n some way- or another
is, in a word, the epigenesis of organization.
2.4 Looking at ASEAN from a New Perspective: Research
Guideline and Working Hypotheses
A Guideline of the Study of Regional Organization for-
Regional Integration
To see the regional integration effort more clearly, the
new perspective of regional integration elaborated in this
chapter provides a comprehensive research guideline of the
regional organization for regional integration and/or cooper-
ation.
First of all, formation process of organization should
be the starting point of anaysis. The purpose for which the
organization in question was created should be carefully
delineated on the basis of background and intention of each
participant, which tends to diverge from one to another par-
ticipant, as opposed to the final compromise as expressed
goal of organization.
After the creation, as the second point, the organiza-
tion is still subject to the relationship among participants.
With or without changing the formality, the goal of organiza-
tion is changeable provided participants agree. Therefore, the
transformation of organization with respect to both goal and
formal structure should be analyzed as the resultant of inter-
participant relations.
Third, the activities of organizations should not be
mixed up between different level of characteristics. The
information transmission function and the collective action
function may be based on completely different need and inten-
tion of participants as well as different goal and structure
of organization.
Finally, the consequence of organization's activities,
i.e., the changing level of regional integration should be
analyzed separately from the activities as such. Being a
vehicle, the organization's performance is not the end, but
the means for the pursuit of participant's interests. The
level and pace of integration should be assessed against the
intention of participants.
Because of its exemplary successful experience in the
developing world, ASEAN is to be analyzed from that perspec-
tive. The research guideline described above provides a
quadri-fold strategy of analyzing ASEAN. Namely, the analysis
strategy consists of (1) the formation process of ASEAN
(Chapter 3), (2) the structural transformation of ASEAN
(Chapter 4), (3) multi-faceted activity of ASEAN (Chapter 5),
and (4) ASEAN's impact on the level of regional integration
(Chapter 6).
The Antithesis of ASEAN's Conventional Image
Aside from detailed differences, ASEAN's prevailing image
surveyed in Section 1.3 can be summarized into the following
elements almost comletely:
(1)ASEAN was created as a functional organization for socio-
economic cooperation, the goal of which was a selective,
partial integration as opposed to general economic inte-
gration such as the formation of free trade area;
(2)ASEAN had been inactive in the sense that its activity had
been discerned only in insignificant fields, and had
provided none of the concrete accomplishments;
(3)ASEAN became active in the mid 1970's, and it not only
externalized but also politicized to start substantially
its original goal as well as newly proclaimed goal, which
included conflict management system among the ASEAN
countries;
(4)The most influential cause of ASEAN's activities was the
sweeping take-over of Indochina by communist governments in
1975, as it forced the ASEAN countries to cope with
worsening environments.
In the course of the analysis of ASEAN from Chapter 3
through 6 following the abovementioned guideline, such a
prevailing image of ASEAN will be necessarily re-examined for
the purpose of obtaining its more realistic image. To state
in a simplest way, working hypotheses throughout the analysis
will be the negation of the prevailing image, and at replacing
it with an alternative view derived from the analysis to
follow. More specifically, they are as follows:
(1) ASEAN was not created as a functional organization for
socio-economic cooperation;
(2) ASEAN had not been inactive since its creation;
(3) ASEAN did not become active in the mid 1970's; and
(4) Indochina's fall into communism was not the most influ-
ential cause of ASEAN's development after 1975.
The above hypotheses, or the counter-view of the widespread
image of ASEAN, may be paraphrased so as to be more informa-
tive in terms of the reality of ASEAN.
The positively specified working hypotheses are as
follows:
(1) ASEAN was created as a regional organization for poten-
tially general purposes which would include not only
socio-economic functional cooperation, but also politi-
cal cooperation on such fields as security and external
economic relations;
(2) ASEAN had been active since its creation not only in
functional cooperation but also political cooperation,
and the emphasis was more on the latter than on the
former type of cooperation;
(3) ASEAN became increasingly active in the mid 1970's, with
economic cooperation becoming more important, while the
association kept cooperating in the security field;
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(4) The communist take-over of Indochina did help accelerate
ASEAN's cooperation, but it was not the cause.
These working hypotheses are summarized as contrasted against
the widespread image of ASEAN in Table 2.2. I shall attempt
to corraborate the above alternative views of ASEAN in the
following four chapters.
ASEAN in a New Perspective
While aiming to rectify ASEAN's image as hypothesizing
above, this work also intends to specify ASEAN's significance
in the perspective elaborated in the preceding. two sections.
In other words, in terms of the ASEAN countries' common orien-
tation toward regional integration and ASEAN's organizational
development, the experience of ASEAN and its participants
during its first decade will be explained by the following set
of causal-theoretic hypotheses..
(1)The ASEAN countries had acquired the common orientations
toward not only economy but security and community before
they created the Association. Their orientation toward
regional integration was not functionally specific but
comprehensive. They were concerned with their collective
adaptation to a rapidly changing international environment
on which they vulnerably depended.
(2)ASEAN's organizational characteristics were those which are
suitable to a group of developing countries, viz., relatively
informal, flexible and egalitarian. Provided such charac-
teristics, the ASEAN countries were able to transform ASEAN's
general but potential repertoire into concrete programs.
the Widespread Image vs. the Hypothesized Reality
WIDESPREAD IMAGE OF ASEAN
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Socio-economic
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Political and economic
cooperation
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HYPOTHESIZED REALITY OF ASEAN
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Ambiguous Political and Political as well as
. subsidiarily economic cooperation
economic cooperation
Active Augmentatively
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response to participant's Internal development
need
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Table 2.2. The Contrasting Views of ASEAN:
----
(3)The ASEAN countries' vulnerability vis-a-vis the outside
world directed ASEAN externally. At the same time, their
orientation toward community directed it internally so as
to accommodate internal differences. Corresponding to its
participants' comprehensive orientation, ASEAN's activities
were also comprehensive in the domain of regional integra-
tion.
(4)ASEAN expanded its integrative repertoire because its
participants made commitment increasingly to mutual colla-
boration in the framework of ASEAN. In turn, they committed
themselves to the expansion of ASEAN's repertoire because
they were relatively satisfied with ASEAN's performance,
and recognized its utility for them to adapt themselves
to unfavorable international and regional-environments.
To summarize, ASEAN's development in its first decade can be
explained by the comprehensive orientation in the domain of
regional integration, the suitable organizational character-
istics of ASEAN, and the reinforcing internal logic between its
performance and its participants' commitment to the organiza-
tion. In short, ASEAN seems a good example of the epigenetic
development of an international organization.
To date, ASEAN is one of the few successful cases of
regional integration efforts in the developing world. The study
of ASEAN from the new perspective will not only delineate its
developmental process that would replace its conventional image,
but also will clarify the significance of integrative orienta-
tions in the domain of regional integration and of constructing
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the suitable organizational structure for groups of countries
in the developing world to succeed in regional integration.
The perspective proposed in this Chapter will be a useful one
to understand regional integration efforts in the develop-
ing world and to predict their future.
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Notes for Chapter 2
i. One of the outstanding exceptions is (Foltz 1965) on
West Africa.
2. See bibliography in (Lindberg and Scheingold (EdS.) 1971) 8).
* 3. (e.g., Nye 1971)
4. (e.g., Schmitter 1972; Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979)
5. In this regard, see (Deutsch et al. 1957; Hoffman 1966;
Hansen 1969; Kechane and Nye 1977; Alker and Sherman 1980)
6. (e.g., Haas 1964)
7. (Newhouse 1967; Camps 1967)
8. (e.g., Lindberg 1971)
9. (Lindber 1971)
10. (Haas 1964: 26)
:e.
11. Although this work is devoted to the analysis of regional
integration in the developing world, the relevance of
three basic orientations is not limited to it. As will
be discussed in Chapter 7, they can be straightly applied
to regional integration in the developed world, EC in
particular.
* 12. (Deutsch 1953)
13. Theoretically conca/tvaLe/ Ts the combination of all the
three orientations. The well integrated nation-state is
expected to attain it. The integration attempt to create
a nation-state can be analyzed as the attempt that
includes a number of programs covering all the three spec-
trums. Therefore, the investigation of those three spec-
trums suffices our foal to present the perspective of
integrations attempts.
14. In the last decade, we observed only one case, i.e., the
unification of Senegal and Gambia.
15. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 65-69)
16. For this reason, it seems misleading for the cybernetic
theory to be called the transaction theory/approach.
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17. (Balassa 1961; Tinbergen 1965)
18. The Ballasa-Tinbergen formulation of economic integration
is based on the liveral economic theory, and is applicable
to market economy countries. But economic integration
can, and do as in the case of East Europe, occur among
central planning economies. It is also aimed at regional
economic gains. See, for example, (Kaser 1965), (Wiles 1968).
19. The sense of economic rationality is certainly different
between market and central planning economies.
20. (Haas 1958; 1964; Haas and Schmitter 1964; Schmitter 1969;
etc.)
21. (Nye 1966; 1967)
22. (Newhouse 1967; Camps 1966)
23. (Haas 1967; Nye 1971; Schmitter 1972)
24. (Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979)
25. The clear cut distinction between economy and security has
been under attack, and close relations between them have
been stressed particularly in the context of interdependence.
However, they have not much treated in the context of
regional integration.
26. (Hirschman 1958; Mytelka 1973, etc.)
27. In this regard, the liberal theory (Nurkse 1961; Johnson
1967; etc.), the Marxist throty (Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1974;
etc.), and the non-Marxist dependency theory (Prebisch
1950; Myrdal 1957; etc.) all agree, even though they
value and assess dependence differently.
28. (Nye 1974)
29. (Schmitter 1972; Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979),
30. (Barratt-Brown 1974; Rosen and Kurth (Eds.) 1974;
Nabudere 1977; etc)
31. (Keohene and Nye 1975; 1977)
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32. (Deutsch et al. 1957)
33. NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and Warsaw Pact all are facilitated
with some form of organization which implies close, regular
communication and collaboration among the member countries.
34. While NATO, Warsaw Pact and other collectvie defense
arrangements are legally based on the United Nations
Charter Article 51, the collective security arrangement
is based on Chapter VIII.
35. (Miller 1970; Haas, Butterworth and Nye 1972)
36. (Deutsch et al, 1957)
37. (Sidjanski 1974)
38. (Lindberg 1971)
39. As Haas (1964) argues, international organizations are not*
like the modern organizations that can be understood from
"the rational systemic perspective" (Scott 1981). Allison
(1971)'s Model II (Organizational model) is based on this
perspective. With respect to the characteristics of
international organization, "the open natural systemic
perspective" (Scott 1981) is suggestive.
40. (Etzioni 1963: 413)
41. It is the accommodation on the basis of upgrading the
common interests in (Haas 1964: 111), and the coopera-
tive variable-sum game in (Lindberg 1971: 101-102).
42. I have no intention to attack the desirability of a higher
integrative mode if it does not impose untolerable
burdens on the participants. I am insisting that it
may be necessary to keep the mode of collective decision-
making at a lower level so that all the participants can
bear its burden.
43. In general, establishing the practice of seeking and
pursuing common interests is burdensome. A voluminous
literature on the theory and experiment of the prisoner's
dilemma game illustrates how difficult it is for the par-
ticipant to develop and sustain a situation of mutual trust.
44. Among African countries, supranational organizations such aS
t~e West African Monetary Union have been functioning. They
are, in a sense, the resultant of disintegration from the
level of unified entity under the colonial rule. The
case of EAC is a good example of downward movement on
the hierarchy of organizational level in Table 2.1.
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45. In my opinion,' the minimal common denominator is quite a
misleading application of a mathematical term to a
situation that is more appropriately described by the
metaphor of the greatest common divisor. Both its users
and I want to predicate the mutual agreement only on the
points shared in common. The set of agreed points must
be smaller than any sets of points advocated by parties
invloved. The finally reached agreement may look mini-
mal, but it is actually the maximal set of points on
which all the participants can agree. I am therefore
obliged to use the greatest common divisor.
46. For problems of consensus in the context of regional
integration, see (Haas 1960). On this particular point,
both the neofunctionalist of integration and the classical
theorists of power politics have agreed. The former
argued that, because of that, higher integrative mode
should be adopted. The latter argued, on the other hand,
that, because of that, integration is unlikely.
47. (Haas 1964: 97)
48.. (Scott 1981: 270)
49. Again, the critical point is what inter-participant
relations result in.
50. Borrowing the notion from an eighteenth-century biological
controversy, Etzioni (1963) introduced the distinction
between preformism and epigenesis into sociology. While
he correctly pointed out that they are "mutually exclusive
in the sense that new units are wither institutional
'embodiments' of old functions or serve new ones"(p. 409),
ne connected them mistakenly with the differentiation
model and the accumulation model, respectively.
Originally, the controversy was over whether the embryo
or the germ cell was already functional and structurally
complete, i.e., preformed, or not. The point was,
therefore, not either differentiation or accumulation,
but wither the enlargement of already formed functions
and structures or the emregence of new functions and
structure.
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Chapter 3. Towards the Formation of ASEAN
3.1. The Background of the ASEAN Region: the Configuration
of Diversities That Makes Cooperation Look Unrealistic
The five countries of ASEAN occupy the bulk of
Southeast Asia in many respects. 1 ASEAN's land area is 68%,
its population is 71% in 1977, and its gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1977 is as high as 86%.
Geographically, the ASEAN region can be sketched, very
roughly to be sure, as a parallelogram leaning west-wise, to
whose east and west upper corners are attached two relatively
small but tall rectangulars with approximately the same size.
This figure is in fact 2,000 miles longitudinally by 3,000
miles latitudinally. The equator runs across on the middle
of the parallelogram, whose north-west quarter is occupied
by Malaysia and Singapore,and the rest of which is by Indo-
nesia. The east rectangular corresponds to the Philippines.
Corresponding to.Thailand, the west rectangular is wedged
in the Indochinese peninsula: Burma on its west-side and
Cambodia and Laos on its east-side. The ASEAN region is
predominantly insular,with over 20,000 large and small islands,
and there are only two national borders drawn on the land:
between southern Thailand and peninsular Malaysia, and be-
tween Indonesia nd Malaysia in the island of Borneo. Lying
between the Asian continent and Australia, this insular
region roughly separates the Pacific from the Indian ocean,
but more precisely it provides commercially and strategically
important sea routes inbetween.
The ethno-linguistic configuration is the result of
thousands of years' history involving Indian, Chinese and
Western civilizations and military forces. 2 In the ASEAN
region alone, hundreds of ethno-linguistic groups are
distinguishable, and their diversity is an oft-told obstacle
of national integration of each country.3 Admittedly,
hostilities, insurgencies, resentment, or indifference
have been observed as closely related to ethno-linguistic
differences. However, at the national level, politically
and/or economically relevant groups who have more or less
privileged influences are relatively limited. Such indige-
nous peoples are the Thai including the Laotian, the Malay,
the Javanese, and the Tagalog.5 Peoples migrating from
outside the region especially in this century are several
Chinese ethnic groups who have to use Mandarin to communi-
cate with each other, and Sinhalise and Tamil Indians. While
the Chinese are scattered all over the region, Indians are
mainly in Malaysia and Singapore for the apparent reason
of British colonial rule.
Moderately congruent with the ethno-linguistic character-
istics is religious affiliation. The Thai are Theravada
Budhists; the Indian are mostly Hindus; the Chinese are
plural affiliates with Mahayana Budhism, Taoism and
Confucianism; the Malay are Muslim; many Indonesian people
are Islam-Hinduism amalgam; many of the Philippine people
are Roman Catholic.
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The vast diversity in religion, language and ethnicity
may be considered as the cause of the fragmentation and
compartmentalization of the ASEAN region, not to mention
Southeast Asia as a whole. However, what really matters in
the ASEAN region today is the boundaries of language, reli-
gion, ethnicity, and state hardly run along with one another.
Muslim Malays live in southern Thailand; both Muslims and
Catholics in the Philippines are racially Malay; many
Malay Malaysians have relatives in Indonesia, etc. An
obstacle to national integration is not the ethno-linguistic
diversity per se, but its incongruity with the territorial
configuration.
Western colonialism in the last few centuries added
another diversifying factor of the ASEAN region. Indonesia
is almost completely identical with the Dutch East Indies;
Malaysia and Singapore are former British Southeast Asia;
the Philippines experienced the Spanish and then American
rules. The independence was realized peacefully in the cases
of the Philippines (1946), the Federation of Malaya, the
predecessor of Malaysia (1957), and Singapore (1959 as the
self-government). Those countries continued more or less
close relations with the respective former metropolises
politically, economically, culturally, and militarily. On
the other hand, Indonesia had to fight against Dutch armies
to become independent (1945-49). Under President Sukarno,
Indonesia adopted the policy of anti-colonialism and non-
alignment, and paid more attention to world politics as the
leader of revolutionary independence movement than to less
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dramatic regional relations. Thailand, the only Southeast
Asian state that survived colonization, had been close to
Japan even before it occupied the entire Southeast Asia.
But the Thai succeeded in establishing a very close relation-
ship with the United States soon after the defeat of Japan.
In the rapidly expanding international economic trans-
actions since World War II, the ASEAN region remained
dependent upon industrial countries outside the region. The
trade ties with former colonial rulers were declined through-
out the 1950's and the 1960's. The percentage of exports
from Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore to their respective
colonial rulers were about 20% in 1950, but in 1970 the
figure dropped to about 5%. The United States has been
continuously -one of the major destinations of the exports
from the ASEAN region. For the region as a whole, the
percentage of exports to the United States was about 30%
in 1950, and about 20% in 1970. On the other hand, Japan
rapidly became the region's major trade partner: less than
5% in 1950; 15% in 1960; and 30% in 1970. The ASEAN region,
therefore, was heavily dependent upon its trade with extra-
regional powers: the United States, Japan and/or colonial
powers (Figure 3.1). From those diversified characteristics
of the ASEAN region, one may draw a conclusion that regional
cooperation is unlikely.7 Provided those conditions, did
people(s) in the ASEAN region not find any communality at
all? Why did the creation of international organization for
regional cooperation come to the minds of the leaders of the
ASEAN countries? Then, on what basis was ASEAN created,
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maintained, and even developed?
3.2 ASA, Maphilindo and Confrontation: Paving the Way to ASEAN
ASA (the Association of Southeast Asia)
In general, precedents which are recalled from one's
memory play an important role in decision-making. The mean-
ing and evaluation attached to each precedent enables one
to learn, whether correctly or incorrectly, from the past,
and to associate the past information with the present
situation.
As for Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN was not the
unprecedented experience of regional cooperation. There
had been some lessons from the regional affairs, both cooper-
ation and conflict, prior to the creation of ASEAN. As in
other developing regions where new states were born one
after another, the orientation toward regional cooperation
started in the late 1950's. In that period, regional
cooperation was much in fashion stimulated by the creation
of the European Economic Community (EEC). The demonstration
effect of EEC (1957), and of following UDE (19591, LAFTA
(1960), etc. cannot be ignored to understand the similar
movement in Southeast Asia.
The initiative for Southeast Asian regional cooperation
can date back as early as 1959, when a Malayan Primier and
a Philippine President launched the idea of economic cooper-
ation, independently of each other.
Soon after the independence in 1957, the Federation of
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Malaya led by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (the Tunku,
the title of Prince, henceforth) began to take a regional
initiative. The Tunku's plan was to create an economic
treaty organization of all the Southeast Asian nations.8
On the other hand, Philippine President Carlos Garcia
announced a plan for the creation of regional bloc among
anti-communist Asian countries for economic and political
cooperation. 9
These two plans were confronted with each other when
the Tunku paid an official visit to the Philippines. The
Malayan leader opposed Garcia's plan because its anti-
communistic nature would generate antagonism from many
Asian countries. He preferred a grouping of non-communistic
countries including non-aligned. On the very same point,
Garcia was not content with the Tunku's plan.1 0
The consequences of the meeting of both leaders were
interesting. They agreed to collaborate with each other
for the creation of economic treaty organization to be
constituted by non-communist nations in Southeast Asia.
Stronger commitment to anti-communism and to political
cooperation was abandoned by Garcia. Compromise was reached
at the greatest common divisor of the two plans.11
Based on an agreement between the two leaders, Malayan
and Filipino foreign ministries made contact with each other,
and concretized the idea of an economic treaty organization.
In such a move, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman was
interested, and proposed his alternative in July 1959.12
Thanat's counter-proposal insisted that regional cooperation
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should be as informal and practical as possible, and that
it also should include cooperation in political matters.
Eventually, Thanat succeeded in persuading both Malayan and
Philippine leaders to grade down the legal foundation of
organization from that of a treaty organization to an inform-
al arrangement. At the same time, however, he compromised.
with them to limit its objective to purely non-political
matters. By July 1960, Malays, the Philippines and
Thailand had agreed on establishing an association for
regional cooperation, which was again the greatest common
divisor of the three plansrproposed by respective govern-
ments.13
Those three countries were all unmistakably pro-
Western states. The Philippines and Thailand were members
of American-guided SEATO, and Malaya was indirectly associated
with the United States through a defense pact with the
United Kingdom which was a member of SEATO, too. In order
to evade criticisms from the Eastern Camp that a planned
association was subsidiary to SEATO, three countries wanted
non-aligned countries to join it as founding members.
Despite continuous efforts, especially directed toward
Indonesia and Burma, no non-aligned countries showed inter-
est in joining.
On the other hand, South Vietnam, another pro-Western
state, expressed its willingness to join the proposed
association on such occasion as bilateral meetings of Viet-
nam leaders with Malayan and Filipino counterparts. However,
South Vietnam was asked not to apply for joining until
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non-aligned countries became prospective founding members.
Thus, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand were
approaching non-aligned countries on the one hand to
persuade them to join, and on the other hand they did not
want to include another pro-Western state. Those three
pro-Western countries were trying hard not to commit them-
selves further to their Western Camp in the structure of
the Cold War. Their consensus on not cooperating together
politically should be understood as an effort to -dilute the
anti-communistic political nature of cooperation among
pro-Western countries.
Non-aligned countries were awaited, and the establish-
ment of an association was postponed day by day. However,
in February 1961, on the occasion of Garcia's visit to
Malaya, Malayan and Filipino leaders agreed to launch an
association without non-aligned countries if the Thai
government also agreed.1 5 Thanat visited Kuala Lumpur, and
met with the Tunku who served concurrently as Foreign
Minister and Filipino Foreign Secretary Serano. They agreed
to create an association for economic and cultural coopera-
tion. In June, a meeting of the Joint Working Group was
held, and made the final draft. On July 31, and August 1,
1961, foreign ministers of Malaya, the Philippines and Thai-
land met in Bangkok, and declared to establish the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asia (ASA).
According to the declaration proclaimed on July 31, the
objective of ASA was primarily consultation, collaboration
and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural and
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scientific fields. It was also explicitly declared that
"This Association is in no way connected with any outside
power or power bloc and is directed against no other country."
Thus, the emphasis on its non-political activities was
obviously the message vis-a-vis non-Western neighbor countries.
On the other hand, ASA's main objective of economic cooperation
was left unspecified in terms of programs and projects.
ASA's three paragraph declaration was very short and simple
compared with the founding documents of other organizations
for regional economic cooperation.
On the next day, the joint communique was issued, in
which ASA's organizational structure was specified. It was
to consist of (1) the annual meeting of foreign ministers,
(2) the annual meeting of the Joint Working Party, (3) the
standing committee, (4) functional committees to be set up
as needed, and (5) national secretariats. Corresponding to
a generality of the objective and to the lack of concrete
programs at the outset, the strucutre of organization was
not ready to implement any functional cooperation. ASA was
created only with a decision-making apparatus and supporting
machinery. Although unspecified, the decision rule taken
for granted was unanimity based on consensus building.
Concrete programs and projects were yet to be formalized in
the following months.
It is difficult to deny that the nature of ASA was
ambiguous: its non-political nature was emphasized, but its
economic nature was not elaborated. However, the formation
of ASA paved a way for regional cooperation in Southeast
Asia. During the formation process over two and a half
years, frequent political communication was established among
Southeast Asian countries for the first time. The start of
regional cooperation was for them the start of mutual communi-
cation which is indispensable fofmutual understanding and
trust.
ASA was also the first multilateral entity within South-
east Asia, in which the collective decision rule was unanimity
as a result of consensus building. More importantly, consen-
sus on the greatest common divisor was to become the implicit-
ly established tradition among three ASA countires. When the
network of mutual. communication was expanded to include
Singapore and Indonesia in 1967, the implicit tradition of
consensus on the greatest common divisor was also inherited.
If it was not well facilitated for economic cooperation,
ASA provided its members with a crucual forum for mutual
understanding and trust. There was no replaceable inter-
national arrangement in the region.
Another noteworthy point is that the three pro-Western
ASA countries were seeking for the way to lessen their
commitment to the Western Camp. Even the Philippines, the
state most dependent on the West, had adopted that policy
by 1960 as a means to de-link with the United States and
to identify itself with Asia. The ASA countries wanted
non-aligned countries to join the group for the obvious
reason that they would make the group less pro-Western. ASA
took the form of a functional organization for economic
and social cooperation. The three member states emphasized
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its non-political nature. However, such an attitude should
not be interpreted as their objective was apparently econom-
ic. In the Bangkok Declaration, more specific goals and/or
programs whould have appeared perhaps with a time table.
De-emphasis of politics in ASA can be understood in the
context of a disengagement policy vis-a-vis the East-West
confrontation. Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines attempted
to evade criticism from non-aligned neighbor countries, and
from communist powers. The ASA countries related ASA with
their economic development which was believed to be an
effective way of fighting with domestic destabalizing factors,
notably communist insurgency. If not ostensible, functional
cooperation in economic and social fields was regarded as
a means to serve a higher political goal. A severe interna.-
tional environment forced the ASA countries to downplay the
orgranization's political nature.
ASA's concrete programs took shape in the following
months. An express train service was started in 1962 between
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. A million dollar contribution
from each member resulted in the ASA fund in 1963. If every-
thing had been all right, ASA might have strengthened function-
al cooperation among members. As in the case of other region-
al organizations in the developing world, obstacles to ASA's
development came from an unexpected direction. That is, a
territorial dispute between members of organizationl.
In the same year as ASA was created, the independence
of British Borneo (Sabah, Srawak and Brunei) was begun to
be discussed. Great Britain and its former colony, the
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Federation of Malaya, announced a plan to integrate Malaya,
Singapore and British Borneo into a single state. Under
this circumstance, the Philippines suddenly claimed its
sovereigny over Sabah on the basis of pre-colonial rule of
a Sultanate. Although relations between Malaya and the
Philippines worsened, they agreed on the principle of mutual
consultation, and ASA kep operating. However, a unilateral
declaration of the establishment of Malaysia in September,
1963 was followed by rupture. In consequence, ASA stopped
working.16
However, ASA was not dissolved, Both Malaysian and
Philippine governments expressed no intention of withdrawal
or dissolution. The normalization between the two countries
was realized in 1966 as will be-discussed later in relation
to the formation of ASEAN. ASA was soon activated, and had
the first meeting of foreign ministers in the previous three
years in August, 1966. In the following year, ASEAN was
established, and it absorbed ASA'a projects.
Maphilindo
The plan to integrate British Southeast Asia into an
independent state, the Malaysian Plan, triggered another
plan of regional integration which resulted in the formation
of Maphilindo. Maphilindo, which existed for barely two
months, was a loose consultation (mushawarah in Malay languages)
system of three Malay nations, i.e. Malaysia, the Philippines
and Indonesia . It can be said that Maphilindo was created on
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the basis of Pan-Malay sentiments shared by Malay peoples
living in those three countries. However, it was based less
on such an emotional tie than on the strategy of both Indo-
nesia and the Philippines to intervene in Malaya's plan to
create Malaysia.17 Therefore, when the establishment of
Malaysia was announced ignoring the objections by Indonesia
and the Philippines, Maphilindo automatically vanished.
Although short-lived, Maphilindo had some significant
implications with respect to regional cooperation and inte-
gration to come. First of all, Indonesid participated in
a regional scheme. Indonesia under Sukarno had been acting
more as a global power representing the non-alignment move-
ment than as a regional actor. A dispute in neighborhood
involved Indonesia in regional affairs. It took efforts
to establish mutual consultation with smaller neighbor
countries on the principle of equal partnership, rather than
as their leader.1 8
Second, non-aligned, anti-Western Indonesia formed a
regional group with more or less aligned, pro-Wester coun-
tries such as Malaya and the Philippines. Indonesia under
Sukarno had not only been a leader of the non-alignment
movement, but had also shown both strong distaste for
American and British ",neocolonialism" and sympathy to
communism. Nonetheless, Maphilindo proved that Indonesia
could cooperate with a member of SEATO and with an agent of
the British "neocolonial" plan of Malaysia. On the other hand,
both Malaya and the Phlippines showed flexibility that they
were "(i)nspired...by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity
forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955,'"19 and that they
agreed that foreign bases in their territory was temporary
in nature.2 0  Thus, differences in foreign policy were over-
ridden by the necessity of showing mutual cooperation.
In mid 1963, there were two trinagles of regional
cooperation in Southeast Asia: Malaya-the Philippines-
Thailand, and Indonesia-Malaya-the Philippines (Fig. 3.2).
Except for Singapore which was yet to become independent,
all the ASEAN countries were involved in regional coopera-
tion. The only missing direct communication tie was that
between Indonesia and Thailand.
Indonesian Confrontation and Aftermath
Consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak,
Malaysia declared its independence in September, 1963. The
formation of Malaysia had disastrous impacts upon insular
Southeast Asia. First of all, it destroyed a delicate
balance of regional cooperation between Malaya on the one
hand, and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other, which
had been created in the previous month.: Second, the rupture
between Malaya and the Philippines paralysed ASA, which had
just initiated concrete forms of cooperation. Finally,
Indonesia adopted a "Crush Malaysia".policy of controntation,
which caused an almost three-year armed conflict against
British-supported Malaysia. 21 Interestingly, ASEAN is located
on the extended line of this turmoil in insular Southeast
Asia. In other words, the formation of ASEAN and the
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rapprochement in the region are difficult to discuss
separately. In fact, those two processes were intertwined
as will be discussed below.
Indonesia's internal political turmoil beginning at the
end of September 1965 resulted in the military take-over
of government in the next March. Under the new anti-Chinese
and anti-communist leadership of Suharto,'1 Indonesia started
to rebuild a more favorable regional environment. Although
representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia had been meeting
before Suharto took power, new Foreign Minister Adam Malik
made contacts with Philippine and Thai counterparts, seeking
the normalization of dipolomatic relations with Malaysia.
In a series of negotiations, both direct and indirect, Indo.
nesia assured that it would stop confronting against Malaysia.
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who had been trying to
mediate adversaries on several occasions since the end of
1963, finally succeeded in hosting a meeting between Malay-
sian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Adam Malik
in the end of May, 1966,, at Thanat's house in Bangkok. In
August, Razak and Malik signed an agreement on the normali-
zation of dipolomatic relations between those two countries. 22
In the course of his mediation, Thant established a strong
communication channel with Malik, which would play an impor-
tant role in the creation of ASEAN.
As for the Philippines, consular relations with Malaysia
revived in 1964 due to criticisms at home. Also, Sukarno's
further inclination to communism caused distrust and fear in
the Philippines. The new President Marcos desired to restore
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full diplomatic relations, but Sukarno strongly opposed
Marcos' move, and succeeded in postponement. However, since
Sukarno's fall in March, 1966, the Philippine government
proceeded with rapprochement on the one hand, and served to
mediate between Indonesia and Malaysia on the other. Rela-
tions with Malaysia normalized in June, 1966. In the course
of rapprochement, ASA resumed its activities, and in March
the first ASA meeting since April, 1963 was held in Bangkok.
In mid 1966, as a result of the end of Indonesian
confrontation against Malaysia, another triangle of communi-
cation channel, i.e. Thailand-Indonesia-Malaysia, was present
in the region. In addition, a triangl6 of ASA was reactivated.
Although Maphilindo was scarcely heard of again, a triangle
of three Malay states was again collaborative (Fig. 3.3).
3.3 The Formation of ASEAN
Participants' Motives and Their Negotiations with One Another
It was Thanat who took the first step toward ASEAN. On
the occasion of peace talks in his house in the end of May,
1966, Thanat asked Malik if it was possible for Indonesia
to join a new regional organization, and received an affirm-
ative answer. Malaysia's response was quick. Within a month,
the Malaysian government suggested that the most important
issue was not ASA's survival, but Indonesia's participation
in regional cooperation. In August, Malik and ASA foreign
ministers met each other, and they agreed on the creation
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of a new organization in which Indonesia would participate,
and on the draft-making by Indonesian and Thai foreign
23
ministries. 23
Later in that year, a "Draft Joint Declaration" of
privately-called South-East Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SEAARC) was sent from Bangkok to Jakarta, Manila
and Kuala Lumpur.24 This document, "a careful and conscious
melding of the purpose of ASA with much of the style and
flavor of MAPHILINDO"25 was doubtlessly based on two prece-
dents of regional cooperation in which Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand had been involved. With some
changes in phraseology, that Draft would become the declara-
tion of establishing ASEAN.
Since taking office as Foreign Minister in 1.959, Thanat
Khoman had been advocating not only economic but also politi-
cal regional cooperatiom among both pro-Western and non-aligned
countries. For him, regional cooperation was to be pursued
for the purpose of avoiding domination by outside powers and
of ameliorating the underrated status of Southeast Asia. In
order to realize cooperation, conflict and distrust should
turn to stability and mutual trust, which was a reason why
Thanat was eager to mediate the territerial conflict between
Malaysia and Indonesia. On the one hand, Thailand committed
to the Vietnam War, but on the other it was seeking the way
of decreasing committment to the East-West confrontation.
In this sense, non-aligned Indonesia's participation in
regional cooperation was most welcomed. Advantage should be
taken of the change in Indonesia's foreign policy under
87
Suharto. Thanat did not hesitate to replace ASA by a new
organization in order to include Indonesia.
For Indonesia under Suharto, participation in regional
cooperation had three advantages. First, it would ameliorate
the international environment which had been devastated by
Sukarno's confrontation policy. Second, it would serve the
new guidelines of foreign policy pursued by the new regime
as opposed to Sukarno's pro-communist foreign policy. Third,
it would help the country show its peaceful and friendly pos-
ture toward neighbor countries. On the other hand, Indonesia
had been accusing ASA for the reason that it had consisted of
pro-Western countries. In order to keep its foreign policy
consistent with the previous exercise, and in order to main-
tain legitimate non-alignment, it was practically impossible
for Indonesia to join ASA. The dilemma of participating
in regional cooperation without joining ASA could not be
solved but by the creation of a new organization which was
compatible with Indonesia's non-aligned policy. In this
sense, it was very much in favor of Indonesia that Thanat's
draft for SEAARC contained almost identical phrases with those
in Maphilindo documents. Furthermore, the military preferred
more pro-Western policy for regional security against communism
than the policy Malik and his foreign ministry was pursuing.26
As itsquick response illustrated, Malaysia welcomed
Indonesia's willingness to join regional cooperation.
Hostilities with Indonesia taught Malaysia its vulnerable
position in the region, the difficulty of ignoring Indonesia's
stands, and the importance of maintaining good-will relations
with it. An important leader had a different view, however,
The Tunku, Malaysian Premier, was suspicious of the Suharto
government's detente policy, and was afraid of the revival of
Sukarno with his confrontation policy. Thus, he was against
not only rapprochement with Indones;ia, but also the creation
of a new organization with it. As a founder, the Tunk-u was
attached to ASA, and insisted that Indonesia should express
its good-willbyjoinng ASA. Thanat, co-i'ounder of ASA, had
not succeeded in persuading the Tunku that the proposed
organization was substantially expanded ASA until May, 1967.
Otherwise, Malaysian leaders put the highest priority on the
establishment of cooperative relations with Indonesia. In the
course of rapprochement with it, the Tunku lost his considera-
ble influence on foreign policy. It was they, rather than the
Prime Minister, who steered the country toward the formation
of ASEAN.
In order to counterbalance its dependence on the United
States, the Philippines had been seeking for the way to
identify itself with Asia. Two successive leaders had been
heavily committed to creating regional organizations, i.e.,
ASA and Maphilindo respectively, for the purpose of establish-
ing Asian regional identity. It was then Marcos' turn.
Instead of getting involved in organizations previous admini-
strations had been committed to, he wanted to launch his
organization, and proposed Asian Forum, in September, 1966
when he visited the United States. Although ASEAN did not
spring from Marcos' proposal, the involvement in the creation
of a new organization meant,domestically,the triumph of
Marcos' diplomacy, which would increase his prestige at home.
When ASA was founded, Malaya, the Philippines and Thai-
land failed to persuade any non-aligned countries to join it.
Their desire to cooperate together with non-aligned countries
was satisfied with the participation of Indonesia, a prolonged
leader of
Indonesia
zation.
countries
Intake of
Draft was
efforts t
grouping.
countries
until the
non-alignment. For the ASA countries, welcoming
was more essential than the continuance of organi-
As for Indonesia, cooperation with pro-Western ASA
should not meanclits abandonment of non-alignment.
phrases of Maphilindo documents into the SEAARC
not enough. With the support of Thanat, Malik took
;o add some non-aligned countries to the prospective
Malik had been trying to have other non-aligned
in the region, Cambodia and Burma,. join in vain
end of May, 1967. At worst Malik hoped to persuade
them not to denounce his country or his scheme. At this
stage, it became probable for new-born, non-aligned Singapore
to join regional cooperation. Eventually, both Malaysia and
the Philippines agreed with Indonesia and Thailand to invite
Singapore as a founding member.
When Malaysia was formed in 1963, Singapore integrated
itself with the new federation. However, in 1965, the Tunku
persuaded Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew to separate his
state from Malaysia. The withdrawal from Malaysia left
Singapore alone between the two much larger neighbors
confronting with each other. In a stormy sea of Southeast
Asia, a small island country was forced to sail out. Announ-
cing the pursuit of a non-aligned policy, Singapore had to
manage to survive in difficult situations under Indonesia's
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confrontation policy. Furthermore, this Chinese-predominant
country needed to identify itself with Southeast Asia, and
to wipe out its imageofa. third China. For the Chinese minor-
ity was the source of domestic tension, especially in Indone-
sia and Malaysia, and China was the source of external threat
for Southeast Asian nations. As Indonesia abandoned confronta-
tion, and started cooperating with Malaysia, it was crucial
for Singapore to establish good-will relations with them.
When they were about to launch a regional organization,
Singapore had no other choice but to go along with them.
Also, participation in regional cooperation would help it
establish its identity with the region rather than with
China.
ASEAN's Goal and Structure: Inheritance from ASA and
Maphilindo
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand agreed in principle to the establishment of a new
regional organization, and foreign ministers of the five
countries convened at Bangsaen, a seaside resort of Bangkok,
from August 5 to 7, 1967. What goal did they assign to the
new organization? How did they design the new organization?
As briefly mentioned above, the proposed organization
as SEAARC was to have almost identical purpose and aims, and
structure with those of ASA. At the meeting no one seemed
to have objections to the draft. As if organization's
objective and structure were not important, no serious
discussion on those subjects was reported. As a matter of
fact, it is quite easy to trace the Bangkok Declaration of
ASEAN back to the Bangkok Declaration of ASA, in terms of its
organizational goal (Table 3.1). The structure which was
spedified in the ASEAN Declaration is identical with that
specified in the joint communique of ASA's founding meeting
(Table 3.2). Thus, as far as the organization as such is
concerned, ASEAN can be said to be the extension of ASA.
Even so, ASEAN was a new organization, and this fact must
have satisfied Indonesia. Perhaps for the three ASA countries,
it must have not mattered.
Not only with respect to the objective and structure,
but also with respect to the manner to launch the organiza-
tion, ASEAN was difficult to distinguish from ASA. The
SEAARC Draft took the form of a joint declaration to esta-
blish the organization by foreign ministers, basically
following the pattern of the foundation of ASA. It indicated
that Malik accepted Thanat's preferred informal and practical
procedure concerning the prospective regional cooperation.
Needless-to-say, Malaysia and the Philippines which had
already accepted such a form at the inception of ASA, must
have had no objection to the Thanat proposal in that regard.
ASEAN was consequently established on August 8, 1967 by
Bangkok Declaration of foreign ministers from the five coun-
tries. 2
Thus, it is undeniable that ASA was an influential prece-
dent. Through the SEARRC Draft co-authored by ASA's co-founder
Thanat, ASEAN was born as another ASA.25
The Comparison of ASEAN with ASA: Purposes
Bangkok Declaration of ASA (1961)
We do hereby declare:
First, the establishment of an associa-
tion for economic and cultural cooperation
among the countries of Southeast Asia to be
known as ASA---Association of Southeast Asia.
Second, that the aims and purposes of the
Association shall be:
1. To establish an effective machinery for
friendly consultations, collaborations
and mutual assistance in the economic,
social, cultural, scientific and admini-
strative fields;
3. To exchange information on matters of
S common interests or concern in the economic,
cultural, educational and scientific fields;
2. To provide educational, professional, techni-
cal and administrative training and research
facilities in their respective countries
for nationals and officials of the associated
countries;
5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collabo-
ration in utilization of their respective
natural resources, the development of their
agriculture and industry, the expansion of
their trade, the improvement of their trans-
port and communication facilities, and gener-
ally raising the living standards of their
peoples;
6. To cooperate in the study of the problems of
international commodity trade;
Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN (1967)
We do hereby declare:
First, the establishment of an Association
for Regional Cooperation among the countries
of South-East Asia to be known as the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Second, that the aims and purposes of the
Association shall be:
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual
assistance on matter of common interest
in the economic, social, cultural, technical
scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the
form of training and research facilities in
in educational, professional, technical
and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the
greater utilization of their agriculture
and industries, the expansion of their trade,
including the study of the problems of
international commodity trade, the improve-
ment of their transportation and communica-
tion facilities and the raising of the
living standards of their peoples;
0· 0 S0
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Table 3.1 (continued)
4. To cooperate in the promotion of Southeast
Asian studies;
7. Generally, to consult and cooperate with
one another so as to achieve the aims
and purposes of the Association, as well
as to contribute more effectively to the
work of existing international organi-
zations and agencies;
Third, that this Association...is
essentially a free association of Southeast
Asian having as its objective the promotion,
through joint endeavor, of the well-being and.
the economic, social and cultural progress of
this region.
6. To promote South-East Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and beneficial coopera-
tion with existing international and
regional organizations with similar aims
and purposes, and explore all avenues
for even closer cooperation among
themselves;
1. To accelerate the economic growth,social
progress and cultural development in the
region through joint endeavours in the
spirit of equality and partnership in
order to strengthen the foundation for
a prosperous and peaceful community of
South-East Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability
through abiding respect for justice and
the rule of law in the relationship
among countries of the region and adher-
ence to the principles of the United
Nations Charter;
0( 0 0 0 0
Table 3.2 The Comparison of ASEAN with ASA:
ASEAN at the outset (1967)
Annual Meeting of the Foreign Ministers
by rotation
Standing Committee
composed of the foreign minister of the
host country as the chairman, and of the
ambassadors residing there
National Secretariat
set up in each member
Permanent and Ad Hoc Committees
to be set up as needed on specific subjects
Joint Working Party Meeting
to prepare for the annual meeting of
foreign ministers
Annual Meeting of the Foreign Ministers
(ASEAN Ministerial Meeting) same as left
Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers
Standing Committee
same as left
National Secretariat
same as left
Permanent and Ad Hoc Committees
same as left
- no corresponding machinery-
Source: ASA - The Joint Statement by the ASA Foreign Ministers on August 1, 1961
ASEAN - The Bangkok Declaration on August 8, 1967
00 0 0 0
ASA at the outset (1961)
Organization Structure
0 0 0 0 0
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What about the "flavor of MAPHILINDO"? It was the
mutual responsibility for the maintainance of the stability
and security of the region, and the temporary nature of
foreign bases, both of which were explicitly mentioned in the
SEAARC Draft as a virtual repetition of the Manila Declara-
tion of Maphilindo.27 The inclusion of those phrases, which
unmistakebly conveyed political implications, was partly a
result of Thanat's compromise with Indonesia's attachment to
non-alignment in order to assure its participation in regional
cooperation. More importantly, however, it cannot be over-
looked that Thanat had been inclined to enhance the political
solidarity of the region vis-a-vis outside powers, and to
disengage the region from the East-West confrontation. It
seems that Thanat utilized, rather than compromised with,
Indonesia's traditional non-alignment and its manifestation
in Maphilindo.
Although this phraseology appeared only in the preamble,
it caused some controversy at the Bangsaen meeting. To some
extent, the countries other than Indonesia and Thailand had
objections to the non-alignment oriented political clauses.
If ASEAN had been created a few months earlier, the controversy
would have been harsh. For, in July, 1967, the prospect of
regional security shifted completely. That is, Britain pub-
lished the plan to withdraw its troops from Southeast Asia by
the mid 1970's.30
Malaysia and Singapore, both of which depend upon the
Commonwealth, especially British, troops for the defense.
Without military supports by the United Kingdom, Malaysia
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might have been unable to survive under Indonesian hostilities
a few years before. Both Malaysia and Singapore were aware
of the importance of foreign military presence for their
national security, and also aware of the importance of regional
stability and security. Foreseeing the withdrawal of British
troops, they were forced to find another way to national
security on the one hand, but on the other hand they had no
reason to keep opposing the temporary nature of foreign bases.
Particularly, Malaysia began to seek for regional stability
and security rather than national security dependent on the
outside powers.
The Philippines:' eagerness to promote regional coopera-
tion in the early 1960's was associated with its anti-American
nationalism, which eventually caused Macapagal's loss of
Presidency. His successor, Marcos, tried to balance the
country's dependence on the United States with the promotion
of regional cooperation. In that context, the Philippines
was against the new organization's committing itself to a
strong posture of anti-outside power, although it had signed
the Manila Declaration under the previous administration.
Five foreign ministers gathering at Bangsaen finally
reached a compromise. The Philippines accepted the inter-
pretation that the phrases in question were a general purpose
which it was unnecessary to implement or realize in the
foreseeable future. The phraseology was toned down to the
extent that the most opposed country, the Philippines, was
able to accept. In consequence, some phrases were added so
as to dilute a strong political committment to non-alignment
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and collective security as appeared in the SEAARC Draft.
Nonetheless, phraseology of Manila Declaration was easily
discernable in the declaration of ASEAN (Table 3.3).
The last issue of controversy at the Bangsaen meeting
was the name of the new organization which had been privately
called SEARRC. It was the Philippines, or perhaps its repre-
sentative, Foreign Secretary Ramos who was opposed to SEAARC
for the reason that it resembled "shark." As proposed by
Malik, ASEAN was finally adopted as the name.
ASEAN inherited much of its organizational goal and
structure from both ASA and Maphilindo. The influence of the
precendents cannot be ignored or overlooked. Indeed, ASEAN
inherited the operational code, too. During the formation
process of ASA, Maphilindo and ASEAN, the consensus rule
became the region's established practice of collective deci-
sion-making. Although consensus was of course the result of
negotiation and bargaining, the ASEAN countries had adopted,
if implicitly, the greatest common divisor as the basis of
consensus. They preferred the consensus or unanimity rule
which finally emphasizes the agreement by all the participants
to the majority rule which inevitably divide between winners
and losers. At the expense of probable efficiency, they
adopted a more subtle way of collective decision-making
operational code.
The five foreign ministers moved to Bangkok, and held
the inauguration meeting of ASEAN on August 8, 1967. It was
the very next day that they agreed on (1) the creation of
ASEAN, (2) its founding declaration, and (3) the country to
Table 3.3 The Comparison of ASEAN with Maphilindo:
Manila Declaration of Maphilindo (1963)
Convinced that their countries...share
a primary responsibility for the maintenance
of the stability and security of the area
from subversion in any form or manifestation
in order to preserve their respective national
identities and to ensure peaceful development
of their respective countries and their region
in accordance with the ideals and aspirations
of their peoples;
Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN (1967)
Considering that the countries of South-
East Asia share a primary responsibility
for strengthening the economic and social
stability of the region and ensuring their
peaceful and progressive national develop-
ment, and that they are determined to
ensure their stability and security from
external interference in any form or
manifestation in order to preserve their
national identities in accordance with the
ideals and aspirations of peoples;
Joint Statement on August 5, 1963
(Agreeing) that foreign bases-temporary
in nature-should not be allowed to be used
directly or indirectly to subvert the national
independence of any of the three countries.
Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary
and remain only with the expressed concur-
rence of the countries concerned and are
not intended to be used directly or indirectly
to subvert the national development;
0 0 0 0
Political Intent
0 0 0 0
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host the next foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta. In
Bangkok, they signed the ASEAN Declaration, and announced
its establishment. They pointed out tourism, shipping and
fisheries as likely fields of cooperation at the outset.35
3.4 ASEAN's Comprehensive Orientation in the Domain of
Regional Integration
Shared Perception of the Urgent Need for Mutual Security
But for Indonesia's abandonment of confrontation and
change in its leadership, the formation of ASEAN would have
been unfeasible. At the same time, however, the confronta-
tion policy imprinted on its neighbor countries the vital
importance of Indonesia, in particular its destructive poten-
tial. For neighboring countries, the establishment and
institutionalization of a good-will relationship with Indo-
nesia was recognized as the crucial prerequisite of their
own security. Thus, the unmet desire to include non-aligned
countries in regional cooperation of the ASA countries was
redirected toward the largest and the most influential non-
aligned country in the region. Moreover, during the confron-
tation and in the course of Indonesia's attempts to ameliorate
relations with its neighbors, the missing link of communication,
Indonesian-Thai linkage, was established. Particularly,
personal relations between foreign ministers, i.e. Malik and
Thanat, were most important. For the formation of ASEAN was
all-the-way guided by those key people who closely collaborated
with each other. Those consequences being taken into account,
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it can be said that both Indonesia's confrontation and its
abandonment made possible the formation of ASEAN. The keen
attention to the need for mutual security was a new conspicuous
element of common recognition anomg the ASEAN countries,
which had been shared neither in ASA nor Maphilindo.
The ASEAN countries had to reduce, if not eliminate,
mutual distrust before they could start cooperation. Mutual
security and responsiveness was missing among them. Being
the highest priority of the five countries, the need for
mutual confirmation of friendly policy vis-a-vis one another
was clearly mirrored by the ASEAN Declaration. Phrases which
never appeared either in the Bangkok Declaration of ASA or
in the Manila Declaration of Maphilindo are underlined in the
following quotations. "Mindful of the existence of mutual
interests and common problems among countries of South-East
Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the
existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation," and
"to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the
spirit of equality and partnership...the Association represents
the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind
themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through
joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their people and for
posterity the blessing of peace, freedom and prosperity "3
On the other hand, little concern with the concrete
goal, program, project, or schedule was also easily recog-
nizable in the Declaration. As spelled out, the aims and
purposes of the Association were all general guidelines for
future cooperation, and no machinery was set up for functional
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cooperation which was supposed to be the essence of coopera-
tion within the framework of ASEAN. Such characteristics of
the Declaration can be said to have neatly corresponded to
what the participant countries had in their minds.
ASEAN's Orientation toward Community
Although concrete programs were unspecified in the
Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN countries' common orientation
toward regional intergration was observable. First of all,
their orientation toward community is obvious, in spite of
it being usually overlooked or regarded as very dubious.
They did not hesitate to express their fundamental concern
with community-building. However, it is difficult to take
for granted literally that they are "already bounded together
by ties of history and culture." 37 In fact, provided the
diversified background of the ASEAN region discussed in
Section 3.1, there was little evidence supporting the belief
in the community of Southeast Asia. Reality was better
represented by the former Thai foreign minister Thanat's
view that the ASEAN countries "are 'balkanised' by prolonged
diverse colonial rule which oriented them towards their
repsective metropolitan centers rather than towards their
neighbors in the area..."
If not in existence, community was postulated as an
ultimate goal to pursue. ASEAN was expected to serve "to
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful
community in South-East Asian nations."3 ? The creation and
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maintenance of a peaceful community was understood by the
ASEAN leaders as an absolute necessity for their own economic
development and political stability.
Although community-building was oriented, the amalgama-
tion or political unification of the participant states was
not sought. Regional community was, from each participants'
viewpoint, an instrument for its own development, not a step
toward eventual amalgamation. The ASEAN countries shared
a general intent to create,.according to the Deutschen
integration theory, a"pluralistic security-community" among
themselves.
ASEAN's Orientation toward Security
The ASEAN countries did not limit their deep concern
with security among themselves. They had recognized their
vulnerability vis-a-vis the outside world, either major
global powers or their neighboring hostile countries. They
agreed at least to express their common concern with external
security in the Bangkok Declaration. As discussed above,
ASEAN's inheritance from Maphilindo showed a conspicuous
inclination toward non-alignment.
More importantly, the ASEAN countries all felt a
Chinese threat to their own internal political stability.
Anti-governmental guerillas in Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand had been at least morally supported
by the People's Republic of China for years. Even Thailand,
which had been more directly threatened by North Vietnam,
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considered China as more formidable. 4 0 The existence of
Chinese minorites intensified the ASEAN governments' fear.
The new leadership of Indonesia banned communism, and became
strongly anti-Chinese.
Nevertheless, it is misleading to equate ASEAN's common
orientation toward external security with an anti-communist
or anti-China alliance. Even after the regime change in
Indonesia, for instance, North Vietnam kept its embassy open,
and the South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government
had a representative in Jakarta. 42 Although the ASEAN
countries, except for Indonesia and Singapore, joined an
obviously anti-China organization sponsored by South Korea,
the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), they tried ASEAN not
43to be an anti-Chinese or anti-communist alliance. They
chose a more subtle way to cope with the penetrating external
threat. While ruling out military cooperation, the ASEAN
countries agreed in principle to cooperate in other forms in
the pursuit of external security.
ASEAN's Orientation toward Economy
Although the declared intent of ASEAN was primarily
socio-economic cooperation, as described in the previous
section, none of the five countries were serious about dis-
cussing concrete projects of regional cooperation. Unlike
other similar regional organizations, ASEAN did not propose
any types of regional economic integration. ASEAN's orienta-
tion toward a unified regional economy seemed weaker than
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the other two orientations.
No matter if regional economic integration serves
national economic development, the ASEAN countries did not
regard integration efforts to be realistic measures for them-
selves. They agreed, instead, to begin with more or less
technical cooperation such as shipping, tourism and fisheries.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that the ASEAN countries
oriented themselves toward regional economy, but this
orientation was limited to very low degrees of cooperation
compared with the ordinary sense of economic integration.
As briefly sketched in Section 3.1, the ASEAN countries'
economic dependence on the outside world was evident. .Due
to the vulnerability of its economic structure, the ASEAN
region's economic security was in jeopardy. Nevertheless,
the ASEAN countries did not seem to be seriously concerned
with this problem during the formation process of ASEAN. Nor
were they concerned with the collective remedy of economic
dependence. The orientation toward the aspect of economy----
security was not taken into consideration by the ASEAN
countries at the inception of the organization.
In a word, ASEAN's declared purpose revealed the orienta-
tion toward economy, it seemed much less important than the
orientation toward community and security.
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Notes for Chapter 3
1. Southeast Asia consists of, besides the ASEAN countries,
the former French Indochina----Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
---- , Brunei and Burma.
2. On a history of Southeast Asia, see, for example,
(Hall 1968).
3. Recent arguments on ethnic politics include (Enloe 1977).
4. (Enloe 1973).
5. Thai and Lao are almost identical, and more Laotians are
in Thailand than in Laos. Malay, Javanese and Tagalog
belong to the same linguistic family, but they are quite
distinctive with each other. The national Indonesia
language (Bahasa Indonesia) and the Malaysia counter-
part (Bahasa Malaysia) are almost identical because both
are based on Malay (Bahasa Melayu). The former vocabu-
lary includes many Javanese and Dutch words, while the
latter English.
6. Language diversity is actually comparable with the origi-
nal six countries of EEC whose major languages are French,
German, Italian, Dutch, and Flemish. Past antagonism
between Catholic and Protestant must have been much more
serious than present antagonism between Muslims and Hindus
in Malaysia.
7. The above diversified characteristics can be extended
to Southeast Asia in general. Despite the cogent warning
to the exageration of obstacles to cooperation nearly two
decades ago (Gordon 1964), they are still widely believed
to be the major source of disonance in Southeast Asia.
"Southeast Asia is still essentially a geographic abstrac-
tion," and not the political reality (Pauker 1977: 19-23).
8. For more detail, see (Gordon 1966: 166).
9. For more detail, see (Vellut 1965: 57).
10. (Gordon 1966; Vellut 1965; Smith 1959)
11. (Yamakage 1980)
12. (Gordon 1966: 167).
13. (Yamakage 1980). Between October 1959 and March 1960,
there were a few calls for regional cooperation by the
Tunku, and by the Philippine government (Boyce 1968: 234-
235; Gordon 1966: 170-171; Singh 1966: 149-154; Morrison
and Suhrke 1978: 267). Those moves did not result in success.
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14. (Singh 1966: 218)
15. (Vellut 1965: 60)
16. See (Gordon 1966: 9-14) for the Sabah dispute between
Malaya and the Philippines.
17. On the formation process of Maphilindo, Philippine
President Macapagal took initiative in proposing "The
Greater Malay Confederation" to prevent Malaya's acquisi-
tion of Sabah. Later on, Indonesia President Sukarno got
involved in Malayan-Philippine dispute over Sabah, and
showed his leadership in the creation of Maphilindo. In
detail, see (van der Kroef 1963; Taylor 1964; Gordon
1966: 22-24, 31-35, 100-103, 188-192), etc. It is little
wonder that the Manila Declaration which proclaimed the
establishment of Maphilindo was issued simultaneously with
the joint statement in which three leaders agreed on a
rationale for solving the Sabah dispute in a United
Nations guided referendum to ascertain the wishes of the
people of Sabah.
18. Compared with Sukarno's attitude towards ASA (Gordon
1966: 171;.Morrison and Surhke 1978: 267), his commit-
ment on regional affairs through the creation of
Maphilindo is worthy to note.
19. (Manila Declaration, August 5, 1963)
20. (Joint Statement, August 5, 1963: Parag. 11)
21. In detail, see (Mackie 1974).
22. Relations normalized formally one year later, after
ASEAN was created. It is believed that there was a
secret agreement that relations were to normalize after
an election was held in Sabah and Sarawak as evidence that
people there wished to belong to Malaysia (Weinstein 1969:
79-88). Delay of normalization, however, had no impeding
influence on establishing mutual collaboration
(Yamakage 1981).
23. (Yamakage 1981)
24. (Gordon 1969: 114-116)
25. (Gordon 1969: 114)
26. (Crouch 1978: 330-341)
27. Malaysia representative was not Prime Minister concurrenty
Foreign Minister, but Deputy Prime Minister concurrently
Defense Minister, Abdul Razak.
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28. When ASEAN was established, ASA was functioning. Late
in the same month, the fourth annual meeting of foreign
ministers was convened in the same city. It was decided
that ASA's projects should be transferred to ASEAN.
29. (Gordon 1969: 116)
30. It changed in January 1968 to the withdrawal from east
of Suez by 1971.
31. By the end of the 1960's, Malaysia had begun to advocate
regional neutralization plan, which resulted in ASEAN's
Kuala Lumpur Declaration calling for the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality.
32. (Gordon 1966: 19-21)
33. (Fernandez 1977: 248-249)
34. ASEAN had been proposed by Fifield (1963) as anti-
communist alliance, which must have been the first
appearance of its name (Fifield 1979). Apparantly,
Malik did not know of this, and learned of it when he
visited Moscow (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 335, fn. 19).
35. (Joint Press Release)
36. (the ASEAN Declaration; emphasis myself)
37. This phrase was clearly taken from the Manila Declaration
of Maphilindo which included that three Malay nations
"are bound together by close historical ties of race and
culture." As for Malay nations there may be a truth in it.
38. (Thanat 1975)
39. (the Bangkok Declaration; emphasis myself)
40. See(Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 134-137) on the change
in the Thai view of China and North Vietnam since the
late 1960's.
41. The military leaders suspected that China had been
involved in Indonesian communist party's attempted
coup and the murder of their fellow army generals in
September 1965. Indonesia's relations with China
worsened to suspend diplomatic relationship in October
1967.
42. (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 227)
43. Like ASA, ASEAN was accused of its anti-communist policy
by the communist countries. But they would endorse ASEAN
by the mid 1970's for their own reasons.
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44. Perhaps Singapore, the most developed of the ASEAN
countries and most dependent on trade, was the only
member that advocated economic integration. Singapore's
foreign minister Rajaratnam expressed the desirability
of a neo-functional type of regional economic integra-
tion before ASEAN was created (see Starner's interview
with Rajaratnam 1967). But even for Singapore, economic
cooperation was not the main reason to join ASEAN as
delineated in the previous section.
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Chapter 4. The Organizational Transformations of ASEAN
in its First Decade
4.1 From Infrastructual Cooperation to Economic Integration
Setting Up Functional Committees in the Initial Years
At its inception, ASEAN was at least expected to promote
regional cooperation "in such fields as tourism, shipping
and fisheries,... "1 Within a year, five ad hoc committees
were set up: three of which were to meet with the above
mentioned suggestion at the inaugurating meeting; and the
remaining two were on civil aviation and on transportation
and communication. The first meeting of those ad hoc
committees was held in June 1968, in the five capitals of
ASEAN.
On the occasion of the second annual meeting of foreign
ministers in August 1968, ad hoc committees on shipping, food
production and supply, civil air transportation, and communi-
cation/air traffic service/meteorology were upgraded to
permanent committees, the last two of which had been sub-
committees of the ad hoc committee on civil aviation. Thus,
ASEAN became equipped with four permanent committees for the
purpose of recommending and implementing functional coopera-
tion on intra-regional socio-economic matters.
All of the four new permanent committees had been opera-
ting to convene their first respective meeting in the latter
half of 1969. Moreover, the ad hoc committee on commerce and
industry was established during that period. At the third
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annual meeting of foreign ministers, it was agreed to trans-
form into permanent committees the following ad hoc committees:
on tourism, on transportation and communication, and on com-
merce and industry. It was also decided to set up the perma-
nent committee on mass media, on that occasion.
Although ASEAN was faced with the most serious crisis to
date during 1968 and 1969 because the "frozen" territorial
conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah
resuscitated, it was not paralyzed by the conflict.
By the time the rapprochement between Malaysia and the
Philippines was announced at the annual foreign ministers'
meeting in December 1969, ASEAN had expanded its organization-
al structure so as to have a number of permanent committees
in order to enhance its functional goal ambiguously proclaimed
in its founding declaration in August 1967.
Organizational expansion did not stop. In 1970, the ad
hoc committee on science and technology was set up, and in
the following year it was transformed into the permanent
committee. In 1972, the permanent committee on socio-cultural
activities was established. Thus, within five years of
the inception, ten permanent committees started operating in
order to fulfill the collective will of intra-regional
cooperation in a functional sense.
Those permanent committees consisted of government
officials and experts on specific subjects from the ASEAN
countries. Their location and chairmanship were distributed
among the five participant countries on a rotational basis. 2
The past exercise indicates that the rotation usually occurs
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every three years.3
In the meantime, the special committee of ASEAN central
banks and monetary authorities was set up, and its first meet-
ing was held in 1972. Subsequently, the set-up was approved
at the following annual meeting of foreign ministers, the
sixth in 1973.
The abovementioned ten permanent and one special commit-
tees were set up one after another during ASEAN's first five
years (Figure 4.1). Those committees worked to concretize
the organization's unspecific goals for functional coopera-
tion in socio-economic fields.
Nevertheless, sucn a structural development was not
regarded to be directed toward integration even at some
corners in the region. Most striking was perhaps Singapore's
Premier Lee Kuan Yew, who addressed at the opening of the
fifth annual meeting of foreign ministers in his country
that "he gained the impression that ASEAN did not for the
present aim at integrating a regional economy," which became
publicly recorded in the meeting's joint communique. He was
doubtlessly right if regional economic integration had to
mean at least trade liberalization as commonly taken for
granted.
However, in the very meeting where Lee made some
disappointing remarks on ASEAN's cooperation, its foreign
ministers agreed to study the restructuring of ASEAN to
more effectively meet the anticipated increase in regional
cooperation.
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The number of
committeesA
121
Total
10-
8
6
4
2-
Year
1967 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
Figure 4.1. The Number of ASEAN Committees to Carry out
Intra-Regional Functional Cooperation on
Socio-Economic Matters
Note: The number is counted on the mid-year of each year.
The advisory committee on the United Nations study team,
which was in operation during 1970-72, and the permanent
committee on finance are excluded from the counting.
,s
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Commitment to Economic Integration
In May 1974, the ASEAN foreign minsters "agreed that
ASEAN, having completed its first stage and presently enter-
ing its second stage of cooperation, should now embark on a
more substantial and meaningful economic collaboration."
As promising rationales, they specified three cooperative
techniques: trade liberalization, complementary agreements,
and package deal arrangements. 5 This was the first commit-
ment to regional economic integration in the form of ASEAN's
collectivity agreed by the participants.
The consideration of economic integration in the frame-
work of ASEAN dates back to 1970. Under the initiative of
the United Nations, ASEAN let a U.N. team study the regional
economic situation and recommend the rationale of intra-
regional cooperation, including economic integration. For
the ASEAN side, the advisory committee was set up, and five
meetings were held during 1970-72. The report was submitted
to ASEAN in 1972, which was published in 1974.7 In that
report, among the recommended procedures were selective trade
liberalization in selected commodities, industrial complemen-
tary agreements, and package deal arrangements. At the sixth
annual meeting in 1973, the foreign ministers "directed that
appropriate steps should be taken by ASEAN to implement those
recommendations of the U.N. Study Team which can be agreed upon." 8
Thus, step by step the ASEAN countries approached econo-
nomic integration. By 1974, they had in principle agreed to
start a new type of regional cooperation toward economic
integration. However, at this point concrete programs were
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yet to be agreed upon. In order to concretize the orientation
of integration, the foreign ministers decided in 1975 to set
up the meeting of economic and planning ministers to deal
with those technical issues to clear up. It is undeniable
that the abovementioned UN report (1974) played no small a
role in paving the way to launch a new goal of ASEAN's
intra-regional cooperation.
Under those circumstances described above, it can be
said that the foreign ministers empowered the economic
ministers to conduct intra-regional economic cooperation
toward integration. While the foreign ministers' meeting
remained as the highest policy-making organ of ASEAN, and
in the position of supervising the economic ministers'
meeting, this begain to act independently of that. With
respect to the organizational structure, the economic mini-
sters created an ad hoc committee on restructuring of ASEAN's
permanent, special and ad hoc committees.9 Accordingly,
several committees under the economic ministers' meeting
came into existence simultaneously with those under the
foreign ministers' meeting. Some important economic functions
were conducted by two different kinds of organs, which was
of course considered undesirable by the ASEAN countries.
The Start of Economic Integration in the Second Decade
The fundamental restructuring of ASEAN's functional
committees took place during 1977 and 1978, leading even-
tually to eight committees for implementing regional
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functional cooperation in socio-economic fields. Under the
supervision of the meeting of ASEAN economic ministers were
five economic committees: trade and tourism; industry,
minerals and energy; food, agriculture and forestry; communi-
cations and transportation; and finance and banking. Under
the auspices of the foreign ministers remained the socio-
cultural committees on science and technology; on culture
and information; and on social development. Each committee
worked to seek and implement various types of cooperation
and integration.
As a result of the abovementioned reform, a so-called
division of labor was established between economic ministers
and foreign ministers. Moreover, regular mutual consultation
was established among other ministers such as education,
labor, information and social welfare. There were undeniably
more talks than decisions. Nevertheless, the establishment
of other ministerial meetings broadened the scope of trans-
governmental cooperation within ASEAN, and also activated
functional committees further.
4.2 The Limited Strengthening of Administrative Machinery-
Decentralized, Minimal Administration
Originally ASEAN had considerably a decentralized
administrative structure. The host of the annual meeting
of foreign ministers and hence of the standing committee
rotated every year; that of permanent committees also rotated
usually every three years. The administration was taken care
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of by the national secretariat in the foreign office of each
participant state. For the purpose of smooth functioning of
the organization's activities, the meeting of ASEAN secre-
taries-general was established by the five national secretar-
iat general. It was usually held on a quarterly basis.
Just like any other international diplomacy, the nego-
tiation at the senior officials' level played an important
role in clearing out as many differences as possible in
ASEAN. The meeting of secretaries-general was responsible
for the preparation of the final draft for the foreign
ministers' meeting. Many administrative decisions on
functional cooperation were made at this level. For example,
the set up of functional committees, and the transformation
from ad hoc into permanent committees were decided at the
meeting of secretaries-general, and later approved at the
foreign ministers' meeting.
Related to administration is the budget. ASEAN started
its operation without its own funding, and the host country
was responsible for spending. Such a procedure was,needless
to say, very defective for implementing any cooperative
programs other than just the convening of the meetings. In
order to study financial matters, the foreign ministers
agreed to set up an ad hoc committee on finance at the second
annual meeting in 1968. 10 Overcoming the intra-regional con-
flict, the ASEAN countries agreed to establish a common fund
in the following year. At the third annual meeting, the
foreign ministers signed the Agreement for the Establishment
of a Fund for the Association of South-East Asian Nations,
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and transformed the ad hoc committee on finance into the
permanent committee. 11 Each participant state was to
contribute a million U.S. dollars, and a common fund was
allowed to be increased from time to time.12 This fund
was agreed upon to be used for the purpose of implementing
projects which had been approved by the ASEAN foreign mini-
sters. 13 The fund was operated by the permanent committee
on finance. Along with a large-scale organizational
reform, the committee was transformed into a committee on
budget, and supervised by the foreing ministers' meeting.
The Creation of the Central Machinery
As the concretization of intra-regional economic
cooperation began to be seriously considered within ASEAN,
strengthened administrative machinery was also designed.
At the fifth annual meeting in 1972, the foreign ministers
agreed to consider the need and desirability of a central
secretariat. 1 5 In the following year, they "decided that
the time had come for the strengthening of the structure of
ASEAN by establishing a Central Secretariat for ASEAN", and
set up a special committee to consider the establishment of
the ASEAN Secretariat, which consisted of secretaries-general
of the five countries' national secretariats.16
The establishment of the central secretariat was dis-
cussed both at the abovementioned special committee and at
the meeting of secretaries-general. At the sixth annual
meeting of foreign ministers, Indonesia alfeady offered to
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provide the secretariat.17 Although the Philippines later
made a counter-proposal to set it in its territory and to
expend all the cost, it was decided to share the expense on
an equal basis, and finally the Philippines withdrew its
proposal.
At the seventh annual meeting of foreign ministers in
1974, it was finally decided to establish the central
18
secretariat in Jakarta. In the following months, secre-
tariat's organization, posts and budgets were negotiated
about at the consecutive meetings of secretaries-general.
The draft agreement on the establishment of the ASEAN
Secretariat must have been finalized by early 1975. The
ASEAN foreign ministers initialed the text of the Agreement
for submission to their respective governments. 19
The Limits of the Central Machinery
When the ASEAN leaders gathered in the islard of Bali
for the first ASEAN summit meeting, the foreign ministers
signed the A-greement on the Establishment of the ASEAN
Secretariat.20 The secretariat was formally set up in June
1976.
Although the establishment of the ASEAN secretariat was
undoubtedly the first major step to centralize the administra-
tion and to make procedures more effective, the structure
was simple, and the power was weak. In terms of the structure,
the secretariat consisted of three bureaus: economic, science
and technology, and social and cultural.2 1 All together, there
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were only seven high-reanking officials, all of whom were to
be appointed by the standing committee upon nomination by
the participant states: three of whom were bureau direc-
tors of at least counselor rank, and the remaining were a
foreign trade and economic relations officer, an administra-
tive officer, a public information officer, and an assistant
to the secretary-general of at least first secretary rank,
and the three-year term of appointment was to be equitably
distributional and rotational.23
The secretary-general was to be appointed by the ASEAN
foreign ministers upon nomination by the participant on a
rotational basis, whose tenure was to be two years. His
function and responsibilities were those which were entrusted
by the foreign ministers' meeting and standing committee,
and his main task was coordinatioh rather than decision-
making on functional cooperation..24 As a matter of formality,
the central secretariat including the secretary-general and
his staff, was subject to the foreign ministers' meeting, but
substantially they were kept under the control of the parti-
cipant states. 25
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4.3 Building Up Machinery for Collective Action vis-a-vis
the Outside World
ASEAN's Committees to Deal with External Economic Affairs
When intra-regional ccoperation on economic and social
fields had barely started, ASEAN had already shown a sign of
"policy externalization."26 By 1971 it had been foreseen,
and in January 1972 it became unavoidable when Britain
signed the Treaty of Accession with EEC, that Malaysia and
Singapore would lose the preferential trade arrangement of
the Commonwealth. This would directly affect only two of
the five ASEAN countries, but ASEAN took advantage of this
occasion to formulate a common stand vis-a-vis EEC. For
that purpose, ASEAN decided to set up the Special Coordinating
Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) in January 1972.27 At the fifth
annual meeting, the foreign ministers approved the creation
of SCCAN.28 It held its first meeting in Bangkok, in June
of that year, followed by the creation of the ASEAN Brussels
Committee (ABC) consisting of the ASEAN ambassadors there to
carry out regular communication with EEC. SCCAN and its
subsidiary ABC were the first machinery of ASEAN for the
new purpose of jointly dealing with actors outside the region.
ASEAN's concern with extra-regional trade was not limited
to joint negotiations with EEC. In the year-following the set up
of SCCAN and ABC, ASEAN established additional machinery for
multilateral negotiations. That is, at the sixth annual
meeting, the foreign ministers "agreed that there was an urgent
need to make necessary preparations for, and a collective
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approach to the forthcoming Multilateral Trade Negotiations"
in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).29
That' top-level agreement was concretized by the establish-
ment of the committee of the ASEAN senior trade officials,
and of the ASEAN Geneva Committee (AGC) composed of the
ASEAN representatives to the United Nations in Geneva.30
Accumulating Liifks with Third Parties
The collective bargaining of ASEAN with extra-regional
powers was formalized first against Japan. The initiative
was taken by ASEAN, and started with accusation. The ASEAN
foreign ministers expressed "their grave concern" with Japan's
increasing export of synthetic rubber.31 Subsequently, the
ad hoc committee of the ASEAN senior officials on synthetic
rubber was set up. Within ASEAN, not all the participants
had been affected by Japanese synthetic rubber. At the
annual meeting, the harshest voice came from the Malaysian
representative, which was no surprise at all due to the
country's heavy dependence on natural rubber exports. It
is worth noting that other ASEAN countries whose economies
did not heavily depend on natural rubber supported those which
depended on it, and unanimously criticized Japan.
In August, ASEAN rather than the ASEAN countries, pro-
posed that Japan convene a ministerial meeting between the
two parties with regard to the rubber issue; Japan agreed,
perhaps reluctantly. Based on an agreement in the minister-
ial meeting in November 1973, the ASEAN-Japan Forum on
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Synthetic Rubber was established. In the following year,
the Japanese government promised the country's exports of
synthetic rubber would not affect natural rubber producers;
the ASEAN foreign ministers "expressed their satisfaction"
with the consequence of "the ASEAN joint approach."32
The success in dealing with Japan may have most likely
encouraged the ASEAN countries to adopt more collective
operations vis-a-vis extra-regional powers. In fact, ASEAN
started joint dialogues: with Australia in 1974; with New
Zealand and with Canada in 1975; with the United States in
1977.
Established in 1975, the meeting of economic ministers
was originally supposed to take care of primarily intra-
regional cooperation on-various economic fields. However,
the ASEAN heads of governments assigned to the meeting the
discussion of "the formulation of joint approach to inter-
national commodity and other economic problems..."33
Consequently, the meeting of economic ministers has been
functioning as the machinery for dealing with parties out-
side the region. It was the economic ministers who considered
a joint approach, and agreed "to establish ASEAN machinery
for dialogue with third countries or groups of countries...
Accordingly, informal dialogues with Canada and New
Zealand were formalized. Since 1977, already formalized
dialogues with Japan and Australia were upgraded to forum
status.35
As ASEAN increased the more or less regularized
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communication and negotiation channels with powers outside the
region, its participant states adopted "the division of labor"
policy to deal with them. Each participant is responsible
for the coordination of the following parties:
Indonesia------------Japan and the European Communities,
Malaysia-------------Australia and West Asian Countries,
the Philippines------U.S.A. and Canada,
Singapore------------New Zealand, and
Thailand-------------UNDP and ESCAP.36
Thus, although there is no permanent machinery within ASEAN
to deal with third parties, except for the ad hoc committee
of the ASEAN senior officials on synthetic rubber which took
care of the ASEAN-Japan Forum on Synthetic Rubber, this func-
tion is differentiated in order to smooth extra-regional
relations.
Collective Action as Mutual, Flexible Responsiveness
Thus, ASEAN had started its collective approach on
international economic issues by the early 1970's. It is
true that the entry of Britain into the EEC was most influen-
tial in uniting ASEAN vis-'a-vis EEC,and that Japan's increasing
export of synthetic rubber solidified the ASEAN countries vis-
a-vis Japan. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to say that
the ASEAN countries were forced to do so by external pressure.
For not all the ASEAN countries were affected by external
pressure, and less affected partners decided to support more
affected partners on behalf of the latter. Faced with unfavor-
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able international environments, the ASEAN countries adopted
the collective approach toward the third parties outside the
region. ASEAN was responsive enough to take efforts in
order to improve its environment. In the early 1970's, the
ASEAN countries revealed their mutual responsiveness to some.
partners' need for the support of others.
ASEAN's increasing contacts with third parties described
above might be called "policy externalization." However,
its process is not the way Schmitter theorized. ASEAN's
policy externalization was not the consequence of the emer-
gence of more or less integrated body so that the participants
are compelled to adopt common policies. In the absence of
an integrated region, the ASEAN countries discovered the
utility of a common policy and collective action vis-a-vis
nonparticipants. It is evident that policy externalization
does not necessitate internal integration. Without an inte-
grated regional economy, the participant countries might find
issues in which they share common interests and may agree to
take action collectively. Such a development may be more
likely for highly integrated countries, but certainly possi-
ble for barely integrated ones like the ASEAN states. The
critical question is not how much they are integrated, but
how far they are willing to act jointly. In the case of
ASEAN, the participants were not rigidly bound to the formal
goal and structure. Almost regardless of the goal, they were
able to carry out whatever type of cooperation they wanted.
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4.4 Regional Security-Seeking
The Informal Meeting for Mutal Consultations
When the foreign ministers convened for the first time
since the establishment of ASEAN, and took an initial step
to concretize intra-regional cooperation in economic and
social fields, they also met informally, and consulted with
one another on regional security issues. The topics included
the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, foreseeable impacts upon
Malaysia and Singapore of British withdrawal from the east
of Suez by 1971, American troops and bases in Southeast
Asia, and so on.
The most important outcome of that informal meeting
held on the second day of the second annual meeting of
foreign ministers was not the fact that they carried out
mutual consultations on security. Of vital importance to
ASEAN in the years to follow was the fact that the foreign
ministers agreed to meet informally so as to discuss any
urgent international or regional problems when it arises.
It was reportedly Thanat who proposed to institutionalize the
informal meeting to discuss political and security matters
affecting the ASEAN region.3 7
Thus, although the ASEAN Declaration did not specify any
cooperation in a political field, the foreign ministers took
advantage of the ASEAN annual meeting to consult mutually
with little difficulty on unspecified matters. As discussed
in the previous chapter, the ASEAN countries were invariably
concerned with international developments affecting regional
126
politico-security conditions when they were shaping the
new organization that was to become ASEAN. The annual
meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers was doubtlessly a
great opportunity to exchange information and views and to
consult with one another. It even may have been a good
excuse for doing so.
The Need for Mutual Security
At the second annual meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers
were faced with a more serious problem which might dissolve
the organization. At the time, the survival of ASEAN was cha-led.
by the Malaysian-Philippine dispute over Sabah. In 1966,
both countries normalized diplomatic relations while the
dispute had been "frozen." In early 1968, the Philippine
government started to claim its sovereignty over Sabah, and
worsened relations with Malaysia. The other three ASEAN
foreign ministers offered their good offices between dis-
puting foreign ministers at the second annual meeting, which
was followed by an agreement to "cool down" the dispute so
as to seek the way of peaceful settlement.
Despite the tacit agreement, the territorial dispute
escalated to the extent that each country closed its embassy
in the other country in November, 1968. Worried about such
a development, Thanat tried to take opportunity of the third
ECAFE ministerial meeting on economic cooperation which was
scheduled to be held in Bangkok from December 11 to 14, which
the Malaysia Deputy Premier and the Philippine Foreign
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Secretary planned to attend. On December 12, the Indonesian
and Singaporean foreign ministers arrived in Bangkok, but
not for attendance at the ECAFE meeting. Nonetheless, it
had not been agreed when and whether the ASEAN foreign mini-
sters should meet, because the Malaysia government was very
reluctant to negotiate with the Philippine counterpart.
Finally, after the ECAPE meeting was over, the foreign
ministers met informally at Bangsaen on December 14, 1968.
Thanat, who kept taking the initiative, said to the press
that the foreign ministers from the ASEAN countries were
interested in regional peace, prosperity and stability, and
in mutual understanding. Although he dared not mention
whether the .Sabah dispute was on the agenda, it was the
issue which the foreign ministers discussed. Although no
agreement was made public, they said with one voice that
Malaysia and the Philippines had agreed to solve the conflict
peacefully, and that it would never cause the dissolution
of ASEAN.
Thus, the first informal meeting was convened in order
to solve an intra-regional conflict, only a few months after
it was agreed that the informal meeting might be held.
Such a type of meeting may have been designed for the pur-
pose of dealing with extra-regional developments affecting
the region. As a matter of fact, the first occasion was
utilized in order to deal with the management of intra-
regional conflict. Obviously, not only Thanat but other
ASEAN foreign ministers were seriously concerned with the
conflict between two participants, and could not as bystanders
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simply sit by and observe the situation worsening. They
made every effort to ameliorate Malaysian-Philippine rela-
tions. These two governments seemed compelled not to dis-
solve ASEAN, and assured the other ASEAN participants that
they put the highest priority on ASEAN's survival rather than
on antagonistic nationalism.
In its second year, ASEAN came to possess important
precedents of regional cooperation on mutual security through
the management of the intra-regional conflict. For the
ASEAN countries, ASEAN was the single existing, and indis-
pensable, mutual consultation network that enabled them to
conduct face-to-face communication regularly.
The normalization of diplomatic relations between
Malaysia and the Philippines was announced on December 16,
1969,the first day of the third annual meeting.38 The
Sabah dispute was "frozen" again, and the two countries
resumed cooperation within the framework of ASEAN. The
critical period was over.
Increasing Common Concern with External Security
Since ASEAN was established in 1967, its participants
were experiencing rapid changes in their international
politico-security environment. In January 1968, the British
labor government published its plan of withdrawal from east
of Suez by 1971. A year later, President Nixon's Guam
doctrine made clear American disengagement in continental
Southeast Asia. In the same year, Brezhnev proposed a vague
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but important idea of collective security system in Asia.
There was every reason for the ASEAN governments to worry
about the region's future.
As mentioned earlier,the ASEAN governments were deeply
concerned with China. Since 1970 it began to send messages
to the ASEAN countries, vis-a-vis Malaysia and Singapore
in particular, regarding its intention of accommodation with
those governments. Much more influential was the dramatic
start of the Sino-American rapprochement in July'1971. In
October of that year, People's Republic of China took over
the seat in the United Nations from the Kuomintang govern-
ment in Taiwan. The ASEAN countries had to reconsider their
own relations with China.
The ASEAN foreign ministers were attending the United
Nations General Assembly when China won the UN seat. They
met with one another informally in New York, and discussed
the future of regional security. In November they met
again in Kuala Lumpur, and proclaimed the Declaration of the
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) based on
the agreement that "the neutralization of Southeast Asia is
a desirable objective..." 4 0
The idea of netralizing Southeast Asia had been one of
the main pillars of Malaysian foreign policy since the late
1960's; it had been advocated particularly since Razak took
the office of Premiership in 1970.41 Compared with Malaysia,
the other four participants of ASEAN were less committed to
the neutralization plan. As a result of the ASEAN practice,
the declaration on which all the ASEAN countries agreed
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turned out less concrete and less specific than the
Malaysian prototype.
The orientation toward ZOPFAN was initated by the
ASEAN countries, but should not be limited,in their view,
to the ASEAN region. ZOPFAN was to be wider than the area
just containing the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN foreign mini-
sters decided to set up a committee of senior officials on
42the creation of ZOPFAN. The committee was to consist of
only representatives from the ASEAN countries initially, but
was also expected to include senior officials from other
countries. Although no other countries has joined the
neutralization plan, that committee is not yet considered
to be either special or ad hoc committee of ASEAN. If
formality is concerned, ZOPFAN was initiated by the ASEAN
countries, but it is not ASEAN's plan.
The Regularization of Informal Meetings
The proclamation of the Declaration of ZOPFAN was
certainly an important event. But its importance did not
lie on its substance. Like the Bangkok Declaration, it
was nothing but a vague general intent. Neither the proce-
dure toward neutralization nor its time table was specified.
The declaration was important because it means that the
ASEAN countries committed themselves to more formal political
cooperation than mutual consultations on regional security.
Because the Declaration of ZOPFAN was the first political
commitment collectively made by the ASEAN countries, the
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Kuala Lumpur meeting of foreign ministers began to be regarded
as the first special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers
although it was actually an informal meeting. No matter
whether that meeting was special or informal, the obvious fact
was that the ASEAN countries used ASEAN as the framework of
mutual consultations and collective actions with respect to
politico-security issues. Even though the ASEAN governments
continued to insist that ASEAN was not a political, but a
socio-economic organization, it was more rhetoric than
reality.
When the ASEAN foreign ministers convened in Singapore
in April 1972 for the fifth annual meeting, they held an
informal meeting again. On that occasion, another major
step was taken toward the institutionaliza-tion of cooperation
in the politico-security field. That is, the foreign ministers
agreed to meet at least once a year so as to consult with one
another on the international affairs affecting the region.
Thus, the informal meeting of foreign ministers from the
ASEAN countries, which had been already de facto formalized,
became regularized henceforth.
Only a few months later, in July 1972, the first infor-
mal meeting that referred to the abovementioned agreement was
held, and a half year later another informal meeting was held. 4 3
At the sixth annual meeting of foreign ministers, another
aspect of ASEEN's politicization took place. That is, the
foreign ministers agreed to establish the ASEAN coordinating
committee for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of
Indochina States (ACCRRIS). This has been the only one
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genuine ASEAN committee to deal with more or less politico-
security issues. Before ASEAN found the way to play a role
in Indochinese situations, the communists took over all the
regimes in Indochina. ACCRRIS is still in existence as an
ad hoc committee,4 5 but its recent activity is unclear.
The regularized informal meeting of foreign ministers
became difficult to distinguish from ASEAN's formal struc-
ture. During the sixth annual meeting of foreign ministers
in April 1973, the regularized informal meeting was held on
one day. Since then, this arrangement has become a tradi-
tion of the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers.
From the second through the fifth annual meetings, two
days had been spent at each meeting. Since the sixth, the
annual meeting had been held for three days, and the second
day had been spent on the regularized informal meeting. The
informal meeting was barely recognized as separate from the
annual meeting, because the press release was issued as
separate from the joint communique of the annual meeting.
As will be examined thoroughly in the next chapter, the
agenda of the infromal meeting was the other issues than
what ASEAN was supposed to do in the economic, social, cul-
tural and scientific fields. Namely, it was focused on issues
on politico-security matters.
Thus, in the way described above, the ASEAN countries
built up the machinery to deal with both intra- and extra-
regional issues concerning security, step by step in almost
every year in the early 1970's. The structure to support
ASEAN's politicalization had been constructed before 1975.
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The Formalization of Political Cooperation
The organizational reform which took place in the mid
1970's was primarily of the machinery for functional coopera-
tion and of the administrative structure, but it indirectly
affected the foreign ministers' meeting too. Particularly
the establishment of the meeting of economic and national
planning ministers was significant. In 1976, the newly
established economic ministers' meeting took over all econo-
mic cooperation tasks from the foreign ministers' meeting,
and obtained control of most functional cooperation activi-
ties. Furthermore, establishment of other ministerial
meetings such as information, labor and education took the
burden of managing remaining functional cooperation away
from the foreign ministers' meeting. Due to those organiza-
tional changes, the decision-making of high policies and
cooperation in politico-security fields became the most
important tasks for the foreign ministers' meeting.
In addition, political cooperation was officially
specified as part of the objectives of ASEAN for the first
time in its entire history, on the occasion of the summit
meeting in 1976. Because it was made public by heads of
governments that AGEAN should promote regional cooperation
in a political field, there was no reason any longer for
the meeting of foreign ministers to deemphasize political
cooperation. The ASEAN foreign ministers did not have to
distinguish the meeting of ASEAN to perform functional
cooperation as specified originally in the Bangkok Declara-
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tion on the one hand, from the meeting of the ASEAN countries
which deals with political and security issues affecting
the ASEAN region, on the other.
Thus, in the mid 1970's, the conditions enabling ASEAN
to formalize its political cooperation function was matured..
In accordance with the established practice since 1973,
a regularized informal meeting was held during the ninth
annual meeting in June 1976. On this occasion, however,
the press release for the informal meeting was not issued
any longer. The informal meeting began to be treated as if
it had been the closed-door session of the annual meeting.
At the tenth annual meeting in August 1977, the informal
meeting was not even mentioned, and the foreign ministers
spent two days at the closed-door session. Thus, the
regularized informal meeting was absorbed by the annual
meeting. The machinery for dealing with the politico-
security cooperation of the ASEAN countries was finally forma-
lized completely as part of the structure of ASEAN proper.
4.5 ASEAN's Comprehensive Development in its First Decade:
A Summary
Developmental Process and Expansion in the Domain of Integration
Referring to the creation of a "peaceful community,"
the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 characterized ASEAN as a
functional organization for regional cooperation in socio-
economic fields. However, concrete procedures in that direc-
tion were undecided at the time of inception, and were to be
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later specified by the meeting of foreign ministry, the high-
est decision-making body. In short, with full potential
for regional integration, ASEAN was created without any
acutality.
The transformation of pontentiality into actuality can
be characterized as a particular sequential order with some
overlapping periods. In other words, ASEAN developed step
by step, as follows.
It is not surprise that ASEAN started to institution-
alize the machinery for cooperation in social-and cultural
fields. For that was the only specified range of ASEAN-based
cooperation in the Bangkok Declaration. It took five years,
namely 1967-72, to reach a saturation point where ASEAN
came to contain eleven functional committees. Their tasks
were limited to very specific subjects including cultural
exchange and infrastructure building.
Surprising is the fact that ASEAN had completed
institutionalizing the machinery to deal with both intra-
and extra-regional security by 1972. That was the informal
meeting of foreign ministers, and was made of a maximal use
for the above purposes. Actually, ASEAN's development in
that direction was not surprising if its formation process
is well understood. The five countries which would become
the participants of ASEAN were deeply concerned with two
aspects of security. One was security from outside threats,
or the avoidance of war caused by interventions. The other
was security among themselves, or the avoidance of intra-
regional conflicts. Therefore, such development was quite
136
natural.
Subsequently, ASEAN became concerned with its external
relations with industrial countries and with international
organization on international economic problems. The initial
step was establishment of the machinery to deal with EEC in
1972. By the time ASEAN set up a forum with the United
States in 1977, it had been already working in several institu-
tionalized arenas with third parties outside the region.
Thus, during the second half of its first decade, ASEAN
acquired the capability of common actions, and hence of
political cooperation, vis-a-vis third parties on economic
issues.
ASEAN's organizational reform was initiated by the
decision to establish its central secretariat in 1973, in
order to respond to increasing activities and to the need
for higher efficiency. Although the central secretariat
began to operate in 1976, its authority and responsibility
has been very limited. The establishment of the economic
ministers' meeting led to the overhaul of existing functional
committees and set up new management during 1977-78, for
the same reason as the establishment of central secretariat.
Thus, the period 1974-78 can be characterized as the age
of organizational reform of ASEAN.
It was 1974 when the ASEAN countries decided to start
cooperation toward regional economic integration. In the
following year, the meeting of economic ministers was creat-
ed, and it took over from the foreign ministers' meeting
the responsibility for handling economic cooperation.
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Substantial cooperations started after ASEAN entered into
its second decade. Trade liberalization, package deals, and
the industrial complementation were the main pillars of.
ASEAN's intra-regional cooperation for economic integration.
The developmental process described above can be summarized
as Figure 4.2. ASEAN's organizational structure had started
to develop well before the communist victory in Indochina
in 1975.
In sum, it can hardly be said that ASEAN is a supra-
national organization. For the highest decision-making
body is still the meeting of foreign ministers; the central
secretariat has yet no power to influence its participant
governments. Being an inter-governmental organization,
however, ASEAN had acquired a certain unified capability
of performing collective actions. In another respect, ASEAN
is an entity to generate and implement various agreements
in accordance with broadly defined goals of the organization.
More fundamentally, ASEAN has been providing its participant
governments with the forum of. mutual consultation on almost
any subject that concerns one or more participants.
By the early 1970's, ASEAN had already been equipped with
the machinery, either formal or informal, to perform
cooperation not only in intra-regional socio-economic fields,
but also in politico-security fields and in extra-regional
economic fields. It can be said that ASEAN had extended
its structure over the entire domain of regional integra-
tion presented in Chapter 2, in its very early days (Fig. 4.3).
ASEAN is better understood, therefore, as a diffuse-purpose
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organization to carry, out almost any agreed cooperation,
rather than as a functional organization to pursue certain
specified goals, from the very time of the foundation.
The Confirmation of ASEAN's Comprehensive Orientation
toward Regional Integration
For the almost fifteen-year old ASEAN, the most
important document is the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. It
was proclaimed on the occasion of the first ASEAN summit
meeting in February, 1976. It was the first document that
was signed by the heads of governments. It specified ASEAN's
goals for the first time since its founding declaration in
1967. In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the ASEAN heads
of government, for the first time, endorsed explicitly
ASEAN's activities in various fields. The ASEAN presidents
and prime ministers lauched ASEAN's objectives and programs
in the document far more clearly than their foreign ministers
did in the Bangkok Declaration nine years earlier.
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord became authoritative
guidelines for ASEAN's cooperation and integration in its
second decade.
Political cooperation was publicly counted as part of
ASEAN's objective. As a whole, ASEAN was to cooperate "in
the pursuit of political stability." It is in clear
contrast with the original statement in the Bangkok Declara-
tion in which the word, "political," was almost taboo. In
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the political objectives
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came first:
"1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN
region is an essential contribution to international peace
and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate
threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthen-
ing national and ASEAN resilience.
"2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall
take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality."47
In the section where the ASEAN cooperative programs of
action were listed, political cooperation came first again,
and was elaborated into the seven items, which included the
pacific settlement of intra-regional disputes. The most
general program was "(s)trengthening of political solidar-
iry by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating
positions, and, where possible and desirable, taking common
actions. ,48
In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, "security"
cooperation was specifically mentioned as "continuation of
cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states
in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs
and interests." At a glance, such a stand seems the same
as ASEAN's practive prior to 1976. However, this inter-
pretation is not acceptable because the informal meeting
to deal with security matters had already been substantially
formalized. "Security" in the declaration whould be inter-
preted as narrowly defined security, i.e., military arrange-
ments that were some type of collective defense. In fact,
142
bilateral military cooperation had been started much earlier
between Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Malaysia and
Thailand along their borders to cope with anti-government-
guerillas. Cooperation on security matters in a broad
sense of ours can be, and actually has been, carried out
in accordance with ASEAN's objective of strengtheming poli-
tical solidarity.
Regional cooperation in an econmic field was also
specified concretely. The cooperative programs were classi-
fied into five categories: (1) cooperation on basic
commodities, particularly food and energy; (2) industrial
cooperation; (3) cooperation in trade; (4) joint approach
to international commodity problems and other world economic
problems; and lastly (5) machinery for economic coopera-
tion. The last category assigned tasks to the meeting of
economic ministers, and the first two categories specified
the intra-regional economic cooperation. Interestingly,
cooperation in trade included both the promotion of intra-
regional trade and the export drive to markets outside the
region, The cooperation in extra-regional trade was further
specified in the fourth category above. If not earlier, it
became obvious that ASEAN could act as a unity in inter-
national economic scene. Regional economic integration in
the form of trade liberalization was not the only objective
of ASEAN, but became part of it.
Being part of the original goal, cooperation in social
and cultural fields was also to be promoted further. There
were altogether seven items of cooperative programs in those
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fields as specified in the declaration.
Compared with the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord was more extensive, more sub-
stantial and more specific. There were much more concrete
programs in the new declaration. However, it should be noted
that, except for a few programs of economic cooperation, both
the goals and the programs were not new. They were not what
the ASEAN countries would start to pursue since then, Instead,
they had been already pursued by ASEAN by 1975. It is true
that many differences had remained among the ASEAN countries
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until the eve of the summit meeting. In February 1976
alone, two foreign ministers' meetings and a two-day econo-
mic ministers' meeting were held to reach consensus. Never-
theless, or perhaps therefore, the substance of ASEAN's de-
clared objectives and programs-strongly suggests that the
ASEAN heads of governments endorsed the organizations' past
activities, and confirmed their continuation. Unlike many
other regional organizations, ASEAN chose to remain without
concrete commitment to the future goal or the future pro-
gram, not to mention the time table.
The ASEAN countries. have never suggested the possibility
of political union or amalgamation. Provided the maintenance
of sovereignty, the regional community building was more
explicitly mentioned in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord
than in the Bangkok Declaration. That is, "(m)ember states
shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity
and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community." 50
The future image of ASEAN which the participant countries
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foresaw was, theoretically speaking, a pluralistic
security-community that settles intra-regional disputes by
peaceful means. The community was to be secure as the Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality from the extra-regional
disturbance. The community would act as a unified body
of the participants in international political and economic
arenas. Also, intra-regional socio-economic cooperation
including integration programs was to be promoted so as
to develop and strengthen each participant's economy, and
hence the regional economy.
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14. This committee should not be confused with the special
committee of central banks and monetary authorities
which dealt with financial cooperation.
15. (Joint Communiqu'e, April 14, 1972. Parag. 9)
16. (Joint Communique, April 18, 1973. Parag. 9)
17. (ibd, Parag. 9)
18. (Joint Communique May 9, 1974)
19. (Joint Communiqu6 May 15, 1975. Parag. 18)
20. (Joint Press Communique. Feb. 24, 1976. Parag. 11)
21. (The Agreement. Art. V.1.)
22. (The Agreement. Art. IV)
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23. (ibd. Art. III.1)
24. (ibd. Art. 111.2)
25. Perhaps the most illustrative event to reveal the power-
lessness of the secretariat is the dismissal of the
secretary-general by his home government in 1978. The
first secretary-general Dharsono, an Indonesian general,
criticised the Indonesian government on regards unrelated
to ASEAN. In early 1978, the government was determined
to dismiss him, and sent its foreign minister to the
four other capitals so as to obtain the consensus. In
its official capacity, the chairman of the standing
committee dismissed Dharsono. His term was completed
by another Indonesian who was nominated by his govern-
ment so as to replace Dharsono
26. On the concept of policy externalization, see (Schmitter,
1969).
27. (Communiqu$, the meeting of secretaries general)
28. (Joint Communique, April 14, 1972)
29. (Joint Communiqu6. April 18, 1973. Parag. 10 the emphasis
added)
30. While SCCAN and ABC are the special committees, both the
senior trade officials' committee and AGC are classified
into the ad hoc committees (ASEAN 1978: 19-21). This
probably implies that ASEAN considers the relations with
EEC is more permanent and perhaps more important than the
joint action on GATT.
31. (Joint Communique. April 19, 1973. Parag. 12 emphasis
myself)
32. (Joint Communique. May 9, 1974. Parag. 13)
33. (Joint Press Communique. Feb. 24, 1976. Parag. 10.)
34. (Joint Press Statement, March 9, 1976. Parag. 20)
35. The arena of ASEAN's collective action vis-a-vis Japan
had been already established under the name of forum, but
its primary agenda had been supposed to be the synthetic
rubber although other issues had been discussed.
36. (ASEAN 1978: 221)
37. (the Bangkok Post. August 8, 1968)
38. (Joint Communique. Dec. 17, 1969. Parag. 2.)
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39. (Taylor 1976: 334-356). China's change in its policy
vis-a-vis the ASEAN countries was unmistakeably evident.
Its official news agency reduced its reports on anti-
governmental insurgency in the ASEAN countries as follows:
365 reports in 1970; 198 in 1971; 151 in 1972; and 32
in 1973 (Leng 1975).
40. (The preamble of the Declaration). Although it is
nowadays called the first special meeting of foreign
ministers, i.e., one of the formal organs of ASEAN, the
Kuala Lumpur meeing in November 1971 was not that sort.
It was an informal meeting of foreign ministers from the
ASEAN countries. One cannot find the phrase, "special
meeting," anywhere either in the declaration or in the
joint communique. It must be concluded that the Kuala
Lumpur meeting was as informal as the Bangsaen meeting
in December 1968 and as the New York meeting in October
1971.
41. Malaysia's plan of neutralization, and its connection
with the Declaration of ZOPFAN was discussed in detail
by Wilson (1974) and Ott (1974). (Ghazali 1971) is a
view of the highest-ranking official of Malaysian for-
eign ministry.
42. (Joint Communique. November 27, 1971. Parag. 8)
43. Both of them were called the special meeting of the
ASEAN foreign ministers: the second and the third,
respectively.
44. (Joint Communique. April 18, 1973. Parag. 7)
45. (ASEAN 1978: 19)
46. (Declaration of ASEAN Concord)
47. (ibd.)
48. (ibd.)
49. When the eighth foreign ministers' meeting was held in
May 1975, they seem to have informally agreed to con-
vene the summit meeting in August. The major differ-
ences were on how firmly they should make commitment
to ZOPFAN, and how extensively and concretely they
should specify their economic cooperation including
integration programs. Months were spent to reach a
consensus among the ASEAN governments.
50. (Declaration of ASEAN Concord. emphasis myself)
51. (Deutsch et al. 1957)
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Chapter 5. The Dynamics of ASEAN's Organizational Perfor-
mance: the Activities of Foreign Ministers' Meetings
5.1 the Meeting of Foreign Ministers: Its Significance to
ASEAN
The Position of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in ASEAN
In the organizational development and the expansion of
activities, the most crucial role has been played by the
meeting of foreign ministers. First of all, it is the
highest policy-making body of ASEAN. Based on the Bangkok
Declaration, ASEAN's constitutional framework includes two
types of foreign ministers' meeting. One is the annual
meeting, which is sometimes simply called the ministerial
meeting. This is the highest policy-making body. The other
type is the special meeting which may be convened as needed.
Although in existence since 1976, the meeting of heads of
governments is not regularly held. The foreign ministers'
meeting is still now the highest organ of ASEAN. Until the
meeting of economic and planning ministers was set up in
1975, the foreign ministers' meeting had been the only mini-
sterial machinery of ASEAN.
Second, decision-making at the foreign ministers' meet-
ing is particularly important for ASEAN's activities because
it was established with neither spcific goals nor specific
programs. ASEAN would have been without substance but for
foreign ministers' collective decisions to activate the
organization. As a result of foreign ministers' decisions,
149
ASEAlN expanded its repertoire, and developed its organizational
structure.
Third, and most fundamentally, the foreign ministers'
meeting has been working as a political forum, a framework
for mutual consultation, Recall that ASEAN was created
largely for the purpose of expressing each participant govern-
ment's good-will vis-a-vis the other participants, and of
replacing mutual distrust with mutual understanding. More-
over, soon after the creation of ASEAN, its participant govern-
ments agreed to mutually consult on regional security issues
affecting the stability of the ASEAN region. For the above
purposes, direct face-to-face communications among the ASEAN
foreign ministers were indispensable.
The Analytical Function of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The ASEAN foreign ministers did not limit themselves
to policy-making on intra-regional socio-economic cooperation.
They dealt with politico-security issues as well. It can be
said that the issues brought into ASEAN by its foreign mini-
sters ranged as wide as to cover the entire domain of regional
intregration discussed in section 2.2. To be sure, not all
the issues were brought in for making decisions. Many of the
issues were for mutual consultation or the exchange of views.
ASEAN inherited its decision-making code from its
precursors, i.e., ASA and Maphilindo. Namely, consensus-
building has been the only legitimate mode of ASEAN's deci-
sion-making. To reach consensus, mutual consultation is the
crucial process. The unanimous agreement is required for
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a prospective issue
-- function as a forum
Is the issue brought NO The issue remains beside
into the meeting? >ASEAN's arena.
YES
mutual consultation
Is a consultation
enough?
NOI
consensus building
Is consensus reached?
NO
Is further consultation
agreed?
YES NO
The issue must
be brought in
the next meeting.
The issue leaves agenda,
but may be brought up
in the future.
YES The process is finished; the
>issue is still subject to be
brought up in the next
meeting.
.--- -----function as a council
YES ýThe decision is made
Lupon agreement.
Is foreign ministers' own
action needed?
NOi YES
The decision is to
be implemented by
a subordinate body.
The ministerial
collective action
is conducted
--function as an agency
Figure 5.1. The Processing Flow of Issues at the Meeting of
ASEAN Foreign Ministers
Note: See Section 2.3 on the definitions of forum, council
and agency as organizational functions.
_1__1 _ I_
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ASEAN to make decisions.
Foreign ministers' collective decisions are often the
agreement to set up the subordinate machiner.y of ASEAN or
to endorse certain functions to their subordinates. Some-
times, decisions are concerning their own collective actions
vis-a-vis third parties. The signing of agreements is cer-
tainly one of the important functions of foreign ministers'
meetings.
In short, the meeting of foreign ministers processes
issues: it makes consultations; if needed it makes decisions
upon agreement; and it may act collectively vis-a-vis third
parties. Such functions are schematically shown in Figure
5.1.
Types and Frequency of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting
During ASEAN's first decade, 1967-77, ten annual
meetings of foreign ministers were held. Because of ASEAN's
alphabetical rotation ruler,' meetings were held twice in each
participant country (Table 5.1.a). In the same period-, there
was only one special meeting',-' which was held to commemorate
the first summit meeting's first anniversary (Table 5.1.b).
In addition to the above two types of formal meetings,
the ASEAN foreign ministers met informally on various occasions.
As discussed in Section 4.4,' they institutionalized informal
meetings as a political forum in 1972. This institutionalized
regular informal meeting was convened several times (Table
5.1.c). Also-, there were.many other informal meetings
(Table 5.1.d). Because of its informal nature,,' the ASEAN
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Table 5.1. The List of Meetings of the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, 1967-1977
a. Annual Meetings
1st 8/ 8/1967 Bangkok
2nd 8/ 6- 7/1968 Jakarta
3rd 12/16-17/1969 Cameron Highlands, Malaysia
4th 3/13-14/1972 Manila
5th 4/13-14/1973 Singapore
6th 4/16-18/1973 Pattaya, Thailand
7th 5/ 7- 9/1974 Jakarta
8th 5/13-15/1975 Kuala Lumpur
9th 6/24-26/1976 Manila
10th 7/ 5- 8/1977 Singapore
b. Special Meeting
2/ 24/1977 Manila
c. Regular Informal Meetings*
7/13-14/1972 Manila
2/ 15/1973 Kuala Lumpur
4/ 17/1973 Pattaya, Thailand
5/ 8/1974 Jakarta
5/ 14/1975 Kuala Lumpur
6/ 25/1976 Manila
7/ 6- 7/1977 Singapore
d. Other Informal Meeting
8/ 7/1968 Jakarta
12/ 14/1968 Bangsaen, Thailand
10/ 2/1971 New York
11/26-27/1971 Kuala Lumpur
4/ 14/1972 Singapore
2/ 9-10/1976 Pattaya, Thailand**
2/ 20/1976 Bali, Indonesia**
8/ 1/1977 Kuala Lumpur***
10/ 5/1977 New York
Notes: *Refer to Section 4.4. **Preparation for the first
summit meeting. ***Preparation for the second summit meeting.
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Table 5.2. The List of Meetings of the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, 1978-1980
a. Annual Meetings
11th 6/14-16/1978 Pattaya, Thailand
12th 6/28-30/1979 Bali, Indonesia
13th 6/25-26/1980 Kuala Lumpur
b. Special Meeting
None
c. .Regular Informal Meeting
None*
d. Other Informal Meeting
9/ /1978 New York
1/12-13/1979 Bangkok
8/ 16/1979 Kuala Lumpur
10/ /1979 New York
12/ 14/1979 Kuala Lumpur
3/ 6/1980 Kuala Lumpur
5/ 24/1980 Geneva
Note: *The function of the regular informal meeting was taken
over by the annual meeting in 1977. Refer to Section 4.4.
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foreign ministers' informal meeting did not leave a complete
list of convening. Further examination could possibly iden-
tify some other meetings listed in Table 5.1.d.
In the period', 1978-80',iannual and informal meetings
were held as listed in Table 5.2.
In sumY, there were at least twenty-seven meetings of the
ASEAN foreign ministers in the eleven-year period', 1967-
1977. In other words',, foreign ministers met either formally
or informally 2.5 times a year. Howeverr, the per anum
frequency.in that period ranges from zero to five, as shown
in Figure 5.2. In the first four years', 1967-70-, the frequen-
cy fluctuated. The following several years, 1971-75, reveals
a relatively stable pattern. In the late 1970's-, 1976-80,
foreign ministers' meetings were convened more frequently and
more fluctuatingly than the previous years. The pattern of
frequency of foreign ministers' meetings,, especially that of
informal meetings', reveals that the ASEAN foreign ministers
met with one another more actively than they were supposed to
meet annually.
5.2. The Foreign Ministers' Meeting as a Forum: Mutual
Consultation in the Framework of ASEAN
Agenda for Mutual Consultations
Meetings in the framework of ASEAN were doubtlessly
convenient occasions for the foreign ministers to make mutual
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,---/ jii
Informal
Informal
1967 68 69 70 71 72 73
Figure 5.2.
74 75 76 77 78 79 80
The Frequency of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers'
Meetings, 1967-1980
Source: For 1967-77, Table 5.1, and for 1978-80, Table 5.2.
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consultation. But what did they discuss? Since Thai Foreign
Minister Thanat persuaded his counterparts to keep the region-
al organization as informal as possible;,, in 1959', the ASA
and ASEAN foreign ministers have been accustomed to dis-
cussing delicate or controversial issues with relative ease.
However, they have been extremely careful not to release the
contents of their discussion. Except for a few occasions,
details of differences in opinions were not disclosed
publicly., However,: the press tried to cover the issues
mutually consulted but unmentioned in the public documents.
To include those issues untouched in official documents
is particularly important in order to better understand the
performance of ASEAN as a forum. With respect to security'
matters in particular, issues which do not appear in official
documents may most probably cover delicate international
problems which the foreign ministers left unmentioned.
On the one hand',' the exclusive use of only public docu-
ments would make the analysis more objective and easier to
check. On the other hand:,' the result based on it would be
less accurate and less relevant for the purpose of shedding
light on ASEAN as a whole. At the expense of a guaranteed
objectivity'; this analysis will not rely only on the public
document, but on the press report as well.
Fortunatley,y partial objectivity can be retained by
using independent source of this analysis in order to iden-
tify issues brought into the foreign ministers' meeting.
As an appendix to a book of ASEAN, A Concise Summary of
ASEAN's Meetings" identified those issues which not only the
157
decision was made on. but also the mutual consultation was
conducted on.2 This identification was based on both
official documents and news reports.
According to the prespective developed in Chapter 2,
those identified items are classified by this author into the
following categories: (1) intra-regional cooperation on the
community ----economy aspect (CEi); (2) intra-regional cooper-
ation on the economy--security aspect (ES i); (3) extra-
regional cooperation on the economy---security aspect (ES );
(4) intra-regional cooperation on the security---community
aspect (SCi); and lastly (5) extra-regional cooperation on
the security---community aspect (SCe). The first category is
for functional cooperation which was,,y in substance, the only
original objective of ASEAN explicitly specified in the Bang-
kok Declaration in-1967. The second and the third categories
are for primarily ASEAN's collective decision or action on the
so-called economic security problem. The fourth and the fifth
categories are for ASEAN's activities toward intra-regional
conflict control and toward external security,, respectively,
Unless specifically mentioned', the region refers to the ASEAN
regionh;, rather than Southeast Asia entirely. If a certain
item identified in the abovementioned data source is judged
to include issues which are supposed to belong to more than
one category,, it is classified into them in proportion.
Table 5.3. The Distribution of Agenda of Foreign Ministers' Meetings
Meeting
Ann. Spe. Informal
Break-down distribution
CEi  ESi  ESe  SCi  S1 1 e 1
Composite Distrib. Number of
C ES SC Intra. itemse
1967 1
1968 2
1969
1971
1972 5
1973
1974 7
1975 8
1976 9
1977
2'
Kuala Lumpur
5'
Manila
Kuala Lumpur
6'
7'
8'
Leged: CE. = intra-regional community---economy aspect; ESi = intra-regional
economy--- ecurity aspect; ES = extra-regional economy---security aspect;
SC. = intra-regional security---community aspect; SC = extra-regional security---
coAmunity aspcet; ES = ES i + ESe; SC = SC i + SCe; Infra. = CEi + ES i + SC .
Note: Data are unavailable in (Okabe (ed.) 1977: 367-177) for the following informal
meetings: Bangsaen(1968), New York(1971), Pattaya(1976), Bali(1976), Kuala Lumpur
(1977), and New York(1977).
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Comprehensiveness and Differentiation
The ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting obviously dealt
with not only intra-regional socio-economic issues which had
been specified in the Bangkok Declaration. As shown in Table
5.3', the subjects which at least consulted mutually among the
ASEAN foreign ministers scatter no only in CEi , i.e., the
original objective of ASEAN,' but also in the other four
categories none of which had been specified as explicit goals.
It is quite impressive how extensively the meeting dealt with
issues related to regional sevurityr, SCi and SCe . As the
highest policy-making machinery, ASEAN was unmistakably
involved in regional security as well as functional cooperation.
The view that ASEAN was functional body for socio-economic
cooperation is therefore untenable.
From the perspective of this work',' the ASEAN countries
brought into the organization various problems which correspond
to the entire domain of regional integration charted in Figure
2.2. Such problems were not brought into ASEAN in a random
fashion. Rather,' a certain order can be observed. In a word,
it is the bifurcation of the problems into the annual and
the informal meeting.
In terms of the organizational structure-, as discussed
in Section 4.4,' the informal meeting was institutionalized to
deal with political issues. As expected!, it dealt predominantly
with issues on the security--community aspect, i.e., SCi and1
SCe (Figure 5.3). Obviously,' the ASEAN foreign ministers
utilized informal meetings to discuss intra- and extra-
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regional security issues.
As shown in Figure 5.l4, agenda. for the annual meetings
were changing. In the first few years, the share of issues
on the security- community aspect (SC. and SC ) is relatively
large. This corresponds to the pre-institutionalization of
informal meetings. In other words, the ASEAN foreign ministers
had not yet set up a political forum outside the annual
meeting. As the SCi and SCe share declined, the share of
issues on the intra-regional community- economy aspect (CEi )
increased. Since 1969 until 1975, the issues on CEi had
occupied the largest share. However, the CEi share tended
to decline since 1970 because the issues on the economy
security aspect (ESi and ES e) had emerged and increased
since then. In 1976, the SCi and SCe share drastically
increased. Recall that the Declaration of ASEAN Concord
explicitly specified ASEAN's political goals and that the
economic ministers' meeting was set to implement economic
objectives. The annual meeting of foreign ministers became
more political than the previous year.
The ASEAN foreign ministers discussed issues covering
the entire domain of regional integration. In the initial few
years, they discussed not only intra-regional socio-
economic cooperation, but security issues at annual meetings.
However, as they institutionalized the informal meeting as
a political forum, they discussed more heavily economic issues
including economic security problems at annual meetings.
In 1975, they decided to set up the economic ministers' meet-
ing for economic cooperation. In the following year, as poli-
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tical cooperation is publicly mentioned as one of the ASEAN
objectives, the foreign ministers began to discuss security
issues openly at annual meetings. Thus, the differentiation
of the organizational structure and the specialization of
function was observed in ASEAN at the ministerial level.
Externalization
As discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4, the ASEAN countries
created the organization tore because of the indigenous
necessity to create a peaceful community than of the external
pressure of economic dependence and/or security threat. In
fact, the ASEAN foreign ministers discussed more on internal
issues than on external ones in the initial years. Issues
belong to the intra-regional community-- economy aspect (CEi),
the intra-regional economy----security aspect (ESi ) and the
intra-regional security- community aspect (SC1) are all
related to internal problems. The CE. + ES. + SC. share is char-
ted in Figure 5.5 for annual and informal meetings separately.
The internal issues exceeded the external ones at most of the
annual meetings (8 out of 10). Even at seven out of the nine
informal meetings, the share of internal issues occupied
more than 30% of the total issues.
To be sure, the ASEAN foreign ministers dealt with
both internal and external issues. But it cannot be said
that they were intially more concerned with external problems.
In the initial few years, issues discussed were predominantly
internal. Nor can it be said that the foreign ministers
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later became concerned more with internal issues. For the
share of internal issues reveals a declining trend for both
the annual and informal meetings. The trend suggests the
externalization of the ASEAN foreign ministers' concern.
5.3. The Foreign Ministers' Meeting as a Council: the
Accumulation of Formal Collective Decisions
ASEAN's Agreements in the Domain of Regional Integration
Among various types of collective decisions indicating
regional cooperation or integration, most conspicuous and most
formal is the binding agreement such as treaties, agreements
and declarations. Although not all the important decisions
are made in such formal means, those signed by the represen-
tatives of the participant governments may be thought of as
constituting fundamental operational codes of the organization.
In the case of ASEAN, the accumulation of agreements is
particularly important because the organization was created
without specific agreements on its activities. Starting from
the almost substance-free, and hence operationally insignifi-
cant, statement of the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN's
activities would have remained contingent without agreement on
specific goals or programs.
During ASEAN's first decade, its foreign ministers
signed eleven agreements or declarations; its heads of
government signed a treaty and a declaration; and its govern-
ors of central banks and monetary authorities signed a
memorandom (Table 5.4). Due to their importance, those
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Table 5.4. ASEAN's Treaty, Agreements and Declarations
a. Signed by Foreign Ministers, 1967-77
1967 The Bangkok Declaration
1969 The Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass
Media and Cultural Activities
The Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for the
Association of South-East Asian Nations
1971 The Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of
Non-Scheduled Air Services among the Association of
South-East Asian Nations
The Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality
1972 The Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for
Aircraft in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of
Aircraft Accidents
1975 The Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for
Ships in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Ship
Accidents
1976 The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN
Secretariat (initialed in 1975)
The ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural
Disasters
The ASEAN Declaration of Principle to Combat the Abuse
of Narcotic Drugs
1977 The Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements
b. Signed by Other Than Foreign Ministers, 1967-77
1976 The Delaration of ASEAN Concord (by heads of government)
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
.Asia (by heads of government)
1977 The Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN Swap
Arrangements (by the governors of central banks and
monetary authorities)
c. Signed by Foreign Ministers, 1978-1980
1978 The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN
Cultural Fund
1979 The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia and ASEAN Relating to the the Privileges
and Immunities of the ASEAN Secretariat
The Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve
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agreements signed by other than foreign ministers will be
included in the analysis. By 1980, three additional agree-
ments had been signed by the ASEAN foreign ministers (Table
5.4.c).
According to the subject of agreement, the abovementioned
seventeen agreements produced during 1967-1980 can be plotted
on the domain of regional integration as shown in Figure 5.6.
Truly many of ASEAN's agreements in its first decade were
more or less technical, and some did not require an imme-
diate or continuous implementation. Nevertheless, as the
expression of each participant's willingness to cooperate
with its partners of ASEAN, the signing agreements had signi-
ficant implications on ASEAN's collective orientation toward
regional integration. ASEAN's agreements accumulated in its
first decade suggest, as a whole, that ASEAN has been active
since the 1960's, and that it was not a functionally specific,
but a diffuse organization covering the entire domain of
regional integration.
Ostensible Impacts of Communist Victory in Indochina
While ASEAN produced seven agreements during the first
nine years, 1967-1975, it produced as many as ten agreements
during 1976 and 1980. The accumulation of agreements seems
to support the view that communist victory in Indochina in
1975 activated ASEAN. Applying the idea of quasi-experimental
design, the magnitude of'the impact of Indochina's political
change can be tested by comparing between the trend prior to
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Figure 5.6. ASEAN's Agreements, 1967-1980, in the Domain of Regional Integration
Source: Table 5.4.
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1975 and trend post 1976. The linear trend for the two
successive periods is as follows:
ECA = 0.22 + 0.80(Year - 1966) during 1967-75, and
ECA =-0.60 + 1.30(Year - 1966) during 1976-80,
where ECA denotes the estimated cummulative agreements.
Differences between two trends indicate that the annual
"productivity" of agreements increased by 60%, and that the
gap at the break-down point was about four agreements. In
other words, the hypothesized impact in 1975 was not only
abrupt but also lasting. Hence, the communist take-over
of Indochina seemed jumped up and accelerated ASEAN's activity
of producing agreements.
However, in the above interpretation, the impact of
communist victory may be exaggerated. First of all, out of
the five agreements signed in 1976, two were in terms of social
cooperation on drug abuse and natural disasters. Although it
is conceivable that external threats solidify the participants
so that the organization more actively produces socio-
economic functional decisions, the ASEAN countries could not
respond to the worsening security conditions by demonstrating
their cooperation on narcotic drug abuse.
Second, additional two agreements had been ready to be
agreed upon by 1975. The Agreement on the Establishment of
the ASEAN Secretariat was initialed by the foreign ministers
at the eight annual meeting held a few weeks later than the
fall of Saigon, which was based on the agreement reached in
1974. As for the important document of the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation, the draft treaty had been ready, and was
1,70
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Figure 5.7. The Accumulation of ASEAN Agreements and
Linear Trends
Source: Table 5.4.
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adopted by the foreign ministers for each government's
early approval at the same annual meeting in 1975.
The remaining agreement is the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord. Publicly declaring ASEAN's comprehensive objec-
tives as delineated in Section 4.5, the ASEAN head of
governments demonstrated their countries' solidarity vis-a-
vis the neighboring communist Indochina.
Thus, except for the Declaration of ASEAN Concord,
agreements in 1976 do not seem to have been responses,.to the
hypothesized impact, i.e., communist victory in Indochina in
1975. If not, how can the sudden increase of signing agree-
ments in 1976 be explained otherwise? Is there any model
that can explain the entire cummulative process of agreements
by ASEAN?
An Alternative Model of ASEAN's Indigenous Development
As observed in various aspects of preceding analyses,
ASEAN's activities revealed the process of the concretization
of vague principles, the change from the potential orientation
to the actual cooperation, and the differentiation of organiza-
tion's functions. They are, in a word, development. Because
the accumulation of agreements is another process of ASEAN's
development, it may be explained by an indigenously governed
developmental pattern. The developmental process is often
traceable by the so-called S-shaped curve with bottom and
ceiling saturations, or the logistic curve.
The application of the logistic development pattern
model to the cumulative agreements resulted in two periods
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Figure 5.8. The Accumulation of ASEAN Agreements and
Logistic Developmental Patterns
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of development (Figure 5.8). The break-down point is about
the year 1974. The estimation of the curves is as follows:
The estimate _ 7
of outputs 1 + 12 Exp(-0.7 (Year - 1966))
during 1967-74,
The estimate_ 12
of outputs 1 + 33 Exp(-1.0 (Year - 1973)) +6
during 1974-80.
The estimated development pattern indicates several points.
First, the first development saturated at seven outputs with
a gradual take-off. The second.developemnt is relatively
steep, and saturates at eighteen outputs. Second, as the
first development approached the saturating point in the
early 1970's, the second development started to take off.
Third, while the first development accumulated six to seven
outputs, the second has done eleven to twelve outputs. This
implies that the latter is the more conspicuous. Fourth, by
the end of the 1970's, the second development approached to
the saturation point. Provided that the model is correct, this
developmenthad been completed by the beginning of the 1980's.
The second stage of development started to take place
in 1974. This implies that ASEAN's remarkable development
which occured in 1976 was the consequence of the fastest
growing phase within the second development pattern, and that
the communist victory in Indochina happened at the time of
developmental take-off more of less coincidentally. The gap
between the estimated curve of development and the actual
accumulation of outputs in 1975 suggests that Indochina's
incidents impeded ASEAN's development perhaps because the
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participant countries had to consult with each other on the
new situation, and to postpone the scheduled agreements.
Moreover, the estimated result of development model
reminds one of the statement made by the foreign ministers
at the seventh annual meeting in 1974 that ASEAN had just
entered in its second stage for more substantial cooperation.
Although that statement was hardly taken seriously at the time,
our retrospective examination suggests that one should have
given credit to ASEAN's statement on its commitment to
regional cooperation. ASEAN's self-image at the time seems
to have reflected the saturation of the first stage of develop-
ment according to our model, and ASEAN's determination to
cooperate further seems to have resulted in the start of the
following stage of development.
The validity of the development model applied here can
be checked empirically by the mid 1980's. The model indicates
that the second stage of development reached the saturating
level by the early 1980's. If the model is correct, ASEAN
may make decisions either to stay at that level of cooperative
repertoire, or to proceed to the third stage for the further
enhancement of cooperation's behavioral codes.
As shown above, the accumulation of outputs could be
described as the incremental process by the linear trend model.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the way of accumulation and the
impact of Indochina's regime change suggest that the augmented
logistic development pattern is more appropriate to explain the
reality. Both models revealed that ASEAN had not been inactive
before the mid 1970's. While the linear trend model fits to
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the widespread image on the impact of the fall of Saigon, the
latter model goes along very closely with the actual process
of ASEAN's generation of firm agreements.' In short, not only
theoretically, but also empirically, the development model of
logistic pattern is better applicable to ASEAN.
5.4 The Foreign Ministers' Meeting as an Agency: Collective
Deals with Outside World
Foreign Ministers' Collective Actions vis-a-vis Third Parties
In a verbal form, ASEAN's collective action at the author-
itative ministerial level can date back in the early
1970's. If not likely to take place, the Declaration of
ZOPFAN in 1971 was, in part, a proposal directed toward the
neighborhood in Southeast Asia to join the ambitious program
ASEAN would take initiative. This explains well why the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation is open for accession by other
Southeast Asian countries. If formailty is concerned, the
treaty took shape of the five ASEAN countries', rather than
ASEAN's.
Another verbal collective action of the earliest ones
was the accusation of Japan for its accelerated export of
synthetic rubber. It was followed by Japanese government's
response toward ASEAN as opposed to some of the ASEAN countries.
As described in the previous chapter, ASEAN's collective action
against Japan was organizationally equipped with a committee
within ASEAN, and the arena against Japan by the name of the
ASEAN-Japan Forum on Synthetic Rubber. Collective barbaining
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was taken place not by the foreign ministers, but by govern-
mental officials representing ASEAN.
During 1972-73, the ASEAN foreign ministers took action
collectively for the peace in Vietnam. They sent the ASEAN
proposal for the peace in Indochina to concerned countries
including the United States, although they would receive no
positive response. 5
Another example of the ministerial collective action
in the early 1970's, is ASEAN's expressed concern with the
Middle East conflict. In November 1973, an active foreign
minister, Adam Malik, of Indonesia issued a press statement
in his capacity of the chairman of the ASEAN standing committee.
In the four-line statement, the ASEAN countries unifiedly
urged the settlement of the conflict along with the line of
the United Nations' actions, and took a pro-Arab attitude.
The above examples unmistakably reveal that the ASEAN
countries had started to take collective actions vis-a-vis
extra-regional actors, or in regards to extra-regional affairs,
by the early 1970's. At the foreign ministers' level, however,
those actions were verbal, i.e., the expression of their
intent or wish or concern, rather than direct deal with the
third parties outside the region.
Minsterial Links with Extra-Regional Counterparts
Until 1977 there had been no institutionalized machinery
at the ministerial level to carry out specifically collective
actions. ASEAN's ministerial contacts with extra-regional
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powers was inaugurated drastically and dramatically. Taking
the opportunity of gathering in Kuala Lumpur for the second
ASEAN summit meeting, the heads of governments met with
prime ministers of Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Three
ministers were invited by Malaysian Premier Hussein on behalf
of ASEAN, and met with the ASEAN counterparts both simultan-
eously and induvidually in Kuala Lumpur. In their respective
jo'int communiqu6s with the ASEAN heads of government, the three
invited prime ministers were made to promise more aid to
ASEAN, more import from ASEAN, and further general support of
ASEAN. The ASEAN countries expressed their strong preference
to the collective deal over the participant countries' bilat-
eral deals with those extra-regional powers.
The meeting with prime ministers of three Pacific powers
had symbolic importance for ASEAN so as to be externally
recognized as a united entity in a highly authoritative man-
ner. The significance of the meeting was not merely symbolic.
Japan, for instance, committed itself to a billion dollar aids
to the ASEAN industrial projects. Note that the aid was not
to the individual ASEAN countries, but to ASEAN. In the long
run, by beginning with the direct contact at the summit
level, ASEAN's ministerial collective action vis-a-vis extra-
regional powers came to be empowered in various forms of
cooperation and negotiation.
The ASEAN meeting with extra-regional powers were sub-
sequently inherited by the foreign ministers' meeting. At the
eleventh annual meeting at Pattaya in 1978, Japan's foreign
minister met with ASEAN counterparts upon the completion of
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the annual meeting. In 1979, the countries which sent their
foreign ministers were Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the
United States. Also the European Communities sent its chair-
man of the Ministerial Council, Ireland's foreign minister,
to Bali where the twelveth annual meeting was held. In addi-
tion to meetings of the ASEAN foreign ministers with those
five foreign ministers outside the region, a general meeting
of all the ten miniqters was held on- that occasion. This type
of direct communication with extra-regional powers became an
established practice of ASEAN's collective action at the
ministerial level.
As a consequence of the establishment of formal arena
of collective action vis-a-vis extra-regional powers, ASEAN's
teetings with those powers have increased in number. In the
first half of the 1970's, the number of meetings steadily
increased (Figure 5.9). With the outstanding exception in
1977, about three meetings have been held each year in the
last few years.
On the other hand, although started very late, the
collective deal with extra-regional powers at the ministerial
level has revealed a rapid increase in the number of meetings.
Such increase can be mostly attributed to the semi-institu-
tionalization of the foreign ministers' meeting between ASEAN
and extra-regional powers following the ASEAN foreign ministers'
meeting.
It seems clear that ministerial collective bargaining
was encouraged by unprecedented meetings of heads of govern-
ment in 1977. The practice was established recently. The
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Table 5.5. Ministerial Meetings Between ASEAN and the
Outside World
8/ 6/1977 heads of government
8/ 7/1977
8/ 7/1977
8/ 8/1977
6/ 17/1978
8/ 2- 4/1978
11/20-21/1978
3/20-21/1979
7/ 1/1979
7/ 2/1979
7/
7/
7/
7/
11/
3/
6/
6/
6/
6/
2/1979
2/1979
3/1979
3/1979
27/1979
7/1980
26/1980
27/1980
27/1980
27/1980
6/ 28/1980
6/ 28/1980
11/28-29/1980
heads of government
heads of government
heads of government
foreign ministers
ministerial level
foreign ministers
ministerial level
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
economic ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
foreign ministers
ministerial level
Australia, Japan and New
Zealand
Australia
Japan
New Zealand
Japan
USA (2nd ASEAN-US Forum)
EC (Ist ministerial meeting)
Australia
EC
Australia, EC, Japan,
New Zealand and US
Japan
US
Australia
New Zealand
Japan
EC (2nd ministerial meeting)
Australia
Japan
New Zealand
Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand and US
Canada
US
EC
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impetus was the decision made by the ASEAN heads of govern-
ment in 1976 to commit their countries further to collectively
deal with extra-regional powers on international economic
issues. The direct contact at the ministerial level is so
conspicuous that ASEAN's collective action seems to have
become externally active in the late 1970's. Nevertheless, it
should not be overlooked that ASEAN had already performed its
external collective activities in the early 1970's. Extern-
ally, in a word, ASEAN became increasingly active'since the
late 1970's.
5.5 ASEAN's Organizational Performance toward Regional
Integration
ASEAN's Open-Ended Goal and Foreign Ministers' Involvement
ASEAN has never been a functional organization for
regional economic integration or cooperation. More specifi-
cally, it has never been an organization to carry out a
particular program or programs in the pursuit of a certain
goal that was set in advance by the participant countries.
ASEAN was created as its purposes were so general as to be
almost open-ended. Lack of specific goals, or more appro-
priately open-endedness of goals made possible for ASEAN to
develop much more generally than the functional organization
is supposed to do. If ASEAN had been legally based on a
treaty which spcified the goal, procedures and the time-table,
it must have been very difficult for ASEAN to revise the
treaty in order to increment new goals one after another. In
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cultural fields.? It was natural for foreign ministers to
consult with each other on politico-security issues, and to
attempt to resolve outstanding conflicts and disputes. In a
word, that was what the ASEAN foreign ministers did, especially
in the first few years. They communicated with each other,
face to face, on whatever they thought were important for the
ASEAN region. But for the meeting of foreign ministers,
ASEAN would have been different from what we see now.
The Expansion of ASEAN's Functions
It is evident, from the discussion in Chapter 3, that
the prospective ASEAN countries were most concerned with
security among themselves. Their commitment to regional cooper-
ation was, whatever it impled, the manifestation of mutual
trust. In reality, mutual distrust was prevailing amongst
their governments and peoles. Therefore, leaders of the ASEAN
countries were hasty to commh Tmutually to the principle of
cooperation and non-agression. For that purpose, they thought,
mutual communication and uncerstanding had to be sought with
no delay. At the governmental level, the foreign ministers'
meeting and the standing committee would provide a regular
channel of face-to-face communication. At the popular level,
attention to and understanding of the neighborhood should be
enhanced by tourism and mass media. It is symbolic that one of
the first agreements signed by the ASEAN foreign ministers was
the Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media
and Cultural Activities.
The ASEAN countries began to make mutual consultation
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on regional security from external threats, especially the
situation after the anticipated American and British with-
drawal from Southeast Asia. As the intra-ASEAN crisis was
over by freezing the Sabal dispute in 1969, their concern
with external security became conspicuous.
Supported by the increasing sense of mutual trust, the
ASEAN governments chose to act collectivley as ASEAN in declar-
ing the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Like the
Bangkok Declaration to establish ASEAN, the Declaration of
ZOPFAN was neither concrete nor specific. It was the express-
ion of general, if vague, intent of the ASEAN governments.
In general, a sense of community, or we-feeling, is a
twin of a sense of environment, or they-ness. The existence
of a certain common enemy does not. necessarily create a sense
of community within a particular group of people(s), but
certainly the latter will, once it emerged, be reinforced by
the former. The threat from China did not create the we--
feeling among the ASEAN countries, but emerging we-feeling was
enhanced by the threat of China. Other threats to the ASEAN
countries were conceived with various degrees of acuteness, but
the emerging sense of community made the ASEAN countries regard
them as common threats. In short, commonness was emphasized;
differences were deemphasized. But for the commitment to
community building, the ASEAN countries would have responded
differently and more individually toward external threats. In
the grand design drawn by the ASEAN governments, the formation
of a pluralistic security-community and regional security from
external threats are closely interconnected.
185
Chronologically, security cooperation was followed by
ASEAN's collective bargaining strategy on international econo-
mic problems. It is often said that cooperation on external
problems is easier to carry out than that on internal problems,
which may be true. However, it does never assure that a cer-
tain group of countries make common actions. As security
cooperation had been, ASEAN's collective action strategy was
certainly supported by the emerging sense of community among,
at least, the governments. Moreover, collective actions worked
with some effect: the ASEAN countries benefitted to various
extents from such actions vis-a-vis third parties. Providing
them with tangible benefit, external cooperation in the form of
collective action reinforced the utility of collectiveness
and the sense of community.
ASEAN's decision in 1974 to commit the participant coun-
tries to engage more substantial intra-regional economic cooper-
ation implies two things. One is that the ASEAN countries
conceded ASEAN's low performance of intra-regional economic
cooperation. The other is, more importantly, that they expec-
ted ASEAN to perform such difficult tasks. While the ASEAN
countries had been in need of economic development, they had
dared not to cooperate with each other toward regional econo-
mic integration. The need had not resulted in economic expec-
tations directed toward ASEAN. Therefore, ASEAN's abovementioned
decision suggests that the ASEAN countries began to see ASEAN
as viable and workable. This change in the image of ASEAN was
underlined by the establishment of mutual trust and of the
sense of community among the ASEAN governments, at least
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durable enough to carry out intra-regional economic coopera-
tion. Without the sense of community, economic integration
may be pursued by technocratic bureaucrats with shared economic
rationality. In fact, those bureaucrats who are relatively
free of political stakes can make decisions and pursue certain
goals within the range that were approved of by higher author-
ities in advance. Until 1974, in the case of ASEAN, the highest
authority had not endorsed any form of economic integration.
AS for foreign ministers, economic rationality was subject to
mutual trust and a sense of community.
In 1976, the heads of government of the ASEAN countries
assigned the meeting of economic ministers to promote coopera-
tion on both intra-regional and external economic fields. The
significance was two-fold. First, the sense of community had
been so heightened that the heads of government were able to
commit themselves to the economic integration of ASEAN. Second,
economic ministers participted in ASEAN So that expertise became
readily available in respective ministries. Thus, starting with
cooperation among foreign ministers, ASEAN involved not only
other ministers, but also the heads of government. At that
time, again, the ASEAN countries had no concrete idea except
for some broad guidelines already agreed upon. When economic
cooperation was decided to promote, the economic ministers
were allowed to substantiate whatever they agreed upon because
they were so enpowered by the heads of government. In terms
of economic cooperation, the only task left in the hands of the
foreign minsters is to sign Agreements.
In general terms, ASEAN's development in its first
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decade can be described as the transformation of its poten-
tial orientations into its actual repertoire, the accumula-
tion of various factions, the emergence of new organizational
machinery, and the differntiation of the organizational
structure. In short, those developmental processes of
ASEAN can be summarized, a word, as the epigenesis of organi-
zation.
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Notes for Chapter 5
1. See my argument in Section 3.2 and (Gordon 1966: 167)
for Thanat's intention.
2. (Okabe (ed.) 1977: 367-377)
3. With respect to the quasi-experimental design, see
(Campbell and Stanley 1966), (Caporaso and Roos (eds.)
1973), and (Cook and Campbell 1979).
4. (Art. 19)
5. ACCRRIS was set up to assist those actions by foreign
ministers.
6. In 1980, the representative of EC was absent, while the
foreign minister of Canada joined the extended ASEAN
ministerial meeting.
7. It could be argued because the foreign ministers created
ASEAN, it had little accomplishments in economic fields.
For instance, (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 277).
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Chapter 6 ASEAN's Contributions and Limits
6.1. Questions of ASEAN's Contribution to Regional Integration
Since the creation of ASEAN, none of its participant
countries have even suggested the possibility of political
unification. Regional economic integration became operative
at last in 1977. Despite intermittent proposals by some
participants consensus has never been reached on the inclusion
of military cooperation in ASEAN's already multi-fold
objectives.
Did ASEAN contribute to its region's integration in
its first decade? As described in Section 1.4, the answer
given by -most of the scholars is negative. Did ASEAN not
contribute significantly ? If not, what was the use of
ASEAN for its participants?
To evaluate ASEAN's contribution, conventional criteria
of integration such as political unification and economic union
are not relevant. For ASEAN has not even attempted to unify
its member states, to integrate its economies completely, or to
form a military alliance. In a sense, ASEAN's objectives
have been modest. But it can be said to be ambitious in the
sense that its participant governments have been trying to
establish a peaceful pluralistic security-community. Not
many countries have succeeded in it.
Recall that the problems ASEAN has been coping with are
regional security from external threats, economic development
vis-a-vis external dependence, and community-building despite
divergent interests among its member countries. The assessment
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of ASEAN must be, therefore, multi-fold. In this chapter,
ASEAN's contribution to regional integration will be assessed
with respect to three main apsects according to-our perspec-
tive of regional integration: community---economy, economy-
security, and finally security--- ommunity.
6.2. Toward Socio-Economic Development and Interdependence
Trade Interdependence
Regional economic integration started with the conclu-
sion of the Treaty of ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement
in 1977. Since then, however, trade liberalization has been
in gradual, but steady progress. As of early 1981, there
were more than 6,J00 items for tariff preferences.1
Besides trade liberalization, ASEAN launched two more
rationales for economic integration. Tney are ASEAN indus-
trial projects and industrial complementation programs. In
terms of ASEAN projects, Indonesian and Malaysian plants,
both of which are urea fertilizer factories, are only now
being implemented. 70% of total costs were financed by
Japan, the remaining by the ASEAN countries. The industrial
complementation programs are yet to be concretized.
In sum, ASEAN's economic integration started in its
second decade. In order to assess ASEAN's accomplishments,
attention should be paid to current economic activities; a
full evaluation is not yet possible.
Due to no practice of trade liberalization, it can be
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inferred that intra-regional trade must have not increased
in its first decade. In a sense, such an inference is correct.
When ASEAN was created, nearly 20% of ASEAN's total trades
were transacted within the region. Ten years later, the
figure had dropped to 15%.
Nevertheless, it is misleading to conclude that trade
interdependence in the ASEAN region had continued to decrease
in ASEAN's first decade. The reality is much more interesting
to observe (Figure 6.1). Throughout the 1960's and until
early 1970's, intra-ASEAN trade revealed an unmistakable
declinina trend. Recording the bottom in 1974, however, the
trend seems to have shifted upward.
Fitting the straight line to the figure in the period
1963-1978 reveals the declining trend of intra-ASEAN trade.
The trend for the entire period is
the 6stimate
ofthe estimate = 23.05 - 0.61(Year - 1961).
of percentage
In order to examine the impact of the creation of ASEAN, the
trends should be calculated for the period prior to 1967 and
for the period later. Also, it is more appropriate to sep-
arate ASEAN's self-evaluated first stage before 1974 from the
second stage since 1974. Thus, three different periods are
assumed to examine trends. The result of estimation is as
follows:
the estimate = 28.11 - 2.19(Year 
- 1961) for 1962-66
of percentage
the estimate = 20.94 
- 0.43(Year 
- 1961) for 1967-73of percentage
the estimatethe im  = 9.78 + 0.30(Year 
- 1961) for 1974-78.
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Figure 6.1. ASEAN-'s Intra-Regional Trade, 1962-1978.
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Although ASEAN's formation did not raise intra-ASEAN trade in
the first stage, the slopes of those trends suggest that it
diminished the rate of decrease in intra-ASEAN trade to a
large extent: from more than two points to less than half a
point. The upward trend in the period 1974-78 is not impres-
sive, for the annual increase is but 0.3 points. Nevertheless,
the difference from the previous period, which is nearly one
point, is noteworthy.
The creation of ASEAN did not stop the decline in intra-
regional trade. For those who believe that ASEAN was established
for functional economic-social cooperation, the above figure
is indicative of ASEAN's failure of goal achievement. But it
must be reiterated that ASEAN was not established for such a
specific purpose. It is true that some ASEAN countries were
concerned with the declining trend of intra-ASEAN trade (see
Section 4.1). Nonetheless, it is also true that before 1974
they had not been serious about intra-regional trade coopera-
tion. Recall that the ASEAN foreign ministers declared that
the organization entered into the second stage of substantial
economic cooperation only in 1974. Intra-ASEAN trade has
shown an increasing trend since then.
Economic Development
As specified in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, national
economic development was a relatively direct goal of the ASEAN
countries. But ASEAN had imlemented no direct measure for that
goal until recently. Economic performance is not expected
I
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to reveal ASEAN's impact upon regional economies. In fact,
the growth rate of their per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) was markedly higher,except for the Thai economy, during
the first several years (1968-74) than during non-ASEAN
period (1960-67) as shown in Table 6.1. Despite the recession
in world economy, they maintained high growth rates in recent
years (1975-78).
In comparison with other groups of economies, and'
ASEAN region gradually improved its relative position. Until
ASEAN was created, it had been unimpressive. During 1968-74,
the economic performance of the five countries definitely
exceeded that of East and Southeast Asian developing countries.
In the late 1970's (1975-78), the ASEAN countries enjoyed
high growth rates in the stagnated world economy (Table 6.1).
Although ASEAN's past operation may not have directly
caused the enhancement of economic growth, the fact that the
ASEAN countries experienced higher rates of growth enhanced
the symbolic utility of ASEAN. The substantial impact should
be evaluated based on the data since 1978, the year in which
trade liberalization started.
Regional Communication Facilities
Perhaps the most conspicuous accomplishment in the
community---economy aspect was a number of projects to
improve the infrastructure for economic and socail trans-
actions in the ASEAN region.
First of all, to build communication networks was aimed
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Table 6.1. The Average Annual Growth Rate of per capita
Gross Domestic Products at Constant Prices
Indonesia
Malaysia
the Phlippines
Singapore
Thailand
Comparison
World Economy
Developing Market
Economy
Caribbean and
latin America
East and Southeast
Asia except Japan***
1960-67
-0.8
2.0
3.8
4.9
3.5
2.6
2.2
1.8
1968-74
4.9
(4.2)*
2.5
6.7
3.8
3.4
4.4
4.5
2.4
*1971-74. **197 5-77 ***Including the ASEAN countries
Source: Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1979 Vol, II,
the United Nations, 1980
1975-78
4.7
(6.6) **
3.3
6.7
5.3
2.8
3.3
2.0
4.3
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at. In early 1970's, several microwave link projects were
completed in the framework of ASEAN projects between Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Other forms of tele-
communication networks were installed, too.2 Currently, pro-
jects to connect all the ASEAN countries by submarine cable
networks are being implemented.3
In the field of shipping, secondly, ASEAN took initiative
to study and set the common policy on containerization and on
bulk shipping. Also, improvement of port and harbor operation
was ASEAN's concern. For those purposes, private sectors
were invited to participate in ASEAN projects. As a con-
sequence, a few non-governmental ASEAN organizations were
established.
Human Mobilities
Enhancement of intra-region travel, particularly tourism,
was one of the earliest focuses of cooperation within ASEAN.
The ASEAN countries cooperate with one anther to simplify and
standardize procedures of qurantine, custom formalities, and
embarcation/d-ambarcation. The issuance of collective travel
documents were recommended and imlemented. Mutual visa
abolition for short visits was also a consideralbe accomplish-
ment.
Due to geographical setting, the five ASEAN countries have
limited mutual access by land. Therefore, it is difficult
to expect a high human mobility all over the region. Truly,
a considerable number of people cross the border between Malaysia
and Singapore connected. by aCaustasay for both cars and trains,
and the border between
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Malaysia and southern Thailand where Malay muslims live densely.
Also, people travel via short distant sea routes between
heavily populated Java, Indonesia and Singapore. Otherwise,
the main means of international travel is air transportation,
which ordinary peoples in the region cannot afford. In sum,
the bulk of human mobility can be observed along with a
narrow strip of the Malay Penninsula extending to Java.
Therefore intra-regional travels may poorly represent
the level of interdependence in the entire ASEAN region.5
Available statistics are incomplete. Nevertheless, the
number of intra-ASEAN tourists increased considerably. Its
rate of increase by and large exceded that of travelers
coming intb the region (Table 6.2).
Increasing Transnational ASEAN Organizations
In order to assist, and sometimes to take intiative on
functional cooeration at the governmental level, non-govern-
mental organizations are in operation in the ASEAN region.
Established in 1971, the first non-governmental ASEAN
organization is the ASEAN Tours and Travel Association
(ASEANTTA). It has been in close collaboration with the
Permanent Committee on Tourism. The second organization
established in the private sector was the Confederation of
ASEAN Chamger of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI). It was
organized in 1972 for the purpose of supporting ASEAN's efforts
in economic and industrial cooperation. Consisting of several
working groups, for instance on trade liberalization and on
The Change in International Tourists, 1972-1977
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industrial complementation, ASEAN-CCI was accorded sole con-
sultative status by the Permanent Committee on Commerce and
Industry. Currently, ASEAN-CCI is taking initiative toward
the imlementation of ASEAN's industrial cooperation.
As of 1978, ASEAN recognized as many as twenty-seven
non-governmental organizations for complementing ASEAN's intra-
regional cooperation in economic, social, cultural and scien-
tific fields (Table 6.3).7
Cultural Exchanges
Getting to know each other does not necessarily mean
getting to like each other. At least, one of the founders of
ASEAN had been worried about it. In 1959, governments of
Malays and the Philippines were collaborating with each other
to create a regional treaty organization for exonomic, social
and cultural cooperation. To this plan, the Thai counter-
part responded positively with several counter-proposals.8
One of the Thai objections to Malaya-Philippine plan was about
cultural cooperation. In the region consisting of Muslimes,
Buddhists and Catholics, the Thia government concluded, cul-
tural cooperation would be more divisive than cohesive.9
Ten years later, in 1969, the ASEAN countries concluded
the Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media
and Cultural Activities. Mass media cooperation includes:
(a)broadcasting regular programs to reflect the aims,
purposes and activities of ASEAN,
(b)organizing film festivals,
(c)encouraging the exchange of film artists and the
undertaking of joint film productions and
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Table 6.3 ASEAN's Transnational Organization
1971 ASEAN Tour and Travel Association (ASEANTTA)
1972 Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(ASEAN-0CI)
1974 ASEAN Motion Picture Producers' Association (AMPPA)
1975 ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIO)
ASEAN Council of Museums (ASEANCOM)
ASEAN Women Circle of Jakarta
ASEAN Port Authorities Association (APAA)
ASEAN Cardiologist Federation
Confederation of ASEAN Youth Cooperation (CYC)
Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA)
1976 ASEAN Federation of Women's Organization (ACWO)
ASEAN Automotive Association (AAF)
ASEAN Bankers' Association (ABC)
Federation of ASEAN Shippers' Council (FASC)
Federation of ASEAN Newspaper Publishers
Federation of ASEAN Economics Association
ASEAN Pediatric Federation
1977 ASEAN Federation of Accountants (AFA)
ASEAN Council of Japan Alumni (ASCOJAAL)
Date of Establishment Unknown
ASEAN College of Surgeons
ASEAN Consumers Protection Agency
ASEAN Steel Community
ASEAN Federation of Jurists
ASEAN Trade Union Council
Federation of the ASEAN Public Information Organization
(FAPRO)
Source: (ASEAN 1978: 239). The date of establishment
was obtained from other sources for some
organizations
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(d)organizing seminars and other activities on mass
media. 0
Cultural cooperation to promote includes:
(a)exchanging artists in the field of visual and
performing arts,
(b)undertaking joint research in the arts and in litera-
ture,
(c)organizing seminars and exhibitions in the arts,
literature, and related matters, and
(d)organizing cultural festivals. 11
In accordance with this agreemnt, festivals, seminars and
exhibitions have been held in the ASEAN countries by the spon-
sorship of ASEAN. Have they been affecting cohesively or
divisively the level of regional integration? It is difficult
to assess precisly. Such cultural cooperation involved many
artists, professionals, experts, authorities and scholars in
the ASEAN region. The direct effects seems to have promoted
friendly familiarity with one another. Moreover, particularly
through mass media, cultures in neighborhood have been exposed
to local people who could not afford to tour the region.
Regional cooperation in cultural activities may have changed
to some extenet some countries' excessive attachment to former
metropolises.
It is remarkable that those countries which are now in
the course of nation-building have been cooperating with one
another in the field of mass media and cultural activities.
For this may be perceived as an obstacle to establish national
identity with a certain culture. Any way, mutual interest in,
202
and familiarity with, neighborhood is a necessary condition for
regional community-building.
6.3. Forming the Externally Recognized Unit
Collective Action for Regional Self-Protection
In its first decade, ASEAN's major success in the
collective bargaining was against Japan. In the bargaining
process, the ASEAN countries showed a strong solidarity in
pressuring the Japanese government through both diplomatic
channels between the participant countries and Japan, and
ASEAN's joint missions to Japan. The Japanese government
was forced to promise to exercise a restraining influence on
the Japanese synthetic rubber industry, and to provide tech-
nical assistance for the increase of the consumption of
natural rubber.
ASEAN's collective action in shipping was not so dramatic
as ASEAN's deal with Japan, but was So significant to indicate
the level of regional integration through ASEAN. In 1973, for
instance, ASEAN adopted a common stand in the meeting to
formulate a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. While the
Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) proposed an increase of
tariff by 26%, ASEAN opposed the plan to make FEFC propose an
18% increase. This collective bargaining took place in 1974,
which was conducted by a. private ASEAN organization directed
by ASEAN.
In the late 1970's, a similar tactic was taken by ASEAN
again to deal with Australia on its low air fare between
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Australia and England and on costly stop-over surcharges
which would particularly hurt Singapore. ASEAN succeeded in
participating in flight operation and in reducing the surcharge
to great extent.
Concrete accomlishments in the aspect of economy ---
security, out of the collective bargaining vis-a-vis powers
outside the region, became more conspicuous since the meeting
of economic ministers took over charge of ASEAN's economic
cooperation. In other words, ASEAN's gain became further
significant as ASEAN entered into its second decade.
In terms of trade relations, ASEAN and EC accorded each
other most-favored nation treatment. 12Moreover, EC, Japan
and Australia have agreed to reduce tariff an/or to improve and
expand product coverage of the Generalized System of Preference.
ASEAN's success in bringing in more aid from advanced
countries outside the region is two-fold. First, extra-
regional powers have commited themselves to increase aid to
the ASEAN countries. Australia, for instance, made a decision
to increase its bilateral aid to the ASEAN countries by 90
million Australian dollars to 250 million. 13Japan's Premier
expressed the country's intention to more than double its
official development assistance (ODA) and the priority would
be given to the ASEAN countries.
Second, ASEAN has become an entity to receive aid and
loans, as an organization. As early as in 1974, Australia
agreed on 5 million Australian dollar aids to ASEAn . The
biggest commitment to ASEAN has been so far made by Japan in
the amount of one billion U.S. dollars to ASEAN industrial
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projects. Australia's commitment, as of 1980, had increased
to 34.5 million Australian dollars.
Initiatives toward the New International Economic Order
The ASEAN countries' similar economic structure enabled
the governments to recognize common problems and needs for
cooperation on commodity issues. The Association of Natural
Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC) was established in 1970
whose majority has been ASEAN countries. 14 In 1974, the
Southeast Asian Lumber Producers Association, a non-governmental
organization, was set up by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Phili-
ppines.
ASEAN expressed its interests in such commodities as
natural rubber, tropical.timber, vegitable oils and oil-
seeds, copper, tin, sugar, etc. The ASEAN economic ministers
adopted a joint ASEAN approach on those major commodity issues
in the arena of UNCTAD. They were particularly eager to
establish common funds. 1 5
ANPRC, now consisting of the all ASEAN countries, Sri
Lank and Papua New Genea, took intiative to create the inter-
national natural rubber agreement. It was concluded in 1979,
as the first of that sort in accordance with UNCTAD's guide-
line.
More generally, the ASEAN countries are heavily depen-
dent upon the industrial countries as briefly sketched in
Section 3.1. In the first half of the 1970's, ASEAN's imports
were supplied mainly by Japan (25%), the EEC countries (17%),
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and the United States (16%) 1 6 . In the same period, intra-
regional imports were 10% while the oil exporting countries
supplied 10% of ASEAN's imports, and the socialist countries
including China only 4%. Although the economic development
policy and the foreign economic policy of the ASEAN countries
have made their economies open to the capitalist market econ-
omy, and hence have kept them dependent upon it, they are
certainly in favor of the New International Economic Order.
The Philippines hosted the fifth UNCTAD in 1979. The ASEAN
economic ministers decided to act collectively at UNCTAD. On
the other hand, while closely tied with the industrial world,
the ASEAN countries have attempted to improve their relations
with major industrial countries. Instead of bilateral nego-
tiations, they conducted collective bargaining.
Propensity for Collective Bargaining
There have been several events which indicated that the
ASEAN countries preferred to act as a regional group rather
than individual countries. In other words, they seem to have
chosen to act collectively as a recognizeable entity vis-a-vis
the world outside the region.
First of all, as described in Section 4.3, regularized
forums where the ASEAN countries conduct collective deals
were established by the initiatives taken by ASEAN. "Coopera-
tion" with Japan began with ASEAN's accusation of it; the group
of ASEAN national secretaries general initiated the dialogue
with Australia; ASEAN successfully took efforts to be recog-
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nized as a substantive group by EC.
Second, the ASEAN countries preferred to be treated as a
regional group by outside powers. Relations with EC seem very
illustrative. When the United Kingdon joined EC, the Common-
wealth countries in Adia were treated as "non-associables," and
were expected to resolve problems related to Britain's entry
into EC at bilateral basis in accordance with "Declaration of
Intent" in 1963.17 In the original plan, the Declaration of
Intent would be applied only to Malaysia and Singapore in the
ASEAN region. Eventually ASEAN succeeded in making EC apply
it to all the ASEAN countries. Moreover, when EC proposed to
conclude trade agreement with them bilaterally, the ASEAN
countries refused to accept EC's plan. Instead, they insisted
to be treated as an entity. It is notable that the above
development of ASEAN-EC relations took place during 1972-74.
Third, the ASEAN countries conducted collective actions
even in the situation where not all of them would benefit from
the deal. Rather, they collaborated with one another where
some of them would benefit and the other would not hurt. One
of such cases is ASEAN's collective action vis-a-vis Japan on
synthetic rubber. Another recent example is a tough bargaining
with Australia on air fare. In the former case, only Malaysia
was the substantial beneficiary. In the latter case, only
Singapore. Nevertheless, in both cases, the ASEAN countries
surprised their counterparts by a close collaboration and
joint moves which were apparantly well planned based on
mutual consultation in advance among the ASEAN countries.
Thus, the ASEAN countries established the practice of
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mutual consultation and collective action in terms of some
major international economic isses during ASEAN's first decade.
The process of institutionalization was undoubtedly reinforced
by the success of early trials in getting concession from
powers. The ASEAN countries quickly learned the utility of
integration vis-a-vis external world.
Attempts at Collective Self-Reliance
In terms of intra-regional collective economic security,
ASEAN has been especially concerned with the security reserve
of rice and petroleum. ASEAN's official commitment started
with the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976, in which
cooperation on basic commodities, particularly food and energy
was mentioned. In 1978, the ASEAN economic minis.ters agreed
18to set up a reserve system for rice. In the following year,
the ASEAN agricultural ministers met to initial the agreement
on the reserve of rice, which was subsequently approved by
the economic ministers. Finally, in December 1979, the
ASEAN foreign ministers signed the Agreement on the ASEAN Food
Security Reserve. Although the amount was only 50,000 metric
tons,it was a significant symbolic step toward ASEAN's collec-
tive economic security.
The agreement on petroleum took more time than that on
rice. In September 1980, the meeting of the ASEAN energy
ministers was held to pave the way for energy cooperation and
for energy security. In the following month, the economic
ministers took note seriously of the recommendations made by
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the energy ministers. 19 A week later, the sixth meeting of
ASEAN Council of Petroleum (ASCOPE), a non-governmental
organization, was held by region's national petroleum companies.
Indonesian energy minister who attended in the meeting proposed
the system of joint reserve of petroleum. The plan was welcomed,
and is to be concretized at the time of this writing.
6.4. A Flexible Search for Security
Increasing Mutual Responsiveness
In the first half of the 1970's, one of the most serious
external problems for individual ASEAN countries was their
relations with People's Republic of China. As mentioned in
Section 4.4., China sent subtle-but unmistakable messages on
its willingness toaccommodate its relations with the ASEAN
countries. It even supported, though informally, Malaysia's
neutralization policy and subsequently ASEAN's. Malaysian
Premier Razak already expressed his plan to establish diplo-
matic relations with China.
In 1971, the ASEAN foreign ministers started to consult
with one another on their relations with China, and agreed
to make prior consultations on taking any action. At the
expense of a few-year delay, Malaysia,the most eager ASEAN
member to establish diplomatic relations with China, took
efforts for all the ASEAN governments to reach consensus on
the issue. Although they failed to take action simultaneously,
they agreed on the order: Malaysia first, then the Philippines
and Thailand. Singapore decided to be last to establish
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diplomatic relations with China.
Malaysia normalized diplomatic relations with China in
1974. In the following year, the Philippines and Thailand
established diplomatic relations with China, and immediately
severed those with Taiwan. Since itS suspension of diploma-
tic relations with China in 1967, Indonesia has not yet
normalized them; hence, Singapore has not either.
Muslim insurgency in the Philippines is another good
example to take a look at as a Jillsttrytion of ASEAN's mutual
responsivenessTsecurity issues. While the population in the
Philippines are predominantly Catholic, there is a significant
proportion of Muslims in the southern Philippines. Since the
late 1960's, many have supported the independence movement
against the central government. Very importantly, Sabah's
chieftain Mustapha and Libya's revolutionary leader Kadaffi
evertly supported this Muslim separatist movement. This
development could have challenged ASEAN's solidarity. For,
Indonesia and Malaysia are both Islamic states, and might be
supposed to support Phillipines' anti-government movement.
Moreover, the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Phili-
ppines could have flamed up again.
The actual response of ASEAN neighbors to Philippines'
Muslim rebellion was indeed interesting. Both Indonesia and
Malaysia took efforts successfully to tone down the Islamic
countries' accusation of the Philippine government as an
oppressor of Muslims, at the foreign ministers' conference
of Islamic countries in Benghazi, in 1973. It is no surprise
that the Philippines government expressed gratitude to
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Malaysian and Indonesian governments. 2 0
Flexibility: an Advantage of ASEAN's Diversity
Although Indonesia's political change in 1966 made all
the ASEAN countries anti-communist, they maintained different
security arrangements. Through SEATO, the Philippines and
Thailand were linked with the United States. Malaysia and
Singapore were with the United Kingdom through the Anglo-
Malaysian Defense Agreement (AMDA), which was replaced in
1971 by a looser but broader arrangement involving not only
Britain but also Australia and New Zealand.21 For Indonesia,
any alignment with major powers was contradicting with its
traditional non-alignmient policy. The ASEAN countries did
not form ASEAN because they needed a stronger military defense
arrangement. Facing the turbulent international environment,
e.g., the unsettles Vietnam war, Sino-American rapprochement,
the ASEAN countries had recognized their incapability of
influenciy major powers to create the favorable environment.
Allied countries in ASEAN sought for a flexible way of secur-
tiy arrangement, rather than keeping attached to rigid collec-
tive defense systems. While five Southeast Asian countries
created ASEAN primarily because they wanted to show their mutual
good-will, they also recognized ASEAN's utility as an instru-
ment to increase their own foreign policies' flexibility.
To begin with, foreign policy differences were part of
incentives to create ASEAN. For Indonesia which had been
inclined heavily to communist China until 1945, to form a
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grouping with the Philippines and Thailand would serve for
amelioration of relations with Western countries, the United
States in particular. For the Philippiens and Thailand, which
both felt to be involved excessively in the Vietnam War, to
form a grouping with Indonesia would add an element of non-
alignment in their foreign policy options.
Because the majority of their population are Muslim, and
because their national religions are both Islam, Indonesia
and Malaysia have been members of the Conference of Islamic
Countries.. Association with these two Islamic countries was
invaluably useful for the Phlippine government when it dealt
with the Muslim rebellion in its territory and with some
Islamic countries supporting the rebels. In addition, because
of Indonesia's membership in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), other ASEAN members which had not
established strong ties with the Middle East countries bene-
fitted during the oil crisis in 1973 to adopt pro-Arab
attitude in international scene.22
Being a non-aligned state, Indonesia had recognized all
the Indochinese countries by 1955, and established ambassador-
ial diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1964. This long
existing channel served for Malaysia and Singapore when they
eStablished their diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in
1973. Interestingly, since Indonesia temporarily worsened
its relations with North Vietnam in 1975 in response to commu-
nist victory in Saigon, Malaysia became a mediator between
Vietnam and th other ASEAN countries.
Similarly, since Malaysia established diplomatic rela-
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tions with China in 1974 in accordance with an ASEAN consensus
as the first ASEAN country to do so, it served as the ASEAN
representative in Peking. Even now, three of the ASEAN
countries which have diplomatic relations with China play a
role on behalf of Indonesia and Singapore. Strongly affected
by the feeling of military threat by the occupying Vietnamese
army in Cambodia, Thailand became closest to China among the
ASEAN countries.
Toward the Peaceful Resolution of Intra-ASEAN Conflict
While the ASEAN countries were deeply concerned with
external threats to regional security, all of them, the neigh-
boring countries of Indonesia in particular, were most concerned
with intra-regional security problems. Among many other-motives,
regional integration toward a peaceful pluralistic security-
community was most strongly perceived by the ASEAN governments.
As discussed in Chapter 5, ASEAN started toward such
crucial integration in 1968, in order to encapulate the Sabah
dispute. The conflict control was formally introduced with
the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In
its Chapter IV. (Arts. 13 through 17), pacific settlement of
disputes is assigned to the ASEAN countries. Rather than a
formalized procedure to settle conflicts peacefully, the in-
formal concilliation and good office is preferred.
Was ASEAN's spirit to settle conflicts peracefully sub-
-stantiated in any form at all? Was the only major outstand-
ing dispute, i.e., the Sabah dispute, settled peacefully? In
1977, Philippine President Marcos visited Malaysia to attend
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the second ASEAN summit. As a contribution to order, fairness,
and justice among the ASEAN peoles, he announced,the Philippine.
government was taking definite steps to eliminate one of the
burdens of ASEAN, the claim of the Phlippine Republic to
Sabah.
6.5 Some Limits on ASEAN's Contributions
The Intra-ASEAN Problem
In the framework of ASEAN, its participant governments
considerably enhanced mutual responsiveness and mutual trust.
Nevertheless, some members' distrust vis-a-vis others has not
yet completely disappeared. Despite the public statement on
the Sabah issue by the Phlippine government, Malaysians seem
still skeptical. Si-rice the Philippines claimed its sover-
eignty over Sabah in 1962, none of Malaysian premiers have
visited the Philippines. WhenIndonesia annexed Portuguese
East Timor by military forces in 1976, at least Singapore
expressed its displeasure by abstaining votes on resolutions
accusing Indonesian military annexation in the United Nations
General Assembly while the other ASEAN countries firmly sup-
ported Indonesia. Although by the late 1970's Indonesia had
experienced bilateral naval exercises with fourother ASEAN
countries, and although bilateral joint military operations
against communist guerillas on state borders have been con-
ducted, the contingent plan against military attack by one
of the ASEAN countries may be still in existence in some
participant governments. It cannot be said that the ASEAN
countries are already a pluralistic security-community.
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As mentioned earlier, ASEAN started to imlement economic
integration programs in 1977. Like preceding efforts of
economic integration in other regions, ASEAN's program faced
various obstacles to further integration. Intra-regional gaps
on industrialization and development were huge. Agricultural
outputs occupied 43% of GDP in Indonesia, but only 1.5% in
Singapore in 1975. In that year, Singapore's per capita GDP
was thirteen times as high as Indonesia's despite its consid-
erable increase in oil export revenue. Singapore was advocat-
ing trade liberalization, but Thailand and Malaysia were very
reluctant. Interestingly, Indonesia which had been expected
to be reluctant turned out most cooperative in concessions
but Singapore. 2 4 With regard to the package deal arrangement,
Singapore had to abandon its ASEAN project of a diesel engine
manufacturing factory becuase of Indonesia's strong objection.
Differences in individual countries' interests were
evident. Because ASEAN has been adopting and implementing
integration programs based on consensus, those differences
will not cause the dissolution of the organization or some
members' withdrawal. In the case of ASEAN, they will inevi-
tably slow down or eventually stagnate the pace of economic
integration unless consensus is reached through mutual
compromise.
The Extra-Regional Problem
Since 1979, ASEAN has been facing a new security problem
caused by Vietnamese invaseion in Cambodia. In 1978, the
relations between the ASEAN countries and Vietnam considerably
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improved, and the Soviet Union expressed its support of ASEAN
for the first time since the formation of ASEAN. Thus, the
ASEAN countries became optimistic about their peaceful co-
existence with Vietnam. However, Vietnamese invasion in
Cambodia in December 1978, the fall of Phnom Penh in the fol-
lowing month, and Chinese invasion in Vietnam during February
and March 1979 had large impacts upon the ASEAN countries.
Although the Vietnamese refugees (boat people) problem united
the ASEAN countries, and although four other ASEAN countries
expressed their will to support Thailand in case of Vietna-
mese invasion in the Thai territory, their perceptions of,
external threats diverged. Thailand regarded Vietnam as the
main threat, and wanted to move closer to China; Indonesia
still feared China as the main source of threat, and pre-
ferred theaccommodation with Vietnam. As a collectivity,
ASEAN took its traditional flexible response: while Indonesia
and Thailand kept contact with Vietnam and China, respectively,
ASEAN took the different position on the Cambodian problem from
China's, and argued for a "political" solution. However, if
some members of ASEAN adopt defense policy that is incompat-
ible. with others', ASEAN's utility of external security-
seeking will diminish.
Although acute conditions in Indochina highlighted the
security vulnerability ASEAN faces, the .economic vulnerabil-
ity of the region still remains as problematical as ever.
Despite their dependence upon industrial economies, the
ASEAN counties have kept their economies open to the
world economy. Unlike ANCOM, ASEAN has not adopted any
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measures to regulate foreign investment in the region.
Exports from the ASEAN countries are occupied by a few pri-
mary commodities. Once, Thailand showed its resentment against
Japan's economic over-presence. Through collective actions
and minsterial negotiations vis-a-vis major industrial coun-
tries, ASEAN succeeded in obtaining several types of economic
gains as delieated in Section 6.3. Nevertheless, the ASEAN
countries will continue to be dependent upon and vulnerable
against economies outside the region.
Past Contributions and Future Prospects
While many obstacles to ASEAN's further integration should
be taken seriously, its contributions, whether direct or in-
direct, to'regional integration should be also taken.seriously.
Supported by the participant governments' common orientation
toward the creation of a peaceful community, ASEAN's activities
have been various, and its contributions to integration among
its participants have covered various aspects, too (Figure
6.3).
ASEAN has been receiving widespread pessimistic assesments
and predictions on its activities. Although its success in
the past does not guarantee its success in the future, ASEAN
demonstrated its viability and utility for its participants.
Through the fifteen-year experience of consultations and coop-
eration in the framework of ASEAN, the five ASEAN countries
learned how to compromise with each other in order to create
a peaceful pluralistic community. ASEAN's past experience
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revealed its participants' increasing capability of handling
differences in interests among themselves.
It is certainly worthwhile to keep paying attention to
ASEAN's future. Will the participant governments continue
to resolve conflict between themselves without resort of
forces? Will ASEAN's flexible regional security-seeking
suffice the need of its participant governments to cope with
external threat? Will new political gernations keep commiting
themselves to regional cooperation and integration in the
framework of ASEAN? Will less privileged peoples in the re-
gion identify themselves with the ASEAN community?
In terms of the major power relations such as Sino-
American relationship, the ASEAN countries, whether indivi-
dually or collectively, have insignificaht influbnce. The
maintenance of security depends upon their capability of
adaptation toward international environment.
On the other hand, the ASEAN countries are relatively
capable of handling their own problems. Adopting economic
development policy under the strong leadership, each govern-
ment of the ASEAN countries are currently trying to build a
nation. Nation-building is still an important goal of each
ASEAN country which contains various ethnic groaps. At the
same time, interestingly, the ASEAN countries did not hesi-
tate to create the regional identity which might impede their
own national identities from taking root. They have so far
succeeded in keeping their respected national identities com-
patible with the regional identity of ASEAN.
Most probably, the five governments will continue to
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aim at establishing both national and regional identities.
Peoples can identify themselves with more than one identity:
in this case, ASEAN and respective nations. The establishment
of identity, however, depends on the actual condition of well-
being and the future promise of better-off that the identity
in question provides people with. If the ASEAN governments
succeed in national economic development and the better-off
of less priveleged people through cooperation in the frame-
work of ASEAN, then they will have a good chance to establish
both national and regional identities, and hence the nation
and the ASEAN pluralistic security-community. If they fail,
people will not regard government-led identities to be desir-
able. Instead, people will look for, and will eventually find,
alternative identities to pursue. In this sense, as for the
ASEAN peoples, the choice is to accept either both or none.
So far, regional cooperation at both governmental and
private sectors goes along with the cultivation of mutual
trust and understanding. In the long run, however, the
formation of a security-community in the region will also
depend on domestic politics and economy that could attach
peoples to the nation and ASEAN. Certainly, there is a long
way to go.
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Chapter 7. Theory and Practice of Regional Integration:
Contributions of the ASEAN Experience and a New
Perspective
7.1 Reasons for the Integration of the ASEAN Region
In Section 1.5, I argued that neither the problem ASEAN
was faced with nor the strategy it adopted was peculiar to the
ASEAN region, and that they were more or less prevalent in
the developing world in general. My question there was why
the integration effort worked so well in the case of ASEAN.
The reason for ASEAN's current "success" will be synthetically
summarized in this section from three clusters: the back-
ground condition, the initial conditions and driving forces,
and the process of regional integration.
The Convergent Background
As briefly surveyed in Section 3.1, the ASEAN region can
be characterized by the considerable divergence in ethnic,
linguistic and religious terms, which one might be tempted to
call primordial factors. However, such divergent backgrounds
did not play any major roles to obstruct the creation of ASEAN.
There was a overriding convergent background in political and
economic terms.
One of the basic aspects of the convergent background was
the ASEAN economies. Although the economic dependence of
individual ASEAN countries upon the outside world prevented
them from creating an interdependent regional economy, there
have been notable communalities. Each of the ASEAN countries
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haS adopted economic develpment policies within the world
capitalist market economy. In each economy of the ASEAN
countries, foreign investment and aid from Western industrialized
countries have played important roles in economic develop-
ment.
Compared with those economic aspects, the anti-communist
stance of the ASEAN countries is a very conspicuous political
aspect of the convergent bakcground. In particular, China was
seen suspicious of the source of domestic political instability
in each ASEAN country.
This political convergence and the economic policy con-
vergence was brought into the region by Indonesia's political
1
shift in the mid 1960's. In this sense, the convergent back-
ground appeared only one year before the creation of ASEAN.
Without Indonesian political change, the ASEAN countries would
never have the convergent background to create the organiza-
tion.
Nevertheless, this convergent background could be applied
to a broader area than the ASEAN region. Economic dependence
on external economy was more or less observed in most of the
Asian countries. The market economy oriented development
policy and the anti-communist policy were in fact the conver-
gent backgournd of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC).
In short, the above convergent background was necessary for
the ASEAN country to create the organization, but certainly
not sufficient.
The last aspect of the convergent background was more
directly associated with ASEAN's operation. That is, the
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practice of consensus building based on the greatest common
divisor. This practice was substantially established during
the formation process of ASA and Maphilindo. Differences were
put aside, and the commonness was emphasized. Because it had
been customary before ASEAN was formed, the practice was
smoothly introduced into the new organization.
The Initial Condition and Driving Forces
Admittedly, the participant countries did not expect much
from ASEAN at its inception, Nor they have ideas what to do.
ASEAN's profile was, in a word, unimpressive.
On the other hand, there were no other practical alterna-
tives than ASEAN for the ASEAN countries to communicate with
each other. Even ordinary diplomatic channels were not well
established within the region.
Moreover, the ASEAN countries urgently needed to consult
with one another about changing international environments.
Specifically, the unsettled Vietnam war and British military
withdrawal plan from Southeast Asia were the major concerns
at the time of ASEAN's creation. By 1969, American disengage-
ment in Southeast Asia had become foreseen.
The most fundamental and decisive driving force of ASEAN
was the agreement among national leaders in the ASEAN coun-
tries to create a "peaceful community" in their words, which
I called a security-community. To be sure, they did not have
any promising programs to guarantee the establishment of a
security-community. But they invariably felt the need for
establishing frequent and regular communication practices to
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replace mutual distrust by mutual understanding and trust.
The Process of Regional Integration
ASEAN was not ready to produce any conspicuous outcome;
it provided its participant countries with the forum, however,
In its initial years, 1967-71, ASEAN's function as the forum
seems to have satisfactorily met its participants' low expec-
tation vis-a-vis ASEAN. Recall how intensively did informal
foreign ministers' meetings deal with threats to their security
from within and without.
Precisely because ASEAN was expected little, its per-
formance was perceiv.ed as rewarding. On the one hand, coopera-
tion in the framework of ASEAN changed from necessity due to
no alternatives to preference due to its utility. On the
other hand, as a forum, ASEAN gradually fermented mutual under-
standing, and to a lesser extent mutual trust, among its par-
ticipant countries' leaders. In consequence, ASEAN started
to serve for its participant governments as the council to
make decisions on regional cooperation. ASEAN as a council
worked mainly in the apsect of community while ASEAN as a
forum extensively worked in the community --- security apsect.
The existence of the ASEAN countries' preference to
cooperate in the framework of ASEAN has been observed since
the end of 1971. The Declaration of ZOPFAN in November 1971
and collective actions vis-a-vis third parties which was
initiated with dealing with EEC in 1972 were good examples.
ASEAN began to work as an agency in the community---security
and the security---economy aspects. In the period 1971-74,
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mutual understanding and mutual responsiveness became apparent
at least at the governmental level. Notable events include
the support of Malaysia by the other four on rubber problems
since 1973, and Indonesian and Malaysian support of the Phili-
ppines on its Muslim minority problems sinoe 1974. Also in
this period, transnational ASEAN organizations began to emerge,
and played a considerable collaboration with ASEAN in the
implementation of ASEAN projects as well as in the conduct of
collective bargaining with extra-regional non-governmental
organizations.
The above development of ASEAN and of the ASEAN region
cannot be explained wholly by the external threats to political
and/or economic security. For such factors do not work effec-
tively unless the ASEAN countries agree to respond to such
threats collectively. ASEAN's development in the period 1971-
74 was made possible by the gradual increase in both expec-
tation vis-a-vis ASEAN and the commitment to ASEAN's coopera-
tive framewok, which in turn took place the satisfying activi-
ties of ASEAN mainly as a forum. The dissemination of a
symbolic use of ASEAN from the public to the private sector
strongly suggests how positively was ASEAN regarded in the
region. The gradual increase in- the expectation toward ASEAN
seems to have been balanced with its limited performance with
certain rewards. Through the involvement in ASEAN's coopera-
tive framework, the participant governments gradually but
steadily became convinced of mutual understanding, responsive-
ness and trust to the extent enough to commit themselves to
more difficult tasks. To state differently, ASEAN's utility
228
was demonstrated not only in terms of forum, but also agency.
The ASEAN countries recognized that the organization could be
used more extensively as council on regional matters.
The year 1974 deserves the starting point of the third
period of ASEAN. In that year the ASEAN countries agreed to
start substantial economic integration efforts, to establish
the central secretariat, and to materialize mutual security
commitment. These decisions seem to have illustrated that the
confidence about the viability of ASEAN was confirmed among
its participant countries. Mutual trust became more reality
than ideal. The central secretariat was established in 1976
upon agreement initialed in 1975, and signed in 1976 in the
form of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Economic inte-
gration program became concrete in 1976, and started to be
substantiated in the following year including the conclusion
of the Agreement on the ASEAN Preferntial Trade Aggangement.
In this way, ASEAN expanded its activities into the community
---- economy apsect.
Thus, by 1977 ASEAN had been operated as not only a
forum but also a council and an agency in the entire domain
of regional integration. ASEAN's development in its first
decade was undeniably a result of its participant countries'
response and initiative toward secure international political
and economic environment. It should be repeatedly stressed
that ASEAN's development was not the forced reaction of its
participant countries against worsening international environ-
ment. It was based on the deliberate choice by each partici-
pant government to commit itself more to ASEAN. Such
229
commitment was certainly induced by a recognizable degree
of benefit ASEAN had brought in and a sufficient degree of
trust on its partners.
Conditions for Successful Integration
In the preceding reasoning of ASEAN's integration
process, a relatively small number of factors seem to have
played a crucial role in making the organization successful.
The most fundamental and indispensable factor is the compre-
hensive orientation toward region integration. Especially,
the inclusion of the orientation toward community seems
imperative for the organization to be invulnerable vis-a-vis
various forms of problems and obstacles.
Provided a relatively comprehensive orientation, the
next important factor is appropriate organizational charac-
teristics. The appropriateness of organization is the bear-
able organizational burden by its participants. It must be
light if the current level of integration efforts is low.
If there is already high, then the burden may be heavy.
When an appropriate type of organization is in existence,
the successful integration process depends largely upon the
participants' satisfaction about the organization performance.
The satisfaction level is the reverse level of the gap between
their expectation toward the organization and the actual per-
formance. It is very important for them to be satisfied with
the organization in order for them to commit to it more deeply
and to take more efforts within it.
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7.2. Prospective Integration Efforts in a New Perspective:
a Generalization of the Experience of ASEAN
The perspective of regional integration proposed in
Chapter 2 is an hypothesized viewpoint that would enable one
to look into integration efforts more relevantly and accurately
than existing regional integration theories. Admittedly,
numerous factors are involved in the process of integration
effots. It is not easy task to formulate a model of
(dis-)integrative processes in which those factors are inter-
locked.
In the previous section, 7.1., however, a relatively small
number of crucial factors were identified in the reasoning of
ASEAN's successful integration process. It was explained by
the particular combination of the existence or absence of
several factors. It seems important to generalize ASEAN's
pattern in the perspective of regional integration so as to
obtain useful lessons from a successful experience, and to
formulate a more specific model of regional integration.
The Comprehensiveness of the Orientation
On the most fundamental basis, the successful integra-
tion process depends on the comprehensive orientation toward
regional integration. If they do not agree with one another
on the concrete program or the schedule, the participant
countries need to agree that they are concerned with regional
matters comprehensively: not merely economy, or security, but
economy, security and community. Especially, the orientation
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toward community should exist in the first place. Otherwise,
the accommodation on the inevitable difference in individual
interests will be very difficult. That economic integration
will eventually succeed in establishing community does not
seem realistic. The successful economic integration is sub-
ject to the strength of the orientation toward community
because the latter affects the capability of solving problems
that would sooner or later emerge in association with the
implementation of economic integrative programs. Those who
have the will to pursue the orientation toward community
would most probably overcome problems in the future, whether
anticipated or not.
On the other hand, the orientation solely toward communi-
ty is insufficient, or at least inefficient, to realize inte-
grative process in the long run. The orientation toward
economy or security should never be ruled out. In fact, eco-
nomic inegration would establish the economic basis for com-
munity development. Mutual security is inseparable from the
successfyl community-building. External security enables one
to get more involved in intra-regional matters. As discussed
in Section 2.2, community, economy and security are inter-
related in the domain of regional integration. Each aspect does
not guarantee the emergence or maintenance of the others.
Although all the aspects do not have to be started to pursue
at the same time, they seem to need to be pursued for the
successful integration in the long run.
In the developing world, for the states that became
independent after World War II in particular, the prior
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experience of pursuing security, economy or community is very
weak, if ever existed. The attempt of establishing integra-
tion in one aspect would be sooner or later be faced with the
ceiling imposed by the absence of orientation in other
aspects. The conscious comprhensive orientation toward
community, economy and security is most important background
condition for the group of countries to succeed in regional
integration.
Moreover, countries in the developing world are vulner-
ably exposed to international political and economic environ-
ment. Hence, security in a broad sense is a particularly
relevant aspect in the domain of regional integration. In
its link with economy, security is pursued through such
measures as .the collective economic-security arrangement of
the trade and investment diversification policy to reduce
economic dependence on a particular industrial country. In
an ordinary political sense, the security-seeking measure
includes not only traditional alliance formation but also
common regional policy vis-a-vis destabilizing oppositions and
guerillas.
Thus, the comprehensiveness of the orientation toward
regional integration is perhaps more important for the inte-
gration effort in the developing world than in the developed
world.
The Appropriateness of the Organizational Characteristics
The mutual commitment to the comprehensive orientation
toward regional integration is relatively easy compared with
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the mutual commitment to the implementation of such orientations.
The organization with centralized power, with specific goals
and programs, and with efficient machinery will carry out a
high level of integration efforts at a rapid pace. In fact,
a powerful, efficient organization may be precisely needed by
some industrialized countries to integrate their economies.
Moreover, for those countries with a long history of indepen-
dence and international relations, more than one organization
exist for carrying different orientations in the forms of an
organizational division of labor.
A powerful, efficient organization could eventually suc-
ceed in achieving goals if the burden it imposes to its parti-
cipants can be borne by them for a long period. It is a big
"if" particularly for new states in the developing world.
Several types of organizational characteristics are perceived
as the burden by the participants.
Most widely recognized burden is the degree of the centra-
lization of power. Supranational organizations have been
disliked by sovereign states. Even at the inter-governmental
level, the higher is the ladder of the power structure (Table
2.1), the more reluctant is the participant to be involved. It
is particularly so for sovereignty-conscious new states.
Similarly, the mode of operational code for a regional organ-
ization can be burdensome. The fear of the infringement of
sovereign right has always added a kind of escape clause in
the institutionalized collective decision-making. Despite its
probably inefficiency and possible impasse, the consensus rule
has been preferred not only in diplomatic negotiations but also
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in regional cooperation. Like diplomacy, an informal style
of consensus-building may be needed prior to making formal
decisions according to the unanimity rule. Moreover, the
specific goal can be burdensome, too. For less-experienced
new states in the developing world, or relatively vulnerable
countries in international political and economic environment,
the specification of explicit goals tends to be excessively
rigid. Instead, such countries need more flexible goals to
start and enhance integration efforts collectively. They must
adapt their own organization smoothly to changing international
environments. For this purpose, goal definition and redefini-
tion must be flexibly carried out.
Although smooth adaptation seems conflicting with the
less efficient consensus-based organization, both needs should
be pursued however difficult. Contrary to the neofunctional
argument, the continuously politicized organization seems most
appropriate to carry out such difficult tasks. In short,
efficient and powerful organization may be appropriate for
industrial countreis, they are not so for developing countries.
The Reinforcing Mechanism of the Organizational Performance
The successful implementation of integration efforts
largely depends on the performance of the organization, which
is in turn, whether supranational or intergovernmental, depen-
dent upon the fim commitment of the participants. Not only
passive consent but active involvement is necessary to succeed
in integration efforts. If an ambitious goal is set, the
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the remaining task is how to achieve it. On the other hand,
if the goal is not well spcified and open to the future agree-
ment, and if the organizational power is decentralized, the
successful integrative process must involve a certain mecha-
nism of reinforcing the participant's commitment and the or-
ganizational repertoirmof integrative programs. In other words,
the organizational performance should be positively fed back
to the commitment of the participants to further materializa-
tion of the orientation toward regional integration.
Provided that a group of countries in the developing world
share a comprehensive orientation toward regional integration
and they created a politicized, decentralized organization
with less formal and less specific goals and programs, what
type of "positive feed-back" mechanism is needed to generate
a successful integrative process? It must be goal-finding and
program-:{inding, rather than problem-solving for assigned
goals .3
The experience of ASEAN suggests one example of such a
mechanism. When the organizational performance is started low
for some reasons, the participants initial expectation must
be low too. The frustraion of participants due to the gap
between high expectations and low performance seems a condu-
cive factor oi not integrative but disintegrative process.
They tend to lessen, rather than enhance, their commitment to
the integration effort in question. Especially at the initial
stage, the balance between the participants' expectation and
the organizational performance seems crucial; perhaps, even
the "surplus" of the performance against the expectation is
desirable.
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The balanced or surplus performance against the expec-
tation will induce a slight, but not negligable, increase in
the participants' commitment to and expectation of their organ-
ization. Moreover, communication and understanding among
the participants will gradually increase so as to enable to
bear together the burden of more efficient organization in
the future. Encouraged by a satisfactory performance, the
participants become more confident of the viability and util-
ity of their own organization, and make more commitment to it.
In turn, supported by larger endorsement, the organization
becomes more able to carry our difficult tasks. In short,
the reinforcing mechanism if realized by, in the case of ASEAN
at least, participants' satisfaction-commitment link under the
initial condition of the low expectation vis-a-vis the organ-
izational performance.
It is yet an open question if other types of relationships
between participants and their organizations involve essen-
tially the same reinforcing mechanism. Nevertheless, the
experience of ASEAN reveals that there is at least one type that
is applicable to decentralized, loosely-structured organiza-
tion. The organization appropriate to the developing world can
realize an expansive logic of regional integration.
A Simplified Judgemental Model of the Future Prospect
The perspective of regional integration in this work is
a perspective, not a theory or model. It is not constructed
to explain and/or predict the (dis-)integrative process or
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the consequence of integration efforts. Nevertheless, the
preceeding argument suggests that variables in the perspective
constitute a structure of interrelationship that provide an
explanation to predict the future prospect of regional integra-
tion efforts. In other words, it contairnSthe structural
general reasoning that can be reformulated in the ferm of a
more explicit model.
The model I am trying to construct is a judgemental flow
chart model. A judgemental model cannot describe the dynamic
process, but can provide a long-term consequence of the
process. This type of model is especially appropriate when
the available information is insufficient to formulate a
quantitative interrelationship among variables.5 .
The variable to be explained is the future prospect of
the given integration effort (FP). In fact, it is a set of
aspects describing the process: the probable direction -
integrative/disintegrative; the probable pace - fast/slow;
the probable disturbaces -- smooth/problematical; etc.
Many aspects being taken into account, the future prospect
will be categorized in this model into likely, problematical,
and unlikely. Although it can be differentiated much further,
the trichotomized prospect at least suffice the judgement of
integration efforts in the long run.
Independent variable5can be also identified by the radi-
cal simplification of the conditions of prospective integra-
tion process. At least, seven essential variablesshould be
included in the model. They are as follows:
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1. the comprehensiveness of the orientation toward
integration (CO)
2. the capability of the participants of bearing the
organizational burden (CP),
3. the organizational burden of the participants (OB),
4. the appropriateness of the organizational structure
(AS),
5. the participants's expectation toward their own
organization (EO),
6. the performance of the organization (PO)
7. the satisfaction of the participants with respect to
the organizational performance (SP).
The substantial meaning of each variable and its role in
the perspective of regional integration has been already pro-
vided above. It should be noted that each variable is highly
abstracted, and that the relationship among variablesis skeletal,
if not oversimplified. In terms of the direction of influence,
the relationship of independent variableswith one another
and with the dependentvariable can be summarized as shown in
Figure 7.1. The simplified judgemental prediction or esti-
mation of the dependent variable is conducted according to
the flow chart shown in Figure 7.2.
According to this model, the judgement on the future
prospect is not fatalistic. Becasue the independent variables
are all changeable in the course of the integration effort
and the organizational reform, the result of judgement are
also changable from time to time. In other words, this
judgemental model could be transformed into a dynamic process
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model by involving the participants' collective decision to
change the orientation toward integration or organizational
structure or both as well as feed-back loops among some
relevant variables.
Toward an Epigenetic Model
The dynamic process of the abovementioned organizational
development can be understood,as mentioned in Section 2.3,
from the epigenetic viewpoint. The idea of epigenesis has
long been accepted as one of the premises of the development
of organism and evolution of species, or ontogeny and
phylogeny. But it has not been well understood in the
social science literature perhaps because of the past mal-
applications of biological thoughts to social systems, such
as the social Darwinsim. As Etzioni (1963) attempted,
however, the application of the idea of epigenesis is worth-
while in order to understand the development of society or
organization.
In the new perspective of regional integration, the
epigenetic modelling needs (1) the potential capability,
(2) the mechanism that can transform the potential into the
actual, and (3) the internal and external conditions that
activate the transformational mechanism. The domain of regional
integration and the organizational characteristics would espe-
cially.serve the specification of the above first and
second prerequisites. To specify the third one, the shared
orientation toward integration and the mutually responsive
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inter-participant relationship would be crucial factors, but
more comapative analyses are needed to postulate the activa-
ting conditions in general.
7.3. A Brief Comparative Assessment of Regional Integration
Theories in the light of ASEAN
At the beginning of this work, I pointed out the insuf-
ficiency of existing regional integration theories to analyze
the practice, that in the developing world in .pabticular.
Is the new perspective I proposed as an alternative sufficient
enough to replace earlier theories? In the light of ASEAN's
experience, the applied perspective will be compared with the
Deutschean communication theory and neofunctional theory in
this section.
To examine the relative validity of each theory, two
contrasting situations will be used: 1967-70 and 177-80. The
former period corresponds to the creation of ASEAN, and the
latter, ten years later, its substantial economic integration.
In-between the Association experienced extensive transforma-
tion. Because both cybernetic and neofunctional theories con-
cern the backgound, the initiation of integration, and the
process (dis-)integrative, it seems most sensible to choose the
situation of ASEAN during 1967-70 when it was created and
started to work. On the other hand, because neofunctional
theory primarily conerns economic union or common market, it:
may be unfair to evaluate the theory in ASEAN's initial period.
But it seems applicable to ASEAN's second decade.
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ASEAN AND Communication Theory
From their extensive research on historical cases, Deutsch
and his associate (1957) identified background conditions that
seem essential for successful integration to build and maintain
a security-community. For the the pluralistic security-community,
they found three essential, and thirteen helpful. The exis-
tence or absence of those sixteen n, background conditions are
judged by myself with respect to ASEAN's 1967-70 and 177-80
(Table 7.1)
The result is interesting. While conditions were very
unfavorable for integration ASEAN's initial years, they changed
relatively favorable ten years later. Why and how did
this change take place? According to the theory, the process
of movement toward pluralistic security-community is subtle.7
The process conditions also changed favorable (Table 7.1). In
other words, ASEAN in the period 1977-80 seemed to move pro-
misingly toward a security-community. However, the profile
was dim in the period 1967-70; the background conditions were
poor, and the process conditions were weak.
The Deutschen cybernetic theory cannot explain the change
in ASEAN during its first decade although it did grasp the
occurance of change. The theory must miss some important
conditions, whether background or process.
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Table 7.1. The Assessment of ASEAN According to the
Deutschean Social Communication Theory
The Conditions of Integration toward Assessment***
a Pluralistic Security-Community 1967-70 1977-80
Essential Background Conditions*
1. mutual compatibility of major values Y Y
2. mutual governmental responsiveness N Y
3. mutual predictability of behavior N Y
Helpful Background Conditions*
4. distinctive way of life N N
5. superior economic growth N Y
6. expected economic ties and gains N Y
7. broadening elite N N
8. unbroken communication links N N
9. multiple ranges of communication N N
10. interchanging group roles N Y
11. compensation of communication/transaction N N
12. mobility of people N Y
13. reluctance to wage wars N Y
14. outside military threat Y Y
15. strong economic ties N N
16. ethnic and linguistic assimilation N N
Process Conditions**
1. increasing unattractiveness of war Y Y
2. intellectual movements N Y
3. traditions preparing for integrative N N
ground
Notes: *(Deutsch et al. 1957: 46-59; 154-159). **(Deutsch
et al. 1957: 115-116). ***Y and N indicate the existence
and absence, respectively, of each condition.
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ASEAN and Neofunctional Theory
Admitting that integrative causal processes are complex,
Haas and Schmitter (1964), the most elloquent advocates of
neofunctional theory in the 1960's proposed a judgemental table
of nine "pattern variables." Several years after, three var-
iables were added to the table so as th respond to the criti-
cism that external factors had been ignored. Altogether,
twelve variables were classified into the background conditions,
conditions at the time of economic union, and the process
conditions. While being compared with their evaluation on
EEC, EFTA, LAFTA, CACM and Comecon , each condition. in the
case of ASEAN was judged by myself. The measure of judgement
was the earlier high/mixed/low scale to avoid the deceptive
precision (Table 7.2).
In comparison with EEC on the one extreme and African
cases on the other, ASEAN's position was more or less unchanging
despite recognizable changes in various variables. As a whole,
both ASEAN in the late 1960's and that in the late 1970's
were by and large comparable with LAFTA in the early 1960's.
In their comparable framework, the development of ASEAN in its
first decade was undiscernible, and hence unexplainable.
However, invariably high marks on the external factors
were indicative of ASEAN's activities vis-a-vis extra-regional
actors and problems. According to (revised) neofunctional
theory, ASEAN must be regarded as an externally driven organ-
ization, which is partly true but misses more fundamental
features of ASEAN as community-seeking framework.
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Table 7.2. The Assessment of ASEAN According to
Neofunctional Theory
Favorable Conditions toward
Integration through Spill-Overs 1
Background Conditions*
1. homogeneous size of economic units
2. high rate of transaction
3. extensive pluralism
4. elite value complementarity
5. external economic dependence**
total judgement
Conditions at Time of Economic Union*
6. government purpose of integration
7. external pressure (meaning dependence)**
8. power of union
total judgement
Process Conditions*.
9. decision-making style
10. high rate of transaction
11. adaptability of government
12. external pressure (meaning dependence)**
total judgement
Assessment***
967-70 1977-80
Notes: *(Haas and Schmitter 1964) and (Barrara and Haas 1969).
**Conditions added in (Barrara and Haas 1969). ***L, M and H
indicate Low, Mixed or Medium, and High, respectively.
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Compared with cybernetic theory, neofunctional theory was
explicit in postulating the integrative process. That is, need-
less to say, the spill-over. ASEAN's expanseve development
in the domain of regional integration looks very similar to
the spill-over phenomenon. In short, the neofunctional
notion of spill-over is a crisis-induced and dissatisfaction-
motivated technocratic initiative to overcome obstacles for
the pursuit of the goal specified in advance. On the contrary,
in the case of ASEAN, the spill-over occured as a result of
the satisfaction-motivated political deliberations to find
new feasible goals to pursue. In this sense, the observation
of West European experience by Deutsch (1962) and Lindberg and
Scheingold (1970) was quite compatible with my observation of
ASEAN in the sense the neofunctional logic of spill-over
played a very minor role at best.
ASEAN and a New Perspective
In comparison with the above two theories, the new pers-
pective is relatively simple in terms of conditions for success-
ful integration. Unlike them, however, this perspective
postulates a structural relationship between conditions.
ASEAN's experience can be summarized, through abstraction, into
the set of scored for conditions (Table 7.3). Based on it,
one can follow the diagramatical model (Figure 7.2) to obtain
the assessment of ASEAN.
In its initial few years, according to the assessment,
ASEAN had appropriate organizational characteristics to meet
the situations that its participant countries were faced with.
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Table 7.3. The Assessment of ASEAN According to the
New Perspective*
Independent Variables 1
1. comprehensiveness of shared orientation
2. capability of participants
gap 3. organizational burden on partici-
pants
4. appropriateness of organization
'5. expectation toward organization
ga: 6. organization's performance
7. satisfaction on performance
Dependent Variable
8. future prospect of integration i
Assessment**
967-70 1977-80
H H
L M
L M
ikely Likely
Notes: *The assessment is based on the simplified judgemental
model proposed in Section 7.2. **Variables 4 and 7 are
measured in the scale of -, 0, and +. The other variables
are in the scale of L(ow), M(edium) and H(igh). Note that
H does not necessarily mean that the variable in question
favorably affects the future prospect by itself.
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ASEAN seemed to work slowly, but still promisingly. In the
late 1970's, ASEAN was more comprhensive in the orientation,
and evolved organizationally. The change in ASEAN in its
first decade may be explained by the reinforcing mechanism of
balancing growth of expectation and performance.
Admittedly, the dynamic process of regional integration
efforts was not spedific enough to stimulate quantitatively.
Nevertheless, the domain of regional integration and the
organizational characteristics provide some crucial explana-
tory and predictive conditions. The new perspective seems to
have a higher theoretical utility than the above two theories
at least in the case of ASEAN.
7.4. The Applicability of a New Perspective
EEC in the New Perspective
The most successful regional integration after World War
II is, without doubt, the experience of West European
countries that today comprise the European Community (EC).
If the argument in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 is correct, how does
this theoretical postulate fit the case of Western Europe? The
development of EEC, the far-reaching success of regional inte-
gration, should be satisfactorily explained by the new perspec-
tive, if it can be claimed as useful in general.
In order to compare Western Europe with the ASEAN region,
one should go back to Worl War II. The war destroyed Europe
and left countries much weaker than the United States or the
Soviet Union. In 1945, there were neither victors nor losers.
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Even if Germany, the new governments, both West and East,were
against the former ruling Nazis. The new, v•lest d-erman Oemo-
cratic regime was very much compatible with French and other
Western European counterparts. It is a well-known fact the
ECSC was proposed for the purpose of creating a peaceful
community of Western Europe. Thus, by the end of the 1940's,
those countries which would form EEC were in much common to
pursue the establishment of community.
In international economic scene, Western Europe was per-
ipheral to cthe extent that it depended totally on American
economy. The former desparately needed aid from the latter.
OEEC was established in 1948 as a regional entity to receive
American aid. In short, Western European Countries shared
common situations and outlook on the extra-regional economy.
Similarly, they shared the common enemy of communism
led by the Soviet Union. They failed to create a genuine
regional body for common defense, i.e., the plan of European
Defense Community. Nevertheless, important was the fact that
extra-regional security was provided in the framework of NATO.
While NATO did not enhance the sense of community among all
the members, Western European countries which had already raised
the sense of community were considerably supported by the
security provided by NATO.
Within the framework of NATO and OEEC,Western European
countries rehabilitated their economies. Ihtra-regional trade
had already shown a considerable increase prior to the crea-
tion of EEC. Industrialists and businessnen were established
transnational collaborative networks in the continent. EEC
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was created in 1957 on the already existing basis of regional
market economy. It is evident that, since EEC was formed,
intra-regional trade further was enhanced. Neveirtheless, it
cannot be said that EEC created the potential of regional trans-
actions; at best, it significantly reduced the barrier which
had prevented transforming the potential into the actual flow.
Based upon the above very brief narrative of the exper-
ience of Western Europe up to the formation of EEC, a striking
correspondence of the case of Western Europe with that of ASEAN
can be pointed out. The Table 7.4 must be self-explanatory,
For our purposes of discussion, important points
are as follows. In the first place, the orientation toward
regional economy through economic integration was preceded by
the orientation toward community and security. Second, the
orientation toward community including intra-regional
security seem to have started to take off first, then the orien-
tation toward extra-regional security followed. Third, to
directly compare ASEAN to EEC has been irrelevant. If relevant,
perhaps ASEAN's economic cooperation since 1977 will turn out
appropriate to compare to the earlier stage of EEC. Fourth,
if the neofunctional theory is applicable to EEC, then will
be possibly applicable to the current economic activitie& of
ASEAN, but certainly not to the entire ASEAN.
The neofunctional theory misled, I regrettably conclude,
many integrative attempts in the developing countries to
provide a seemingly applicable and promising model to them.
The development of ASEAN illustrated the excessively narrow
perspective of neofunctional theory and the necessity to take
Table 7.4. EEC and ASEAN in Comparison
The Comparable Point
destructive intra.-
regional conflict
Political Change in
the hostile country
perception of power-
lessness
community-building as
the eventual goal
common external threat
common defense
"periphery" of world
economy
need for commitment
by "center"
common external
economic relations
The EEC Countries
World War II (1939-45)
Nazi to Democratic Germany
(1945-50)
vis-a-vis USA and USSR
The ASEAN Countries
the Confrontation (1963-66)
pro-communist Sukarno to pro-Western
Suharto Indonesia (1965-66)
vis-a-vis international environment
in general
Schuman Plan (1950) followed the formation of ASEAN (1967)
by the formation of ECSC(1951)
USSR
NATO
destroyed economy, inferior
to American economy
need for aid and investment
from USA
the formation of OEEC(1948)
economic interdependence increase in intra-regional
trade in the 1950's
pluralistic association spontaneous formation of
transnational associations
and commercial networks
in the 1950's
China; later also Vietnam
no military alliance, but common
political outlook
economic dependence upon the
industrial world
need for aid and investment from
the industrial world
formal dialogues and fora with Japan,
Australia, etc. (1973- )
increase in intra-regional trade
(1974- )
government-encouraged formation of
transnational associations and
commercial networks (1971- )
0 0 00 0 0
Table 7.4. EEC and ASEAN in Comparison (Continued)
The Comparable Point
high political
commitment to economic
integration
institutionalization
of economic integration
The EEC Countries
the Massina Conference of
foreign ministers (1955)
the Treaty of Rome (1957)
The ASEAN Countries
the 7th annual meeting of ASEAN
foreign ministers (1974)
the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential
Trading Arrangements (1977)
0 0
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into account the orientation toward community. If ASEAN
provides the developing world with any relevant model, it
must be an externally-responsive community-building attempt
model.
A Brief Assessment of Some Regional Integration Attempts in
the Developing World
Despite their striking resemblance, there are radical
differences between the EEC region and the ASEAN region. The
latter is sharply distinguished from the former by continued
external economic dependence, weak political and economic
bases of national development and the vulnerability vis-a-vis
international environment. For regions like ASEAN, the comp-
rehensive integrative orientation and the light organizational
burden is especially needed for a successful regional integra-
tion in the long run.
It is worthwhile to check if incomprehensive_ orienta-
tion toward integration and/or the heavy organizational burden
can explain failed integration efforts in the developing world.
First of all, the failed attempts to maintain a regional
community in British East Africa through EACSO and EAC seem
to provide typical examples of how the orientation toward
community is absolutely necessary for countries to realize
and/or maintain integration.
Compared with the , East African case, ACM and RCD may be
regarded as relatively successful cases temporarily although
both organizations failed to carry out integration efforts
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eventually. These two attempts were obviously based on the
orientation toward external security because ACM and RCD were
"derived from" the Arab League and CENTO, respectively. Through-
out integrative attempts, the orientation toward community
continued to be weak in both cases. They taught us the impor-
tance of the mutual compatibility of basic values.
When LAFTA and CACM started to work in the early 1960's,
both regions, the latter in particular, were oriented compre-
hensively toward not only economy but also community and secur-
ity. Both were within OAS, and the CACM countries had created
ODECA. In their initial years, both LAFTA and CACM revealed
a smooth integrative process but until they found deadlocked
in dealing with intra-regional conflicts" over the share of
benefits and integration. Both organizations were faced with
crisis in the late 1960's. Consequently, ANCOM was formed
within the LAFTA region, and the temporary withdrawal of
Hodurasand Costa Rica from CACM.10  In both cases, the goal,
program and schedule were very specific, and disagreements in
the course of integratioh process generated organizational
crises. Neither the LAFTA countries nor the CACM countries
were capable of solving their own intra-regional conflicts
caused by integration. The organizational burden was too heavy
for them to keep bearing for the further integration attempts.
In this sense, the relaxation of the burden by changing the
goal via structural reformation from LAFTA to ALADI in 1980
is very suggestive.
Special attention was paid to ANCOM because of its
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externally oriented regional economic integration efforts.11
By the mid 1970's, ANCOM had been faced with the same problem
as LAFTA and CACM, i.e., the slow down of the integrative
process due to increasing intra-regional conflict over the
process. Even the withdrawal of Chile in 1976 was caused not
by the military coup but its conflict with Peru over economic
policies. Thus, the organizational burden of ambitious goals
was borne in the first few years, but it became intolerable
for some participants. However, the resentment vis-a-vis
Bolivia's military regime felt by the other participants and
the border conflict between Peru and Equador suggest that the
orientation toward community may not be strong enough to carry
out concrete economic integrative programs. As ASEAN in its
initial few years indicates, as long as the orientation toward
community is kept sharing, conflict resolution and further
integration is possible in the long run.
7.5. Regional Integration in the Developing World
Some Lessons from ASEAN's Success
Truly ASEAN is faced with various obstacles to further
regional integration such as its participants' different
preference conerning the pace and coverage of economic inte-
gration, and different perceptions of external threats. Among
the ASEAN countries, mutual distrust has not been yet completely
wiped out. Nevertheless, during the past fifteen years, they
accomplished a wide range of regional cooperation and inte-
gration practices. Such accomplishments, which are certainly
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a much lower level of integration compared with the EC, was
made possible by the ASEAN countries' shared commitment toward
a peaceful community. The case of ASEAN strongly suggests that
a group of developing countries should be aware of the crucial
importance of the orientation toward regional community if
they seriously want to succeed in regional integration.
In the case of ASEAN, the shared orientation toward
community encouraged its participants to establish the
practice of their foreign policy coordination vis-a-vis the
outside world. The sphere of coordinated policies ranges from
ASEAN's relations with Indochina's communist countries to its
pursuit of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the
UNCTAD. The ASEAN countries have not reached consensus on all
the major regional foreign policy issues, e.g., mutual military
security arrangement. Not all coordinated policies resulted
in success. Nonetheless, limited success in their coordina-
tion reinforced their commitment to further orientation toward
community. As the ASEAN countries have tried, a .groupof
developing countries should find issues on which they can
cooperatire, and should not fruitlessly spend their time and
energy in discussions and debates. of issues difficult to
reach agreement. For those developing countries which are
vulnerable vis-a-vis external political and economic environ-
ment, the promising sphere of coordination inculdes collective
economic-security arrangements to reduce excessive dependence
and trade and investment diversification prolicies.
As every economic integration effort has experienced, intra-
regional cooperation toward integration becomes inevitably
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faced with various types of intra-regional conflicts derived
from the implementation of integrative programs. The ASEAN
governments were skeptical of regional economic integration,
and until recently they had not even attempted to integrate
their economies regionally. It was wise for them to postpone
the concretization of regional economic integration programs
until they became confident of ASEAN's.viability .and mutual
commitment to the pQganization althcough they had been urged
toward the implementation of economic integration programs by,
for instance, a United Nations research team. The experience
of ASEAN gives a warning, if not disappointing,signal that
a group of developing countries should not start regional
economic integration programs until they feel they are at
least psychologically integrated enough to resolve intra-
regional conflicts which will sooner or later take place as
integration programs are being implemented.
Organizationally, ASEAN is an intergovernmental organi-
zation with a very weak central secretariat, not to mention
a supranational body. If probably efficient, a supranatural
organization is difficult for developing countries to create
and operate successfully because of their individual sovereignty-
consciousness. In the case of ASEAN in particular, the organi-
zation was created with its vague goal, and later was provided
its more concrete objectives and programs. For such an organ-
ization to work, its participants need to commit themselves
seriously to the organization. The highest decision-making
body of the organization should be at the ministerial level.
With respect to the collective decision-making, the ASEAN
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countries have practiced a consensus-building approach, a
socalled "the ASEAN spirit." Its catchword, mushawarah-
mufakat, is a Malay word, and hence may be culturally bound.1 2
However, the custom of consensus-building is not a peculiar
practice in Asian cultures. Informal caucusing, spadeworks
or oiling are prevalent in every culture. In diplomatic rela-
tions, consensus-building is pursued, too. To operate the
organization flexibly, the decision-making through consensus
in the course of integration efforts may be more practical
than the imlementation of a particular goal decided in advance.
The New Perspective and the Developing World: Some Implications
According to the new perspective of regional integration,
the comprehensiveness of the orientation toward integration is
a crucial factor of successful integration. Particularly, the
orientation toward community must come first. For developing
countries, new states in particular, their limited experiences
to deal with their neighbors make difficult for them to share
the orientation toward community. However difficult, it is
necessary for them to realize the importance of the orienta-
tion toward community if they want not merely a remporary
coalition or alliance vis-a-vis a particular common problem,
but a more or less lasting peaceful community that may or may
not integrate their economy.
If a group of developing countries plan to create a
regional economy through integration, they should be sure that
they share a common orientation toward community before start-
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ing concrete programs. When the compatible differences in the
implementation of integration programs become politicized,
the shared orientation toward community makes the participants
seriously try to resolve those intra-regional conflicts.
According to the new perspective, the organizational
structure seemilnly desirable to efficiently implement
regional integration efforts is not suitable for developing
countries. In other words, specific goals, well designed
programs and time table, a strong central machinery to carry
out integration efforts, and the participants' prior commit-
ment to the joint endeavor in question are too heavy a burden
for the fragile and vulnerable developing countries to bear
for a long period. The desirable organizational structure is,
therefore, counterintuitively equipped with a weak central
machinery if in existence. If they may look trivial, concrete
goals and programs should be, at least in the initi2l years,
those which will be accomplished without difficulties.
Such an organization cannot implement its tasks efficiently.
Therefore,its participants should not expect a high level of
accomlishment by the organization. It is important for the
participant countries to keep their expectation toward their
organization at a low level. It is improbable for the govern-
ments of developing countries to make little commitment to a
strongly regional organization and to obtain benefits from it.
The balanced gradual increase in both the commitment to and the
expectation toward the organization seems an appropriate process
of lasting and successful integration efforts in the developing
world.
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Utilities of an ASEAN Model in the New Perspective
If ASEAN's experience is applicable to developing
countries, the disadvantage that an ASEAN model has shculd be
well aware of. The integrative process is inevitably slow,
if in progress. It depends upon the participants' joint
initiative to transform their potential orientation toward
integration into actual goals and programs. They should be
patient enough to wait until consensus is reached in terms of
each important issue.
On the other hand, neofunctional models and many integra-
tive practices in the developing world are aimed at a fast
integration process with specific goals and programs. This
type seemed more promising than an ASEAN model. However, many
promising practices turned out to be failures. There is a choice
between a high reward with a high risk and a low risk with a
low. reward. In the short run, the former may bring a success-
ful integration. In the long run, however, the latter seems
more durable. ASEAN's case to date well represents regional
integration with a low risk and a low reward. If low compared
with EEC's, ASEAN's reward has been certainly attractive for
its participants. It seems worthwhile for developing countries
to consider the desirability and possibility of a type of
integration efforts that the ASEAN countries have been engaged.
Countries in the developing world are more of less vulnera-
able against international political and economic environments,
and , have- insufficient capability to control environments.
Hence, their survival and development depends on successful
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adaptation to environments. As a regional group, developing
countries may Tot want to unify their sovereign states into
one political union, but may be able to adapt themselves
collectively to international environments according to an
ASEAN model. A shared orientation toward a security-community
and a flexible and responsive concretization seems a promising
strategy for developing countries to succeed in their collec-
tive adaptation.
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Notes for Chapter 7
1. See (Weinstein 1976) for the country's dilemma between
development and dependence.
2. ASPAC consisted of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.
It was formed in 1966 by the initiative of South Korea,
and lost its raison d'^tre in the early 1970's due to
the Sino-American rapprochement.
3. Undoubtedly, more than one type of the interrelationship
between the organization and its participants suffice
such a mechanism. The neofunctional notion of spill-
over is one of them. It postulates an expansive logic
of regional integration practice. However, its assump-
tions are not applicable to the situation assumed here.
One needs something else.
4. See (Alker 1971) for various types of regional inte-
gration models, and their advantages and disadvantages.
5. For similar reasons, Haas and Schnitter (1964) proposed
a judgemental model based on "pattern variables."
6. (Deutsh et al. 1957: 65-69; 154-159)
7. (ibd.: 115-116)
8. (Barrera and Haas 1969)
9. (Haas and Schmitter 1964: 720; Barrera and Haas 1969:
153-154)
10. Regional economic integration resulted in the increased
dependence upon external economies (Schmitter 1972), but
CACM had to experience crisis not because of high external
dependence, but its inability to solve intra-regional
conflicts caused by the integration in itself.
11. (Mytelka 1979)
12. Etymologically, both "mushawarah" and "mufakat" can be
easily traced back to Arabic. However, they are applied
to the traditional Malay, especially Indonesian, political
custom in the village life. They became a slogan of
national politics during the period of Sukarno's guided
democracy in the late 1950's.
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